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ABSTRACT
This study addressed special education costs and equity of special education 
per-pupil revenues among Louisiana’s sixty-six school districts. Actual data from 1980 
to 1992 were examined and four special education finance models were developed.
Average annual rates of increase in mean per-pupil revenues for regular 
education and special education were examined to determine the increase in cost of 
special education versus regular education. Findings indicated special education per- 
pupil revenues increased at four times the rate of regular education per-pupil revenues 
for the period examined.
Special education per-pupil revenues were examined to determine whether or 
not per-pupil revenue disparities increased or decreased. The Range (R), Standard 
Deviation (SD), Coefficient of Variation (CV), Federal Range Ratio (FRR), and 
McLoone Index (MI), indicated increased disparity in special education per-pupil 
revenues from 1980 to 1992. These measures also indicated the largest increases in 
per-pupil revenue disparity occurred from 1990 to 1992. During this period, Louisiana 
utilized a “placeholder” formula until a new formula could be developed.
Four special education finance models were developed which used pupil 
weighting schemes and addressed equity issues in regard to special education costs, 
per-pupil revenues, and amount of per-pupil revenue for mild and severe disabilities.
Findings in regard to equity were mixed according to the perspective of the 
measure used. All measures with the exception of the McLoone Index indicated one
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
weight not linked to local effort to be the most equitable model. The McLoone Index 
indicated two weights decreased per-pupil revenue disparity in the lower half of the 
distribution.
Relationships between district fiscal capacity, special education enrollments, and 
special education per-pupil revenues were examined. Two alternative definitions of 
district fiscal capacity were used. When district fiscal capacity was defined using per- 
capita income, relationships were noted among all variables in 1992. When district 
fiscal capacity was defined using the Representative Tax System Index which Louisiana 
now uses, relationships between these variables no longer existed.
Finally, enrollments of five mild disabilities were examined. Large enrollment 
increases in all disabilities were noted with the exception of Speech Impaired. Findings 
indicated lack of clarity in the definition of disabilities coupled with many different 
interpretations of these definitions contributed to considerable variability in enrollments 
across districts.
XI
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
Many states have attempted to reform their educational finance systems in 
recent years. These reform efforts have been prompted by a number of factors, 
including increased accountability, improved performance, and taxpayer revolt. At 
the same time, considerable attention has been focused on special education. Current 
levels of special education reform across the nation are possibly at their highest point 
since the Education For All Handicapped Act was passed in 1975, commonly known 
as Public Law (P.L.) 94-142. The name of this legislation was changed in 1990 to the 
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). While most of the original act 
remains intact, several new provisions have been added, broadening the scope of the 
law (Anthony, 1992).
Recently, many states have been moving toward reform of their special 
education finance systems. Of the fifty states, forty-four states either are taking 
action or are considering taking action regarding their special education finance 
systems. Twenty seven states are currently considering reform of their special 
education systems. Seventeen states have implemented special education finance 
reform in the last five years. Seven states have implemented special education finance 
reform in the last five years and are considering reform again. The state of Montana 
has passed reforms that are scheduled for implementation in the 1994-1995 school 
year. The state of Pennsylvania faced a $100 million deficit in special education
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
funding before reform (Parrish, 1993). A complete table of the reform activities of the 
fifty states may be found in appendix A.
Two issues driving special education reform are those of per-pupil revenue 
disparity and over-identification of special education students. Average per-pupil 
revenues in special education among the states in the 1986-1987 school year ranged 
from a low of $1,568 in the state of Arkansas to a high of $10,613 in the state of New 
York. Over-identification means that there may be students enrolled in the special 
education program who in fact do not belong there. Special education enrollment 
percentages of states’ total education populations recently ranged from 6.23% in 
Oregon to 17.07% in Massachusetts (Verstegen & Cox, 1990). Many of the 
financing strategies currently used by states encourage over-identification to some 
degree because state dollars are allocated according to the number of students or in 
some cases, teachers in the local district (McLaughlin & Owings, 1993; Parrish,
1993). In Montana, reform was precipitated by a projection made in the mid-1980’s 
that the current rate of growth would lead to every student in the state being enrolled 
in special education by 1994. Pennsylvania experienced a twenty percent decline in 
special education enrollment when the tie between funding and student enrollment 
was discontinued (Parrish, 1993). Louisiana is currently considering reform of its 
special education financing system and also faces the issues of equity in the area of 
per-pupil revenue disparity among its sixty-six local districts, as well as issues of 
definition of some of the milder disabilities.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Background of the Problem
In 1975, in extensive hearings to extend and amend the Education of the 
Handicapped Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-380), testimony indicated that a large 
percentage of children with disabilities remained unserved or underserved across the 
states, often due to state financial constraints. The Bureau of Education for the 
Handicapped estimated that only half of the eight million children with disabilities 
were receiving an appropriate education (U.S. Senate, 1975, The Education of the 
Handicapped Act).
Passage of P.L. 94-142 in 1975 by the United States Congress guaranteed that 
children with disabilities would have access to a free, appropriate public education 
(FAPE), an individualized educational program (lEP), special education services, 
related services, due-process procedures, and placement in the least restrictive 
environment (Anthony, 1992). These guarantees are also present in the Individuals 
with Disabilities Act (IDEA) of 1990. Under IDEA, eligibility of students has 
become much more inclusive. Any child with “mental retardation, hearing 
impairments including deafness, speech or language impairments, visual impairments 
including blindness, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, 
traumatic brain injury, other health impairments or specific learning disabilities” is 
eligible for services (IDEA, 1990, sec. 1401 [a][l]).
All children with disabilities are afforded a free appropriate public education.
A decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1982 interpreted appropriate to mean 
“access” to a free public education. This free education consists of specialized
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
services and instruction from which the student with disabilities derives educational 
“benefits ” (Board o f  Education o f the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. 
Rowley, 1982). Also, in the Rowley decision, the court defined benefit in terms of the 
child’s ability to progress effectively along the educational spectrum and cautioned 
that benefit did not mean maximizing a child’s full potential. The court did stipulate 
that the benefit derived could not be trivial.
An Individualized Education Program (IE?) must be provided to every child 
with disabilities. The DEP is developed in a meeting in which at least one parent of the 
student, the student’s teacher, and an administrator or representative of the school 
district are present. The program that is collaboratively written by this group must 
reflect the individual needs of the child, along with objectives and strategies for 
meeting those needs (Anthony, 1992). These objectives and strategies are reviewed 
yearly or whenever a placement change is being considered.
Special education services are defined as “specially designed instruction, at no 
cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of the child with a disability, 
including, (A) instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and 
institutions, and in other settings; and (B) instruction in physical education” (IDEA, 
1990, sec. 1401 [a][16][A][B]). Related services is defined as “transportation and 
such developmental, corrective and other supportive services... as may be required to 
assist a child with disabilities to benefit from special education” (IDEA, 1990, sec. 
1401 [a][17]). Some of these related services include speech pathology and 
audiology, psychological services, physical and occupational therapy, and social work
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
services. Any service that is defined as supportive, corrective, or developmental in 
nature is allowable under IDEA (Anthony, 1992).
The decision to evaluate a child suspected of having a disability sets in motion 
comprer ■ due process procedures. Such procedures include fair and 
nondis».. -i.iinatory evaluation procedures, notification of the child’s parents, and if 
necessary, disciplinary actions. Fair and nondiscriminatory evaluation procedures 
include the use of testing instruments that are not racially or culturally biased and that 
are administered in the child’s native language and mode of communication (Anthony, 
1992). IDEA also requires that more than one criterion be used to determine whether 
or not a student is in need of specialized services (IDEA, 1990, sec. 1412 [5][c]).
The child’s parents must be notified that an evaluation is taking place and when there 
is a change in the Individual Education Program (EEP). This notification must be 
written in the parents’ native language and be in understandable terms (IDEA, 1990, 
sec. 1415 [b][l][C][D]). Disciplinary actions for children with disabilities is one of the 
most controversial areas. According to a 1988 ruling in Honig v. Doe, no student 
with a disability can be excluded fi-om school for disciplinary reasons for a period of 
more than te-- :-vs. Although disciplinary measures involving lesser amounts of 
exclusion ti. ools are permissible, courts have ruled that students suspended for 
fewer than ten days still must be provided educational services {Kaelin v. Grubbs, 
1982; 5 - / V. Turlington, 1981).
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Education in the least restrictive environment has been central to this
legislation. To the maximum extent possible, students with disabilities must be
educated with children who are not handicapped. IDEA mandates that;
to the maximum extent appropriate, chiloren with disabilities, including 
children in public or private institutions or other care facilities, are educated 
with children who are not disabled, and that special classes, separate 
schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular 
educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the 
disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of 
supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily (IDEA, 
1990, sec. 1412 [5][B]).
Although the word never appears in the law or its implementing regulation, this
concept has come to be known popularly as “mainstreaming” (Hepner, & Crull,
1984).
IDEA also has a zero-reject policy, which means that no child with disabilities, 
no matter how severe, can be denied services {Timothy W v. Rochester School 
District, 1989). The principle of zero-reject rests squarely on the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution that no state may deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. As applied to handicapped children, and 
through a series of judicial interpretations, the Fourteenth Amendment has come to 
represent a principle that prevents governments from denying their benefits to persons 
because of certain unalterable characteristics (Turnbull & Fiedler, 1984). This 
principle of zero-reject has become a vehicle in which courts readdress the areas of 
education inequalit}' and discrimination.
Zero-reject has also revolutionized the relationship of parents and school 
officials by providing for nondiscriminatory evaluation, individualized appropriate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
education, and procedural due process (Turnbull, 1990). Parental participation in the 
education of their handicapped children has increased due to this principle. Under the 
principle of zero-reject, the 1990-1991 United States Congress sought input from the 
public concerning Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) being designated a category 
under IDEA. This category however, has yet to be included (Ordover & Boundy, 
1991). ADD is noted under the Learning Disability (LD) category in Louisiana’s 
Special Education Law (R.S. 17:1941 et seq. p. 103, [946]).
The effect of this legislation provided a vehicle to bring vast numbers of 
previously unserved students into the public education system. During the 1976-1977 
school year approximately 3 .7 million children received some type of special 
education service, and by 1987 that number had increased to 4.3 million (US 
Department of Education, Tenth Annual Report to Congress, 1988). Much of this 
growth has been attributed to the growth of the Learning Disability (LD) category. 
The LD category grew from twenty-one percent of all children with disabilities in 
1976 to forty-eight percent in 1989 (Finlan & Hartman, 1992). Approximately $2.1 
billion was spent on special education in 1976 (American Association of School 
Administrators, 1983). This amount increased 663% to $16 billion by 1986 (Finlan & 
Hartman, 1992). The revenue to fund special education is derived from federal, state, 
and local sources (Verstegen & Cox, 1992), with 92% of the costs borne by state and 
local agencies (Finlan & Hartman, 1992).
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The Federal Role
Federal legislation has had a major impact on the way states educate 
handicapped children. The federal government’s role with regard to financing has 
been secondary to that of the states and local districts. The method of financing 
under IDEA is a state grant-in aid program which requires participating states to 
furnish all children with disabilities a free, appropriate public education in the least 
restrictive setting (Parrish, 1993).
There are four grant-in-aid programs which operate under IDEA. Education 
of the Handicapped Part B (EHA-B) Grants constitute the primary source of federal 
revenues used to serve handicapped students aged three through twenty-one years of 
age (Anthony & Jones, 1990). Chapter I of Education Consolidation and 
Improvement Act Grants serve handicapped children birth through age twenty 
through state-level rather than local district programs (State Grants, Education of the 
Handicapped, 1989). EHA-B Preschool Incentive Grants came about when Congress 
amended the Education of the Handicapped Act by enacting the New Federal 
Preschool Program under P.L. 99-457 in 1986, which extended the frill protection to 
handicapped children ages three to five years (Anthony & Jones, 1990).
Also under P.L. 99-457, Education of the Handicapped, Part H (EHA-H) 
Childhood Intervention Grants came into being (Anthony & Jones, 1990). The 
purposes of the EHA-H Childhood Intervention Grants were to: 1) enhance the 
development of handicapped infants and toddlers and minimize their potential for 
developmental delay, 2) reduce the educational costs to our society by minimizing the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
need for special education services after handicapped infants and toddlers reach 
school age, 3) minimize the likelihood of institutionalization of handicapped 
individuals and maximize their potential for independent living in society and 4) 
enhance the capacity of families to meet the special needs of their infants and toddlers 
with handicaps (The Early Years, 1988).
In order to qualify for these federal funds, the state educational agency is 
required to submit an annual program plan setting out how it intends to provide 
education to handicapped children within the state. Details of this plan must include 
what services will be provided, what procedural safeguards will be in place to ensure 
that programming is being provided, and also a system for identifying, evaluating, and 
locating children in need of special education (Rothstein, 1990).
The amount of funding that states may receive if they comply with these 
guidelines is based on the number of handicapped children in the state, multiplied by 
the average per-pupil amount. States often set out a similar formula for local districts 
to be reimbursed from state funds. This funding mechanism is designed to provide 
support primarily at the local level. Seventy-five percent of the monies received from 
the federal government by the state goes directly to the local districts (Rothstein, 
1990).
While the states anticipated federal revenues to match the P.L. 94-142 
authorization levels, the actual appropriations have remained at a far lower level 
(Moore, Walker, & Holland, 1982). The federal government only provided 7.5% of 
all special education funds in 1987 (Verstegen & Cox, 1992). This discrepancy
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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between federal authorization and appropriation levels has caused considerable 
friction among federal, state, and local policymakers. The United States Department 
of Education can enforce its requirements by withholding funds from states that fail to 
assure compliance with the federal law (Rogers, 1993). From the perspectives of 
those who view the guarantees of IDEA as essential, the law is a civil rights mandate 
which incorporates the states’ own statutes and which needs to be implemented 
regardless of the level of federal funding.
The State-Local Role
The financial burden of this federal legislation for special education has been 
shouldered by the individual states. The National Association of State Directors of 
Special Education (NASDSE) reported in 1989 that 56.7% of the financial burden for 
special education was taken on by the states (NASDSE, 1989). In Louisiana, 70.6% 
of the financial burden was shouldered by the state in the 1986-1987 school year. 
Nationally, localities contributed approximately 36.5% of the revenues toward special 
education in 1986-1987. For the same year, Louisiana localities contributed 23.6%, 
much lower than the national average (Verstegen & Cox, 1992).
All fifty states provide funds to local school systems to help defray the costs 
of educating handicapped students. Each state has adopted one of several types of 
funding formulas specifically for special education. They are complex and often 
involve complicated interagency structures (O’Reilly, 1989), and are more than a 
computation of state aid (Moore, Walker, & Holland, 1982). These formulas
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encompass the mandated procedures, prorating provisions, administrative guidelines, 
and exceptions or exclusions that determine and regulate the allocation of funds to the 
district (Bernstein, Hartman, Kirst, & Marshall, 1976). Numerous constraints, 
regulations, and exceptions concerning the flow and use of state funds usually 
accompany the technical elements of a formula (Moore, Walker, & Holland, 1982).
Finance formulas not only technically compute financial resources available to 
districts from the state, but also convey important state policy choices about how 
handicapped students shall be educated (Moore, Walker, & Holland, 1982). They can 
affect the number and type of children served as handicapped, the type of programs 
and services provided by local school districts, the duration of time students spend in 
special education programs, the placement of students in various programs, class size 
and caseloads, as well as administrative processes. Moreover, funding mechanisms 
can be used to support state priorities and initiatives by earmarking funds for special 
activities, or instituting disincentives to discourage local districts from serving 
students in particular placements (O’Reilly, 1989).
Estimating the average state support for special education and related services 
has been problematic due to several factors. Such factors include states reporting 
budget goals rather than actual expenditures, states estimating special education 
transportation while other states do not and, states excluding revenues from general 
education programs or other state and federal sources. Trends noted in the funding of 
special education were increases in special education’s share of the total state revenue
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and positive annual growth rates in revenues allotted to special education. (Moore, 
Walker, & Holland, 1982).
Louisiana’s Current Funding Formula
Louisiana’s current method of financing special education is under review and 
the Louisiana Department of Education (LDE) anticipates that the formula will be 
changed to a one or two place weighting system. The system utilized at this time is 
defined as a percentage reimbursement, with the allocation of fiinds based on actual 
expenditures (Parrish, 1993). There are no weights according to classification of 
students utilized under the present formula. The amount of funds a district receives is 
directly related to the number of students enrolled in the special education program. 
The current process of allocation of funds is fairly straightforward.
The LDE possesses for each district the special education actual expenditures 
less capital outlay for the school year 1992-1993, the special education actual 
expenditures plus a two percent adjustment for inflation for the school year 1991- 
1992, the special education student membership for 1993-1994, the special education 
student membership for 1992 -1993, and the 1992-1993 average state cost per 
student. From these data, the formula allotment for special education per district is 
computed. The steps of calculating a districts’ special education allotment for 1993- 
1994 is computed using actual figures in order to make the methodology 
understandable.
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District A reports 1992-1993 special education actual expenditures less capital 
outlay ($16,326,315). This district also reports 1991-1992 actual special education 
expenditures plus the tw-o percent adjustment for inflation ($16,048,180). A 
reconciliation adjustment is calculated for the district ($16,326,315 - $16,048,180 = 
$278,315). The special education student membership for 1993-1994 and 1992-1993 
are reported by the district. The difference in this membership is computed ( 5405 - 
5353 = 52). This difference, called the Budget Adjustment is multiplied by the state 
average cost per student which was $3,393 for 1992 and 1993 ($3,393 X 52 = 
$176,438). Finally, the 1992-1993 actual number, the reconciliation adjustment 
number, and the budget adjustment number are added together. This sum is the 
1993-1994 special education formula allotment for District A ($16,326,315 + 
$278,135 + $176,438 = $16,780,888).
Problem Statement 
As special education policies and programs have been established within the 
states, notable variations have been observed in per-pupil revenues (Verstegen &
Cox, 1990), state policy interpretations (Gerry, 1985), and implementation of 
mandated procedures (Brinker & Thorpe, 1985; Dardelson & Bellamy, 1989; Fomess, 
1985; Hallahan, Keller, & Ball, 1986). This variation among states in the 
implementation of their special education finance programs has occurred because the 
system of allocating funding to the local districts has been left up to the states. 
Differences in average per-pupil revenues among states for special education ranged
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funding was severed from the number of students identified, special education 
enrollments dropped by twenty percent (Panish, 1993).
The issues of variation in pcr-piqjfl revenues and the ever increasing 
enrollments in the milder disabilities are causing many states to reexamine their special 
education funding systems to see if they encourage variation of per-pupil revenues 
among local districts and/or increased eiuoUments of mildly handicapped students of 
local districts. Results from a national survey indicated that almost nine^ percent of 
the states were considering policy adjustments to address the over-representation of 
mildly handicapped students, and more than seventy-five percent of the states were 
beginning to question the use of resource rooms and other partial services as a catch­
all or “dumping ground” for children who were experiencing learning or behavioral 
problems (Noel & Fuller, 1985).
This study was guided by the following research questions:
1) What is the ratio of costs between regular education and special education 
fiom 1980 to 1992, and has fiiis ratio increased or d e c re a ^  over the 
period examined?
2) Has die degree of disparity in per-pupil revenues for special education in 
Louisiana among the sixty-six local districts changed over the last decade, 
and if so, how?
3) Can improvements be made to special education finance models 
wiiich can help monitor special education costs in Louisiana?
4) Can special education finance models be developed which will lessen the 
the degree o f disparity in per-pupil revenues among local districts in 
Louisiana?
5) Are there relationships between Louisiana's local school districts’ fiscal 
capacity and special education per-pupil revenues, fiscal edacity and 
district special education enrollment, and district special education 
enrollment and district per-pupil revenue, and have these relationships 
changed over the last decade, and if so, how?
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mildly handicapped students, and more than seventy-five percent of the states were 
beginning to question the use of resource rooms and other partial services as a catch­
all or “dumping ground” for children who were experiencing learning or behavioral 
problems (Noel & Fuller, 1985).
This study was guided by the following research questions:
1) What is the ratio of costs between regular education and special education 
from 1980 to 1992, and has this ratio increased or decreased over the 
period examined?
2) Has the degree of disparity in per-pupil revenues for special education in 
Louisiana among the sixty-six local districts changed over the last decade, 
and if so, how?
3) Can improvements be made to special education finance models 
which can help monitor special education costs in Louisiana?
4) Can special education finance models be developed which will lessen the 
the degree of disparity in per-pupil revenues among local districts in 
Louisiana?
5) Are there relationships between Louisiana’s local school districts’ fiscal 
capacity and special education per-pupil revenues, fiscal capacity and 
district special education enrollment, and district special education 
enrollment and district per-pupil revenue, and have these relationships 
changed over the last decade, and if so, how?
This study examines Louisiana’s special education per-pupil revenues and 
seeks to determine the ratio of costs between regular education and special education. 
These ratios are examined to determine whether or not special education costs have 
increased more or less compared to regular education costs. Special education per- 
pupil revenues are examined to determine whether revenue disparity has increased or 
decreased from 1980 until 1992. In addition, this study presents special education 
finance models which seek to reduce the disparity of per-pupil revenues and monitor
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costs of special education. Finally, this study seeks to determine if there are 
relationships between district fiscal capacity and per-pupil revenue, district fiscal 
capacity and special education enrollments, and district district special education 
enrollments and district per-pupil revenue. Per-pupil revenues for special education 
among local school districts in Louisiana indicated a wide variation in the 1992-1993 
school year. Special education district enrollments varied from 6.44 percent of total 
district enrollment to 21.94 percent of total district enrollment in school year 1992- 
1993. District wealth defined as a district’s per-capita income ranged from $9863 to 
$18,962 in 1992. The average per-capita income for Louisiana was $13,769.
Louisiana’s financing formula for special education must address these issues. 
First, the state financing formula must address the issue of disparity in per-pupil 
revenues for special education among the districts because the courts have considered 
revenues per pupil as “prima facie” evidence in determining the fulfillment or lack of 
equity in a state school finance system (Hickrod, Chaudhari, Hubbard & Lee, 1982, 
p. 1). Second, models for special education need to be developed in order to 
determine whether or not the disparity of per-pupil revenue issue may be resolved and 
costs monitored. Finally, relationships between district fiscal capacity and special 
education per-pupil revenues, district fiscal capacity and special education 
enrollments, and district special education enrollments and per-pupil revenue must be 
determined so that state financing models for special education may be developed and 
tested which are sensitive to these relationships.
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This study answers the call for more study of state special education financing 
formulas, specifically in the State o f Louisiana. Louisiana is currently considering 
changing its funding formula for special education. Different financing programs 
impact different areas in different ways, such as how much money the local district 
spends per-pupil, enrollments o f special education students, the category o f disability 
in which students are placed, and whether or not the special education service is 
remedial, temporary, or permanent. The information which this study will generate 
will prove helpful in planning new strategies and policies for financing special 
education in the State o f Louisiana.
Significance o f the Study 
The large responsibility of states to fund special education services, coupled 
with increased emphasis on equity issues and caps on state and local tax revenues, has 
generated important questions about the effects of funding patterns in special 
education (Dempsey & Fuchs, 1992). Rising costs and widening gaps between the 
costs of regular education and special education programs, increasing public scrutiny 
of the costs of special education, and a growing need for state revenues to finance 
special education were predicted as future challenges (Vasa & Wendel, 1982). This 
prediction has come true in 1994, as evidenced by the flurry of reform of states’ 
special education financing programs across the nation. At both the federal and state 
levels, educators are asking for reviews of the special education system to ensure that 
children are not being unduly removed fi-om regular classrooms (Richardson, 1994).
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An example of the problems that states are facing may be found in the 
problems of the New York City special education system. New York City’s special 
education program costs more than twenty-two cents of every school dollar and 
employs one-fourth of all school personnel (Dillon, 1994). Thirteen percent of all 
New York City’s school children are enrolled in special education (Dillon, 1994), for 
a total of 130,000 students (Richardson, 1994). It was also noted that there seemed 
to be very little incentive to limit special education and every incentive to expand it. 
Of the children referred to special education, about ninety percent were tested and 
about seventy percent were found to need special education (Richardson, 1994).
Incentives in New York City, as in many states, are monetary, convenient, and 
political. More students translate into more money. Schools in New York City 
receive up to $10,000 per student in special education money, and teachers can 
effectively reduce class size by funneling bothersome students to special education 
(Richardson, 1994). About seventy percent of these students are classified as 
Learning Disabled or Emotionally Handicapped, classifications which are vaguely 
defined by statute and can be loosely applied (Dillon, 1994). Secretary of Education 
Richard S. Riley observed this problem of over-identification by calling it 
“overlabeling” (Richardson, 1994).
The example of the New York City Special Education System rings true for 
many local districts across states. Many of the same incentives exist to classify more 
students. Like New York City, more students mean more state money to a local 
district because the funding mechanism is driven by the number of students in that
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district’s special education program. Teachers can remove bothersome students from 
the classroom by having them referred to special education programs. In Louisiana, 
getting a student classified removes them from the regular classroom, reduces the 
pupil teacher ratio on the school report card, and inflates school test scores because 
special education students, with the exception of the gifted, are not entered with the 
regular education student population.
Unfortunately, there have been few empirical analyses of statewide strategies 
to fund special education (Dempsey & Fuchs, 1992). Virtually no empirical research 
has been conducted to test the validity of hypothesized effects of various funding 
formulas on statewide placement and service provisions of special education 
(Albright, 1988; Gaughn, 1976; Guanino, 1971). With the courts being presented 
challenges to state special educational finance systems, it is important that researchers 
accurately identify how past and contemplated new special education finance reform 
efforts affect educational resource distributional equity .
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
The past three decades have brought about dramatic changes in the 
fundamental policies governing special education. Special education laws enacted 
during this time have presented problems not anticipated by those who sought such 
legislation. The most visible of these problems is a lack of money and resources 
(Rogers, 1993). Handicapped children require special education and related services 
of different intensity and duration to meet their unique educational needs (Weintraub 
& Higgins, 1980). Special education is costly and it is burdensome for local school 
districts to support it (Rothstein, 1990).
The purpose of this chapter is to review the related literature regarding 
special education finance. The chapter begins with a discussion of the evolution of 
special education and traces the role of the states in this development. The next 
section addresses the legislative framework for special education and includes judicial 
interpretations of this legislation in regards to appropriate placement, related services, 
and attorneys’ fees. The final section addresses the costs of special education, in 
particular state financing formulas and third party billing for special education.
The Evolution of Special Education
Weintraub and Higgins (1980) characterize the evolution of the provision of 
special education into three phases. Each of these phases describes the different roles
20
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played by states in their delivery of special education services. These phases are 
identified as the Benefactor Role, the Programmatic Role, and the Facilitator Role. In 
the first period, the state was perceived to be the benefactor because historically, 
public education for handicapped children was perceived as a charitable activity for 
state government. Traditionally, handicapped children were educated by the public 
schools when sufficient pressure or enlightened leadership forced them to do so. The 
period was also characterized by great discrepancies in fiscal planning across states 
(Weintraub & Higgins, 1980).
Increasingly parents, professionals, and lobbyists joined efforts to increase 
pressure on state authorities to move from a permissive policy posture to a posture of 
mandating changes in the provision of services (Weintraub & Higgins, 1980). The 
Brown v. Board o f Education (1954) decision by the United States Supreme Court 
established education as a constitutionally protected right and also established a 
federal presence in public education in America (Rogers, 1993). This decision has 
also guided the courts over the ensuing years in many matters relevant to special 
education. The Brown decision led to a second period, with another policy role for 
the states.
The second period, called the programmatic role, marked an emergence of the 
states as a driving force in mandating change as it related to the provision of services 
to handicapped students. During this period, state legislatures passed laws that either 
mandated or fiscally assisted special education for many categories of handicapped 
children through the public schools (Weintraub & Higgins, 1980). New federal
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dollars were flowing to the states to be given to locals on a grant basis, reinforcing 
the programmatic role of the state. Many school districts found that the operation of 
special education programs, with financial assistance provided by state legislatures, 
not only permitted the provision of services for handicapped children, but also helped 
improve services for the school population as a whole (Reynolds & Birch, 1977).
A period of transition was ushered in when the courts began to issue mandates 
that called for a policy shift from programmatic services for some handicapped to the 
right of all handicapped students to an appropriate education (Weintraub & Higgins,
1980). In particular, the Pennsylvania Association o f Retarded Children v. 
Pennsylvania {\911) and the M ills v. D.C. Board o f Education (1972) reflected the 
demands of vocal advocacy groups and a growing body of successful litigation 
asserting the rights of children with varying disabilities to a free and appropriate 
public education in the least restrictive environment (Rogers, 1993). The 
programmatic period came to a close in 1975 with the passage of the Education For 
All Handicapped Act or Public Law (P.L.) 94-142, which established a minimum 
policy base for each state.
In the third period, called the facilitator role, the states shifted from 
programmatic change to facilitator of change. This shift occurred as a result of 
special education being established as a right of all handicapped children. New 
demands were being placed on the states. The state’s primary role was now one of 
establishing and enforcing criteria to deliver special education and related services.
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The local district has become the vehicle for determining a child’s educational 
program (Weintraub & Higgins, 1980).
The Legislative Framework for Special Education
To a very large extent, the Civil Rights Movement provided the initial 
stimulation to the special education movement (Osborne, 1988). Many of the rights 
established for minorities were subsequently provided to handicapped students. The 
Brown v. Board o f Education (1954) case laid the foundation for the future of 
education for handicapped children. The decision was based on the federal 
constitutional principle of the fourteenth amendment, which provides that the states 
may not deprive anyone of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” nor 
deny anyone “equal protection of the laws” (U.S. Constitution, amendment XIV). 
The Supreme Court concluded that “it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education,” and this 
education is “a right which must be made available to all on equal terms” {Brown v 
Board o f Education o f Topeka, 1954).
The Brown decision recognized that educating black children separately, even 
if done so in “equal” facilities, was inherently unequal because of the stigma attached 
to being educated separately, and because of the deprivation of interaction with 
children of other backgrounds (Rothstein, 1990). This argument was often utilized in 
later handicapped education cases because many similarities exist between the 
plaintiffs in civil rights cases and handicapped children in special education cases. In
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subsequent years, the handicapped children became known as “the other minority,” as 
special educators and parents demanded that the handicapped be given the same 
rights to an equal educational opportunity as other minorities (Osborne, 1988).
The principles of the Brown case have been applied in a number of cases 
involving the handicapped. Beginning in 1969 with W olf v. Legislature o f the State o f 
Utah (1969) the judge not only identified education as the most important function of 
state and local governments, he also declared education to be a fundamental right 
under both the state and federal constitutions (Thomas & Denzinger, 1993).
Although the Supreme Court was to later disagree with the conclusion that education 
was fundamental under the United States Constitution in the San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodrigues case (1973), the Wolf case set a precedent 
for many cases to follow.
The evolution of the Education For All Handicapped Act began with the 
passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965, also 
knowTi as Public Law (P.L.) 89-10. Although ESEA was not specifically for the 
handicapped, it was amended in 1966 and 1970 to better serve handicapped students. 
The U.S. Congress made some preliminary efforts to provide for special education in 
1966 and 1970 by enacting grant programs. Although mainly for personnel 
development, these programs attempted to address the issue of educating the 
handicapped children in the regular education system (Thomas & Denzinger, 1993). 
Title VI was added to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act which 
established the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped to provide leadership in
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special education programming. In 1970, Title VI was repealed and the Education of 
the Handicapped Act passed. Part B of this legislation provided for grants to states to 
encourage special education programming. These programs were primarily incentive 
programs and required little specification o f specific guidelines and enforcement 
(Rothstein, 1990).
In 1971 and 1972, two cases previously cited resulted in landmark decisions 
regarding special education. The Petmsylvania Association fo r  Retarded Children v. 
Pennsylvania (1971) resulted in a consent agreement that stated that no child could 
be denied admission to a public school or have his educational status changed unless 
formal due process was provided. The parties agreed that mentally retarded persons 
are capable of benefiting from an education and that the state must provide them with 
a free, public program of education and training appropriate to their capacity. In 
1972, the M ills v. Board o f Education o f the District o f Columbia expanded the right 
to an appropriate public education to children labeled as behavioral problems, 
mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed and hyperactive (Thomas & Denzinger,
1993). The M ills consent decree went so far as to set out an elaborate framework for 
what due process would entail (Rothstein, 1993). Both of these cases were based on 
constitutional theories of equal protection and due process under the U.S. 
Constitution’s fourteenth amendment and were the impetus for similar cases in a large 
number of states. These two landmark cases set the stage for a constitutional right to 
special education because states provide education. Further, the basic framework set
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out in the M ills case was later to be incorporated into the Education For All 
Handicapped Act (Rothstein, 1993).
The next important piece of legislation came when the United States Congress 
passed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which included Section 504. Section 504 
represents the first federal civil rights law protecting the rights o f handicapped 
persons (Thomas & Denzinger, 1993). That section requires that no qualified person 
with handicaps be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance (29 U.S.C., p. 794).
In 1974, a major increase in funding for programs for the handicapped was 
enacted by passage of the Education of the Handicapped Amendment, Public Law 93- 
380. It also provided due process safeguards for the handicapped with assurances of 
a free, appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment (Osborne,
1988).
The role of the federal government became even more substantial when 
President Ford reluctantly signed the Education For All Handicapped Act or Public 
Law 94-142, on November 29, 1975 (Thomas & Denzinger, 1993). Actually, this 
piece of legislation amended Public Law 93-380 to provide more financial assistance 
and to strengthen the rights of handicapped children (Osborne, 1988). As originally 
written. Public Law 94-142 provided for the creation of programs to serve certain 
populations of children with specific disabilities and it required local school districts 
to provide these special education services (Rogers, 1993).
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Finally, Public Law 94-142 was expanded and reauthorized in 1990 by the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Major features of IDEA have 
added two new categories of special education eligibility, which are autism and 
traumatic brain injury. IDEA has also required transition planning and specified 
provision for technological aids and services (Rogers, 1993).
As federal mandates to educate children with disabilities have broadened, 
federal funding for special education has decreased, leaving public schools in an 
understandable dilemma. They are required to provide expensive special education 
and related services to children with disabilities at no expense, and in such a way that 
these children will derive a meaningful benefit (Rogers, 1993). This dilemma has 
resulted in extensive litigation and other legal issues in relation to special education 
finance.
Equity
The main issue of all legislation and litigation in special education is that of 
equity. “Equity refers to the notion of distributive justice and fairness in educational 
systems” (Geske, 1982, p. 334). That which is just or fair in special education finance 
has largely been mandated by the courts. For handicapped students, the concept of 
equity in educational programs means that the programs and services which they 
receive are appropriate to their educational needs (Hartman & Haber, 1981). 
Secondly, equity has to do with the fiscal resources from which education can be 
supported (Weintraub & Higgins, 1980).
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Two basic concepts of equity employed in school finance research involve the 
notions of horizontal equity (equal treatment of equals) and vertical equity (unequal 
treatment of unequals) (Cohn & Geske, 1990). These two concepts may also be 
utilized when examining special education financing strategies. Horizontal equity 
involves a comparison of the treatment of comparable individuals or groups (e.g. 
special education students) in a state. Under this notion of horizontal equity, equal 
treatment of special education students requires similar expenditure levels for these 
students by the local districts. In regard to funding, the basic idea behind the 
horizontal equity principle has been to reduce the large interdistrict disparities in 
expenditures per special education pupil.
Vertical equity requires that basic differences among groups be taken into 
consideration. Different disabilities in special education (e.g. mild/mental retardation, 
deaf, blind, speech impaired, learning disabled) may require different expenditure 
levels. In regard to the principle of vertical equity. Brewer and Kakalik (1979) note 
that equal educational opportunity for handicapped children “does not mean either 
equal resources or equal objectives for both handicapped and nonhandicapped 
children. In general, the educational resources and goals established for each 
handicapped child will be different and will be based on the child’s needs and 
potential” (p.42). Proponents of greater vertical equity might argue for the adoption 
of a pupil weighting system or for increased categorical aids (e.g. for specific 
handicapped pupils) to bring about greater student equity (Cohn & Geske, 1990).
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Findings From Single State Longitudinal Equity Studies of Regular Education
Studies concerning the equity of per-pupil revenues among local districts have 
enabled researchers to note the impact of school finance reform attempts in terms of 
general trends in distributional equity (Geske, 1983). They allow for an assessment of 
the longitudinal effects of finance formulas. Unfortunately, these types of studies have 
been primarily concerned with regular education. This study utilizes some of the 
methodologies of these equity studies in order to examine special education, therefore 
the findings of these studies of regular education (in Cohn & Geske, 1990) will be 
briefly summarized. The findings in regard to per-pupil revenues have been mixed. 
Some states have improved the disparity problem while in other states the problem 
has become significantly greater.
Forerunners in this area of research are Hickrod and his associates at Illinois 
State University, having assessed equity goals since 1973. These studies indicated a 
decline in the horizontal equity dimension from 1979-1983 (Hickrod, Chaudhari, and 
Hubbard, 1985). Jones and Salmon (1983) reported that Virginia lost ground in 
progress toward its school finance equity since its major reform was implemented in 
1974-1975. King (1983) found New Mexico’s financing system making progress 
toward financial equalization across school districts. Cohn and Smith (1989) reported 
improvement in school finance equity in South Carolina and finally, Geske and 
LaCost (1990) reported a reduction in revenue inequality in Louisiana from 1977- 
1978 to 1985-1986.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
Judicial Interpretation of Special Education Legislation
Since the passage of the Education For All Handicapped Act in 1975 litigation 
involving handicapped students has increased significantly. Parents, state agencies, 
and local agencies have been engaged in bitter disputes over the quality of services 
provided and who will pay for these services. The courts have been used by these 
groups in an effort to seek relief. Two frameworks are useful in classifying the 
complex legal issues in special education finance. Thomas and Denzinger (1993) have 
examined the judicial interpretation of federal, state, and local laws in regard to 
financial issues. (A list of these relevant cases may be found in Appendix B). Anthony 
and Jones (1990) have divided Judicial decisions into three areas of special education 
litigation; 1) appropriate placement, 2) related services, and 3) attorney’s fees. The 
financial implications of each of these three areas o f special education litigation will be 
discussed.
Appropriate placement
In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Board o f Hendrick Hudson School 
District v. Rowley (1982) established a minimum standard of educational 
programming for handicapped students by defining appropriate placement to be 
access with benefits. This decision serves as a benchmark for examining the 
appropriateness of a placement. The Rowley decision however, should not be 
construed as an ultimatum governing placement of all handicapped children. “[W]e 
do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of
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educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act” (Rcm’ley, p. 
3049).
If parents can show that a public school district is unable to provide a free, 
appropriate public education to meet the needs of their child as outlined on the child's 
lEP, the parents will prevail. In Beasley v. School Board o f Campbell County ( 1988) 
the court concluded that a private school was the appropriate placement for the 
student and the district must assume the cost. In addition, if parents maintain 
successfully that the appropriate placement of their child is in a private school after 
removing their child from a public school program, the district will have to assume the 
cost of the student's private school program ( School Committee o f the town o f 
Burlington, Massachusetts V. Dept, o ï Education o f Massachusetts, 1985).
School districts incur costs when they must extend the school year to provide 
for the appropriate education for handicapped students. Some handicapped students 
must have year round schooling so their skills will not regress. The court contended 
in Battle, Bernard and Armstrong v. Commonwealth o f Pennsylvania (1981) that for 
some handicapped students, an individualized education program must extend beyond 
the normal school year because o f severe regression in learning which may take place 
if the student's schooling is not continued. In this case, the district had closed all 
schools for the summer to offset rising costs.
In some cases, conflict over the kinds of benefits accrued from different 
proposed placements occurs. In Visco v. The School District o f Pittsburgh ( 1988) 
the court determined that the acquisition of oral language skills outweighed the
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benefits that hearing-impaired students would receive if they were placed in a 
mainstreamed program.
Recalling an earlier case, the court ruled that the deaf students could remain in their 
private school placement, because "the risks of change outweigh the possible 
benefits” (GrAwow V. Scarilon, 1981, p. 1037).
The need for residential placement is not addressed directly by The Education 
For All Handicapped Amendment, but regulations concerning the use of residential 
treatment centers have been made known in section 300.302 (1986). In Drew v. 
Clarke County School District (1987) the court ruled that since the school district 
was unable to provide an appropriate placement for a 16-year old autistic boy, it 
would have to assume the costs of private residential placement.
The escalating survival rate o f severely handicapped infants could have a 
significant impact upon school districts special education costs. The Timothy v. 
Rochester School District (1989) established zero reject which was discussed in the 
first chapter, and should this standard prevail, will cause special education costs to 
rise.
Several states have developed regulations governing private school 
placements and their tuition costs. The Council o f Private Schools fo r Children with 
Special Needs v. Cooperman case (1985) tested the legality of these regulations and 
the court upheld them. These types of regulations have been beneficial in holding 
some costs down.
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Some states have laws mandating a higher level of service than EHA 
established. The David D. v. Dartmouth School Committee case (1985) established 
that the state has an obligation to provide that service. Since the David D. v. 
Dartmouth decision in Massachusetts, the number of cases in which parents obtained 
their requested educational placement dramatically increased, from 38.8 percent in 
1985 to 54.5 percent in 1987 (Massachusetts Department of Education, Facts on 
Special Education in Massachusetts, Mar. 1988).
Finally, vaguely written statutes or regulations have contributed to the 
escalation of special education costs. In Massachusetts, Chapter 766 requires that 
any student failing to "make effective progress" in school should receive special 
education services (The Comprehensive Special Education Law, supra, note 28). The 
effect of this regulation was to drive special education enrollments up to 16.2 percent 
o f the state's total student population even though the overall student population 
declined. Concerned with the ever increasing costs of special education within their 
state, Massachusetts Department of Education officials advised that the state begin 
alternative programs for non-disabled students currently being referred into special 
education for tutoring and remedial services (Massachusetts Department of 
Education, 1988).
Related Services
Since the definition of related services has been expanded to include services 
not originally stipulated, the costs of these services has increased dramatically. In
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the Corbett v. Regional Center fo r the Exist Bay, Inc. case (1988) the court, while 
acknowledging that residential placement can be construed as a "related service," 
decided that the original placement had occurred in response to self-abusive behavior. 
The court further stated that any future change in placement must be "made pursuant 
to state law alone," because "residential placements made by other state agencies, or 
independently by parents, are not educational placements” (Corbett, pp. 968-969).
The Irving Independent School District v. Tatro case (1985) affirmed a lower court 
decision that clean intermittent catherization is a related service under The Education 
of the Handicapped Act (EHA), not a medical service, because it is not required to be 
administered by a physician. Significant costs once thought to be associated with the 
provision of these types of services have not materialized.
Shortly after the Rowley (1982) decision, the U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari and allowed the decision to stand in a case concerning psychotherapy as a 
related service in the Piscataway Township Board o f Education v. TG. (1984). A 
federal district court had previously ruled that psychotherapy for an emotionally 
disturbed student is a related service under The Education of the Handicapped Act.
Transportation is specifically mentioned in The Education of the Handicapped 
Act as a related service. Disputes usually involve the provision of services for a 
private school placement chosen by parents or a need to depart from a mandated 
school district policy. Parents of two spina bifida children sought relief from a district 
policy prohibiting buses to travel poorly maintained private roads {Kennedy v. Board 
o f Education, McDowell County, (1985). The court ruled that the district had an
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obligation to provide an alternate form of transportation, and that denying the 
students attendance at school denied them equal protection of the laws.
In two other cases involving parentally chosen private school placements, the 
court ruled in favor of the school districts. In McNair v. Cardimone case (1988) 
the court found that the state is not required to assume the cost of private education if 
the state has fulfilled its obligation by making its own appropriate program and 
services available. The Barwacz v. Michigan Department o f Education case (1988) 
involved parents seeking district assumption of the cost of transporting their student 
from Michigan to Washington D.C. to attend the Model Secondary School for the 
Deaf. The parental request was denied.
Attomev’s Fees
Finally, in 1986, the U.S. Congress amended the The Education of the 
Handicapped Act to include the awarding of attorneys' fees and other costs 
engendered by parents when they prevail at either the due process hearings or in 
court. This piece of legislation is also called Public Law 99-372. (Handicapped 
Children's Protection A ct, 1986). This legislation was enacted in response to an 
earlier decision in which the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that The Education of 
the Handicapped Act did not allow the awarding of attorney’s fees to prevailing 
parents {Smith v. Robinson, 1984). As a result o f this legislation, in virtually all cases 
where parents have prevailed at either the administrative level or in court, they have 
collected attorneys’ fees when claims were justified (Anthony & Jones, 1990).
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The Cost of Special Education 
Special education costs have been the focus of much concern by educators 
and policymakers due to; 1) the visibility of special education, 2) parent and advocacy 
group activism, 3) the high cost of special education, 4) the uneasy relationship 
between special education students and regular education students in the classroom, 
and 5) the perception that traditional special education services have not met 
expectations. Special education is the most visible of several areas in which state and 
federal governments have mandated specific requirements of local school districts 
without providing sufficient financial support to comply with the mandate.
Parents actively demand appropriate programs and are provided with 
considerable support fi-om advocacy groups at the local, state, and national levels. 
Mandated special education services impact negatively on the rest of the school 
budget and when these services force reductions in regular education services, parents 
of non-disabled children object questioning why the school’s limited resources are 
used to provide expensive services to a minority rather than to the majority of 
students. Teachers and parents sometimes complain that children with disabilities 
make unreasonable demands and disrupt classes. Finally, there is a growing concern 
that traditional special education services have become one more costly, self- 
perpetuating bureaucracy that offers no meaningful benefit and may be injurious to 
some children (Rogers, 1993).
Accurate estimates of the costs of special education and related services help 
policymakers to make objective, informed decisions when allocating funds.
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Estimating these costs is a difficult and often uncertain process. Experts can develop 
estimates of the costs of special education, but these costs are neither fixed nor totally 
impervious to the decisions of state policymakers (Kakalik, Flurry, Thomas, &
Carney, 1981).
Some of the kinds of special education costs which must be determined 
include direct special education costs, costs of related services, residential costs, and 
Section 504 costs. Direct special education costs include the cost of teachers, 
classrooms, and books for students. Costs of related services include speech, physical 
and occupational therapies, as well as counseling. Residential costs are incurred when 
children must be housed in special facilities in order to receive an appropriate special 
education program. Section 504 costs include the costs of making educational 
programs accessible to students with disabilities, whether or not those students 
actually require any special education (Rogers, 1993).
The average additional cost for providing programs and services for special 
education students beyond the regular program costs across all states was $3,932 per 
pupil in fiscal year 1987, compared with $3,649 per pupil in 1985-1986. In addition, 
dollars spent on special education students derived from regular education finances 
were estimated at $2,686 for the 1985-1986 school year, totaling $6,335 per 
exceptional student from regular and special education revenue. Expressed as a cost 
ratio, the total cost of special education was 2.3 times the cost of regular education 
(Moore, Strang, Schwartz, & Braddock, 1988). Research has consistently shown 
that the average additional cost for providing programs and services for special
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education students, beyond the regular program cost is about twice that for other 
students (Bentley, 1970; Chaikind, Danielson, & Braven, 1992; Clemmons, 1974; 
Kakalik, Furry, Thomas, & Carney, 1981; McClure, Bamham, & Henderson, 1975; 
Raphael, Singer, & Walker, 1985; Rossmiller, Hale, & Frohreich, 1970; Singer & 
Butler, 1987; and Snell, 1973).
Substantial differences exist between and within states, not only in spending 
on special education and the size of the identified special education population as a 
percentage of total enrollment, but also in spending among exceptionalities and 
instructional arrangement. For example, Oregon provided special education services 
to 6.3 percent of its total school population and Massachusetts provided special 
education services to 17 percent of its total school population in 1987. At one 
extreme, $1,568 per pupil was spent for special education in Arkansas, and at the 
other, $10,613 was spent per pupil in New York (Verstegen & Cox, 1990). The 
average total per-pupil expenditures for special education in different instructional 
arrangements may vary more than ten-fold, from $2,463 for students receiving 
services in resource rooms to $29,108 for students in residential programs. Cost 
differences among disabilities vary by 400 percent, from more than $31,000 for 
students with deafness/blindness to less than $800 for students with speech 
disabilities. Generally, low-incidence disabilities and more restrictive instructional 
settings with additional resource personnel and materials result in higher costs than do 
less restrictive settings (Chaikind, Danielson, & Braven, 1992).
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Learning Disability
Of particular interest in the cost issue is that of Learning Disabled Students 
(LD) because the increase in the identification o f these students has produced 
substantial impact on the allocation of financial resources and demands for additional 
funds for students in special education. Since the financial incentives for identifying 
students with disabilities are great, and since LD is the primary condition for which 
disagreement regarding identification exists, the potential for misclassification and 
abuse exists there more than with other exceptionalities, and any attempt to reduce 
special education costs must ultimately deal with minimizing the misclassification of 
LD students (Finlan & Hartman, 1990).
On the national level, there has been a tremendous increase in the numbers of 
Learning Disabled students identified while there was a decrease in other 
exceptionalities in the general school population. LD grew from twenty-one percent 
of all children with disabilities in 1976 to forty-eight percent in 1989 (Finlan & 
Hartman, 1992). It is estimated that the learning disabled pupils represent almost four 
percent of all school children in both regular education and special education (Keogh, 
1990).
The development of the category of learning disabilities occurred as a result of 
the realization that a large number o f children, despite average to above-average IQ 
scores, did not seem to profit from academic instruction (Finlan & Hartman, 1992). 
Numerous causes have been put forth to explain this “hidden disability” (Kranes, 
1980), including genetic factors, prenatal causes, perinatal causes, biological or
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biochemical causes, environmental causes, developmental causes, and educational 
causes (Taylor & Sternberg, 1989). None of the suggested theories concerning LD 
has been confirmed (Coles, 1987), casting doubt on the very existence of the 
condition (McKnight, 1982). Because o f these many ambiguities, there are dramatic 
differences in incidence and prevalence o f learning disabilities in different locations. 
For example, sixty-four percent o f all handicapped children in Hawaii were classified 
as learning disabled while only twenty-six percent were classified as learning disabled 
in Alabama (Finlan & Hartman, 1992).
Which students and how many students are identified as Learning Disabled are 
influenced by a variety of factors. Professional differences among different disciplines 
affect how many and which students are identified. Learning Disability is considered 
the proper and legitimate concern of neurology, psychiatry, psychology, education, 
ophthalmology, and occupational therapy. Each profession focuses on different 
aspects of the problem, so there are varying opinions regarding identification, 
diagnoses, symptoms, and treatment approaches (Keogh, 1991). Second, there is 
considerable variation in how the discrepancy in aptitude and achievement, a widely 
accepted criterion of learning disability, is operationalized (Keogh & Hall, 1984; 
Keogh, 1991; Reynolds, Burk, Boodoo, Cox, Gutkin, Mann, Page, & Wilson, 1985; 
Shepard, 1980). A third problem relates specifically to measurement and the inability 
of professionals who administer the diagnostic tests (Keogh, 1991; Thurlow & 
Ysseldyke, 1979; Berk, 1984; Reynolds, Burk, Boodo, Cox, Gutkin, Mann, Page, &
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Wilson, 1985; Shepard, 1983; Shepard & Smith, 1983). These factors have 
influenced the increase in enrollments of learning disability students.
These rapidly increasing enrollments of learning disabled students has had a 
substantial impact on the total cost of special education. Approximately $2.1 billion 
was spent on special education in 1976 (American Association of School 
Administrators, 1983), whereas $16 billion was spent on special education in 1986, a 
663% increase with 92% of the costs home by state and local agencies (Finlan & 
Hartman, 1992). From the 1977-78 school year to the 1985-86 school year, in terms 
of average per-pupil expenditures, special education showed a constant dollar 
increase of ten percent, while regular education showed an increase of only four 
percent (Moore, Strang, Schwartz, & Braddock, 1988).
Costs of Categorical Programs
The empirical studies of the costs of categorical programs tend to be of three 
types, the cost per student approach, supplemental/replacement approach, and the 
resource-cost approach. The cost per student approach examines the average per- 
pupil expenditure patterns of a state or local district. The supplemental/replacement 
approach determines the supplemental, replacement, and common costs of a program, 
and the resource-model approach involves the specification and costing out the 
components that make up the program (Hartman, 1979).
The cost per student approach has taken several different forms. First, the 
average dollar cost per student has been calculated by simply summing up all the costs
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directly associated with programs for a particular type of student, and those indirect 
costs that may be allocated to the programs, and then dividing the total program costs 
by the number of students involved. Kakalik (1973) used this type of approach in 
reporting the average costs by category of handicapped students. This approach has 
serious limitations on the use of results for analytical or funding purposes. The 
average cost by type o f student masks a significant variation among individual student 
costs. The use of the average cost figure also obscures the cost differences due to 
educational need. The differences in selection, quantity, and organization of 
resources that cause the programmatic cost differences are not specified and their 
effects are unknown (Chambers & Hartman, 1981). Another study of special 
education has shown that there is less variation in cost-per-student by the type of 
delivery system than by type of handicapped student (Hartman, 1980b).
Another form of the cost-per-student approach has been the development of 
cost factors for categorical and grade level programs. The general procedures in the 
cost factor approach were used in the special education component of the National 
Education Finance Project (NEFF) by Rossmiller, Hale, & Frohereich (1970). A cost 
factor, which is the ratio of the cost-per-student of a special education program to the 
cost-per-student of the regular education program, was calculated for each special 
education program. A ratio of greater than one indicated the degree to which the 
estimated total cost o f a special education program was greater than that of the 
regular education program. The overall cost index averaged about 2.0 for all special
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education students, but there were wide variations among categories within a single 
district and among districts with similar categories.
The cost factor approach presents a number of problems for cost analysis and 
funding applications. Rossmiller noted some of the primary limitations to using these 
cost factors:
A cost index generally is expressed as either a statewide average or a 
median...Provision must be made... to deal adequately with the fiscal needs of 
individual districts which deviate from the state average for good and 
sufficient reasons. . .They reflect only what is currently being done, not what 
could be done (or should be done) in the way of educational programming for 
specific pupils... Cost indices show the relative cost of educating pupils in 
special programs compared with the cost of educating pupils in regular 
programs. .. It is possible that a given special education program could be 
offered to an equal number of students, could provide the same educational 
services, and could cost the same amount per pupil in two school districts but 
the cost indexes in the two districts could differ because of differences in the 
cost of the regular program in each district... A cost index which lumps 
together all programs for educating a particular category of handicapped 
children without regard to the way in which educational services are delivered 
to such children will mask a great deal of cost variation within these 
programs... . Finally... for a variety of reasons, costs will vary between 
districts for identical programs... the cost of transporting pupils involved in 
special programs... pupil/teacher ratio... difference in salaries and in the cost of 
educational supplies and materials... and these differences will be reflected in 
educational program cost and in cost indices (Rossmiller, 1974, p. 14).
There have been other state studies conducted using the cost factor 
methodology. These studies were conducted in Delaware (Rossmiller & Moran, 
1973), Florida (National Education Finance Project, 1973), Idaho (Shrag, 1974), 
Illinois (Sorenson, 1973), Indiana (Jones & Wilkerson, 1973), Kentucky (National 
Education Finance Project, 1974), Mississippi (Governor’s School Finance Study
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Group, 1973), South Dakota (National Education Finance Project, 1973), and Texas 
(Busselle, 1973).
A second methodology that can be used to recognize the costs of 
programmatic needs of categorical programs focuses on specifying the supplemental, 
replacement, and common costs for the special education program. The analytical 
emphasis is specifying which activities, resources, and costs are appropriate for each 
classification and on making the subsequent adjustments to the regular and categorical 
program costs to reflect these changes (Marriner, 1977). Supplemental services and 
costs are those that are in addition to the regular education program. These services 
include the special education resource room and vocational education counseling.
The students who receive supplemental services obtain the bulk of their education 
from the regular education program. The supplemental programs and services can be 
considered completely additional since the students receive them while also attending 
the regular education program. Therefore, the costs of these programs are totally in 
addition to those of the regular program (Chambers & Hartman, 1981). Replacement 
costs are for those programs and services that are substituted for the regular 
education program. The general procedure for determining these costs is to total the 
direct costs of the replacement education programs, but then to deduct the costs of 
the regular education programs and services that are replaced. This net cost is the 
additional cost of the programmatic needs of students served by these programs.
Such deductions may include only the instructional component to the entire regular 
education cost. The common costs for general services that are provided to all
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students, such as district administration and debt service, are generally allocated to all 
students or programs in a district on a pro quota basis. (Chambers & Hartman, 1981).
The major difficulties in this approach to cost adjustment are with the 
replacement costs. The supplemental costs are additional by definition and would 
need to be included in any adjustment. With the common costs, care must be taken 
not to double-count students or omit them. Double counting involves including 
students in both the regular education program and in the cost adjustments for special 
programs. Omitting students means not including them in either regular education or 
special education program costs. The initial and non-trivial problem with calculating 
replacement costs is deciding specifically which program components and services are 
being replaced in the regular program.
Moreover, deduction of the average per-student replacement costs can be a 
misleading calculation. Many of the costs on a classroom level are fixed over the 
range of a few students per class and the reduction of several students would not 
appreciably change the costs of that regular classroom. Similarly, schoolwide and 
districtwide service costs are not greatly affected by the reduction of a relatively small 
number of students. Rather than deducting the average costs per student of these 
components, which are relatively easy to calculate from student and financial records, 
the marginal costs per student would be the correct deduction. Unfortunately, 
marginal costs per student are generally unknown since they are not collected or 
reported by financial accounting systems in education, they will, however, certainly 
be much smaller than the average cost per student (Chambers & Hartman, 1981).
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The final cost methodology used in studies of categorical programs is that of 
the resource-cost model (Chambers & Hartman, 1981). The focus of this approach is 
on the specification in programmatic terms of the educational program to be 
provided. This approach involves the specification of the total special education types 
and numbers of students to be served, the definition of programs in terms of 
resources, the allocation of eligible students to various programs, and student/teacher 
ratios. The program costs are explicitly derived from the structure of the educational 
program.
State Financing Formulas for Special Education
Many efforts have been made to categorize the various funding formulas used 
for special education. Categorization is difficult because the formulas are complex 
and there are many other factors which cut across the dimensions of the framework, 
such as the use of pupil teacher ratios, adjustments for district size, and caps or 
limitations for reimbursement purposes on the number of students served (O'Reilly,
1989).
Four major categorization schemes have been utilized by previous researchers. 
Thomas (1973) identified six types of funding formulas in common use. unit, 
personnel, weight, straight sum, percentage, and excess cost. Hartman (1980) 
condensed these six categories into three categories based on the main factor used for 
funds allocation: resources, students served, or cost. Moore, Walker, and Holland 
(1982) further condensed the Hartman classification by categorizing formulas based
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on two dimensions: 1) the main factor upon which the allocation is based (i.e. 
resources, students or costs); and 2) the mechanism used to allocate funds (i.e. flat 
grant, percentage, or weights). Finally, Verstegen and Cox (1990) determined that 
states distribute funding through four broad approaches; pupil weighting schemes, 
instructional unit methods, excess cost/percentage reimbursement formulas, and other 
approaches including flat grants, full state funding, and combinations of approaches 
(Verstegen, 1988; Anthony & Jones, 1990; Burrello and Sage, 1979; Crowner, 1985; 
and Thomas, 1973). The magnitude of the categorical funds is ultimately tied to the 
population of handicapped students to be served (Hartman & Haber, p.28). The most 
common funding mechanism used is the pupil weighting scheme used in eighteen 
states. Excess cost or percentage reimbursement schemes follow in frequency with 
fifteen states using this method, ten states use flat grants, full state funding schemes, 
or a combination of funding approaches and, eight states use some type of 
instructional unit methodology (Verstegen & Cox, 1990). A detailed explanation of 
these methodologies by state is included in appendices C and D.
Pupil Weighting Schemes
These formulas have been defined as “the local district being reimbursed for 
each handicapped child served on the basis of a multiple of regular per-pupil 
expenditures, which may vary according to the type of educational placement or type 
of disability”(Kakalik, 1979). Under a weighted formula, additional funds are 
provided for special education students in the district. This amount of money is
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determined by the per-pupil amount in the regular education school program. The 
per-pupil amount is given a weight of 1.00. This base amount is then adjusted by an 
additional differential or “weight” that typically varies across special education 
programs according to disability, instructional service arrangement, or both. This 
translates into more dollars spent on the handicapped student. For example, a weight 
of 1.5 percent provides fifty percent more funding for an exceptional student than for 
a regular education student (Vestegen & Cox, 1992).
Two types of weighting schemes are commonly used. The first type is based 
on the student’s disabling condition, such as mental retardation, hearing impairment, 
learning disability, or emotional ability. The second type is based on the instructional 
arrangements used to deliver services to exceptional students, such as itinerant 
teachers, resource teachers, or self-contained classrooms (Vestegen & Cox, 1992). In 
addition, several states provide additional assistance for the excess cost of meeting the 
needs of exceptional students through weighting schemes that vary by intensity of 
service, thus providing additional assistance based on needs but without labels or 
prespecified service delivery schemes. In these cases, service intensity may be 
designated by levels with need and cost increasing with each successive level 
(Vestegen & Cox, 1992).
Instructional Unit Schemes
These funding formulas are defined as those in which school districts are 
reimbursed a fixed sum by the state for each designated unit of classroom instruction.
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administration, and/or transportation (Kakalik, 1979). States that use this funding 
method allocate a dollar amount per special education teacher or classroom consigned 
to special education instruction. States using this approach usually specify the 
maximum number of special education students per teacher or classroom unit for 
different exceptionalities. Specific class size requirements and/or minimum teacher 
salary schedules affect funding per unit (Vestegen & Cox, 1992). Louisiana uses this 
scheme for its financing of special education.
Excess Cost/Percentage Reimbursement Schemes
These funding mechanisms are generally defined as the additional costs of 
educating students in special education, beyond the cost of educating those in regular 
education (Hartman, 1990). These models are based on two alternative 
conceptualizations. The first conceptualization consists of the total costs to educate a 
special education student, minus the costs to educate a regular education student.
The second conceptualization consists of the supplemental costs for a special 
education student for services outside the realm of education (Moore, Schwartz, & 
Braddock, 1988). States compute excess costs by calculating special education 
expenditures and deducting state-defined costs of regular program students. This is 
typically expressed in terms of average per-pupil expenditures. Then the state 
reimburses the district for all or a portion of the difference, which is the “excess cost .” 
States usually stipulate the level of approved excess cost reimbursement (Hartman, 
1990).
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A new definition of excess costs has been proposed. Under this new 
definition, excess costs would be defined in terms of programs and services provided 
by school districts, rather than an expenditure difference between cost per student of 
special and regular education (Hartman, 1988). Special education programs and 
services would be categorized as either supplemental or replacement. Supplemental 
programs are defined as programs and services provided in addition to the regular 
education program received by the student. Replacement programs are defined as 
programs and services provided instead of the regular education program by a 
student. Supplemental programs would be considered completely excess because the 
student would also be receiving the regular education program. Consequently, all 
costs of supplemental programs would also be considered excess. Replacement 
programs are not completely excess because the student would not be receiving some 
or all o f the regular education program. The excess costs of these programs would be 
the difference between the special education program costs and the regular education 
program costs (Hartman, 1990).
Other Approaches: Full State Funding. Flat Grant, and Combination
These programs are referred to as straight sum systems, because the state 
reimburses local districts a fixed amount of money per handicapped child (Kakalik, 
1979). Hawaii provides full state funding for the cost of educating special education 
students. This system does not include local supplements. Washington, North
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Carolina, and Nevada use flat grants that allocate uniform amounts of state dollars per 
pupil in each special education program (Vestegen & Cox, 1992).
Six states utilize a combination of funding approaches; in three of these states, 
flat grants are used in conjunction with other approaches. Illinois implements a 
combination of flat grant and excess cost for “severely/profoundly handicapped " 
students (with a cap). Minnesota uses a combination of instructional unit (66% of the 
salary of essential personnel) and partial percentage reimbursement. Ohio uses a 
combination of instructional unit and partial percentage reimbursement. Vermont 
employs a percentage reimbursement for some teacher salaries (for those who work 
with mainstreamed students) and full state funding for designated programs. New 
York incorporates aid ratios based on property and income wealth in its excess cost 
aid formulas, with various maximums set for reimbursable expenses. West Virginia 
provides weights for special program costs conjoined with additional excess costs 
(Vestegen & Cox, 1992).
Public school administrators often face the problem of having to emphasize 
some special education goals and de-emphasize others because of limited funds and 
resources. The potentially enormous costs of compliance with federal special 
education mandates combined with the chronic shortage of funds has forced 
policymakers to make some decisions in this manner. Public school administrators 
have sought funds in varying places and this has been termed Third Party Billing.
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Third Party Billing
Special education may be funded in part by sources other than by federal, 
state, and local government. Such sources, collectively called Third Party Billing, 
include parents, the public sector, and insurance companies.
One such source may be the parents of the special education students 
themselves (Rogers, 1993). Many parents feel that it is part of their parental 
responsibility to provide for their children with disabilities in the same manner they 
provide for their non-disabled children. It is recognized that, regardless of the 
guarantee of a "free, appropriate education" by the Individuals With Disabilities Act 
(IDEA), many parents have opted to pay for services provided for their handicapped 
children themselves. Such services as speech therapy, hearing therapy, and 
psychiatric treatment are utilized by parents from
the private healthcare sector. Parents and their children are more comfortable using 
their own practitioner.
Sometimes parents also provide specialized equipment such as eyeglasses, 
hearing aids, or tape recorders for their children. When parents acquire equipment 
needed for their children, whether the equipment is purchased by themselves, an 
insurer, or Medicaid, they usually want their child to have the opportunity to use that 
equipment at school just as in other environments (Rogers, 1993). Other issues are 
that of third party payers prolonging services in the interest of protecting the school 
from liability. Parents also have legitimate concerns about the kinds of records 
generated by third party claims. Some records may indicate that their child's
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condition is deteriorating when, in fact, the child is showing improvement (Rogers, 
1993).
Programs in the public sector, including Medicaid and Supplemental Security 
Income, as well as specialized programs for victims of specific diseases, also provide 
funds to families. Within a state, agencies serving persons with mental illness and 
developmental disabilities, or agencies charged with providing vocational 
rehabilitation, may have overlapping responsibilities with public education 
(Rogers, 1993). Ross's observation that, "Joint cooperative agreements between 
various agencies on state and local levels can facilitate the delivery of related services 
to handicapped children and enable the agencies to share costs and personnel" (Ross, 
1980, p. 36), suggested a model in which decreased redundancy of services might 
result in a net benefit for recipients of those services. Sharing of responsibilities 
between public agencies and cooperation among public agencies were clearly 
outcomes envisioned by Congress [20 U.S.C. 1143 (a)(2)].
The outcomes envisioned by the U.S. Congress did not materialize when 
various public agencies were beset by chronic budget shortages when the U.S. 
Congress failed to adequately fund special education. For a while, hope of children 
receiving these monies were lost because of interagency bickering. The U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Bowen v. Massachusetts settled disagreements 
between agencies by determining that discrimination against children occurs when 
such agencies fail to fund services for children which they would otherwise fund for 
adults. This case involved the issue of whether certain services to residents of state
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facilities for persons with mental retardation could be reimbursed under Medicaid.
This outcome provided guidance for public agency cooperation in funding of special 
education costs.
The need to consider interagency agreements is another source of confusion in 
the interpretation of federal laws concerning third party billing. Different federal 
agencies in different branches of the federal government write their own regulations 
which may conflict with one another. A number of governmental agencies define 
themselves as an "insurer of last resort" (Rogers, 1993). In any particular situation, 
only one agency or company could actually be an insurer of last resort. The problems 
surround the issue of who will pay. The result is that citizens must seek relief from the 
confusion of these many regulations from the courts.
Two court cases serve as examples of this problem. In an Illinois case, the 
court found, based on the interrelationship of the agencies' responsibilities and their 
shared responsibility for forcing the family into the courts for relief, that each was 
equally responsible for the parents' attorney's fees {Consolidated School District No. 
54 V. Illinois State Board o f Education, 1991). The holdings in this case are 
instructive because they suggest that the courts may be willing to force interagency 
cooperation in situations in which various agencies' failure to cooperate causes 
problems for the children they are supposedly serving (Rogers, 1993). The other 
court decision, McClain v. Smith, (1991), appears to lead in a different direction from 
the Illinois case. This decision addressed the funding problems of the local districts 
when interagency agreements are inadequate. The court agreed with the local district
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that the interagency agreement failed to provide adequate guidance and the state's 
lack of full compliance with Part B of the Individuals With Disabilities Act (IDEA- B) 
in developing an adequate interagency agreement did not relieve the local school 
district of responsibility for the cost of the child's educational services or of the 
responsibility for the family's legal expenses. The court found that these failures by 
the state’s education and mental health agencies did not cause the family any undue 
expense. Thus, while the court ordered the state's mental and education agencies to 
revise their interagency agreement, the responsibility of paying the cost of the child's 
education and her parents' legal expenses remained with the local school district 
(Rogers, 1993).
Another source of ambiguity is that states and local districts have considerable 
latitude on how programs such as Medicaid are implemented. The collection of 
Medicaid reimbursements is of special interest to public school personnel. The hope 
that third party billing could be a viable means of tapping Medicaid was encouraged 
by the outcome of the Bowen (1988) case. The Court's finding was that eligibility 
criteria could not arbitrarily discriminate against the residents of those facilities in 
determining their eligibility for Medicaid. Following the concept to its logical 
conclusion would suggest that children could not be discriminated against in eligibility 
for Medicaid simply by reason that the service was listed in their Individual Education 
Programs (Rogers, 1993). This conclusion appears to be far more sweeping than the 
language of the resulting regulation that reads;
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Nothing in this title shall be construed as prohibiting or restricting, or 
authorizing the [Health and Human Services] Secretary to prohibit or restrict 
payment under subsection (a) for medical assistance for covered services 
furnished to a handicapped child because such services are included in the 
child's individualized education program established pursuant to Part B of the 
Education o f the Handicapped Act or furnished to a handicapped infant or 
toddler because services are included in the child's individual family service 
plan adopted pursuant to Part H of such Act [42 U.S.C. 1396(c)].
In another case, the medical and health service providers of the nation are 
watching with great interest the manner in which Medicaid service delivery is being 
considered in the State of Oregon (Daniels, 1991; Hadom, 1991; Health Economics 
Research, Inc. 1991). The model is described as a modified cost effectiveness 
approach with a great deal o f public and professional input into the priorities. 
Specified services are provided as opposed to identifying specific persons who are 
eligible (Rogers, 1993). This approach attempts to make certain life protective and 
life saving services available to all who need them. The model places heavy emphasis 
on vital health services for children, such as for immunizations and treatment of 
accidental injuries from which full recovery can be anticipated.
Some school administrators encourage the use of families' own private health 
insurance benefits when their policies cover the same sorts of special education 
related services the schools may need to provide. This attitude had its genesis in an 
ambiguous provision within both the Individuals With Disabilities Act (IDEA) and the 
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The provision states that nothing relieves an 
insurer or similar third party from an otherwise valid obligation to provide or pay for
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services provided to a handicapped child (Code of Federal Regulations, 1990, p. 34, 
300.301).
The Council for Exceptional Children (CEC) did a study on policy issues and 
implications of third party payments for special education services. Part of this study 
examined insurance companies' policies and practices regarding third party payments 
for related services. The CEC study concluded that, "school systems are not eligible 
for reimbursement under the individual's group health insurance policy, and that 
othenvise reimbursable services are not reimbursable to the school system when the 
system provides those services" (Ross, 1980, p. 1). It is tempting for school 
administrators to seek to stretch their special education dollars by having equipment 
and services reimbursed through private funds instead of public funds. Such requests, 
however, put more burden on the family in the area of increased insurance premiums 
(Rogers, 1993).
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CHAPTER III
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
The equity o f Louisiana’s special education financing system will be examined 
using Beme and Stiefel’s (1984) equity framework. This framework offered different 
concepts o f equity based on responses to four questions: 1) Equity for whom? 2) What 
is the object to be fairly distributed? 3) Which equity principle assesses fair distribution? 
and 4) How is equity to be measured?
The special education students in the State o f Louisiana is the response to the 
first question of “equity for whom”. The object to be fairly distributed are per-pupil 
revenues. Per-pupil revenues are defined as each local district’s total special education 
allotment from the State of Louisiana divided by the total special education enrollment 
for each district. Each district’s special education allotment is detailed in the Budget 
Letter received by the district from the Louisiana Department of Education (LDE). 
Special education enrollments are reported in the Louisiana Statistical Report published 
yearly by the LDE. The equal treatment of equals principle is represented by the degree 
of disparity in per-pupil revenues for special education. The state’s special education 
financing system moved closer to or further from equality as the disparity in per-pupil 
revenues either decreased or increased. The equity of the state’s special education 
financing system is measured by using univariate statistics which capture the variability in 
the dispersion of revenues in a given distribution.
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The principle of “equal opportunity” which states that there should be no 
relationship between per-pupil revenues, resources, programs, outcomes, and per-pupil 
wealth or fiscal capacity (Beme & Stiefel, 1984) was of great importance to this study. 
This principle was represented by the standard of fiscal neutrality which specifies that 
there should be no relationship between local fiscal capacity and per-pupil revenues. In 
general, fiscal capacity refers to the available wealth of a school district. For this study, 
two alternative definitions of local fiscal capacity are utilized.
Local fiscal capacity was defined alternatively as the per-capita income of the 
school district and then by the RTS system. The per-capita income of a district is a 
logical choice for use as a measure of that district’s fiscal capacity because it is the 
traditional measure used and is considered by most experts to be the single most 
important determinant of governmental expenditures (Geske & Lacost, 1990). Second, 
local fiscal capacity was defined using the Representative Tax System (RTS) approach. 
Louisiana began using this approach in the 1992-1993 school year. This approach 
permits meaningful comparisons of the ability of local governments to raise revenues to 
support public services (Cohn & Geske, 1990). Under the RTS approach, local fiscal 
capacity is expressed in dollars per capita, and indicates the relative ability to pay of state 
and local governments (Cohn & Geske, 1990). The LDE uses an adaptation of this 
system and computes the fiscal capacity of local districts by combining sales and 
property tax capacity per-pupil for each district, and then calculates the individual 
district’s index on a relative basis to the statewide average (Langley & Geske, 1994). 
These data rank the districts fi-om highest to lowest. Changes in the relationship between
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these alternative measures of fiscal capacity and per-pupil revenues provides an 
assessment of whether Louisiana’s equal opportunity for special education students 
increased, decreased, or remained stable between 1980 and 1992.
Distributions of per-pupil revenues for special education were examined for 
school years 1980-1981, 1985-1986, 1990-1991, and 1992-1993. The year 1980 was 
chosen because the federal regulations of the late 1970’s in regard to special education 
had time to take effect and 1992-1993 was the last year for which data were available. 
These distributions were explored quantitatively by using selected univariate dispersion 
statistics described in detail in the methodology section.
Methodology
This study was guided by the following research questions:
1) What is the ratio of costs between regular education and special education 
from 1980 to 1992 and has this ratio increased or decreased over the period 
examined?
2) Has the degree of disparity in per-pupil revenues for special education in 
Louisiana among the sixty-six local districts changed over the last decade, and 
if so, how?
3) Can improvements be made to special education finance models 
which can help monitor special education costs in Louisiana?
4) Can special education finance models be developed which will lessen the 
degree of disparity in per-pupil revenues among local districts in Louisiana?
5) Are there relationships between Louisiana’s local school districts’ fiscal 
capacity and special education per-pupil revenues, fiscal capacity and 
district special education enrollment, and district special education enrollment 
and per-pupil revenue, and have these relationships changed over the last 
decade, and if so, how?
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The first question addressed the issue of the ratio of costs between regular 
education and special education by examining per-pupil revenues to determine whether 
or not this ratio changed over the last decade. The second question addressed the issue 
of per-pupil revenue disparity in special education among the sixty-six local school 
districts in order to determine if revenue disparity has been growing or declining. The 
third question was concerned with whether or not special education costs could be 
monitored by a finance formula. The fourth question was concerned with whether or not 
improvements could be made to a special education finance model which would improve 
equity of per-pupil revenue among the local school districts. The fifth question addressed 
whether or not relationships existed between district fiscal capacity and special education 
per-pupil revenues, district fiscal capacity and special education enrollments, and special 
education enrollments and special education per-pupil revenues, and whether or not 
these relationships changed over the last decade.
The ratio of costs between regular education and special education will be 
examined by comparing per-pupil revenues for regular and special education. The degree 
of disparity in per-pupil revenues among the local districts utilizing the Coefficient of 
Variation, Federal Range Ratio, and the McLoone Index will be examined. Four pupil 
weighting special education finance models will be presented. Relationships between 
local district fiscal capacity and per-pupil revenues, local district fiscal capacity and 
enrollments of special education students, and local district enrollments and per-pupil 
revenues will be examined by setting up bivariate correlations between each pair of 
variables.
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Per-F*upil Revenues For Regular and Special Education
The ratio of costs between regular education and special education may be 
determined by comparing rates of increase in per-pupil revenues for regular and special 
educaiton. Mean per-pupil revenues for regular and special education were converted to 
constant dollars for years 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1992. This conversion procedure is 
commonly called a To From Index and may be bound in Appendix E. The average annual 
percent increase will be calculated for each year, and the average annual percent increase 
from 1980 to 1992 will be calculated. These percentages for regular education and 
special education will be expressed as a ratio.
Degree of Disparity in Per-Pupil Revenues
The degree of disparity in special education per-pupil revenues is measured by 
univariate statistics which capture the variability in the dispersion of revenues in a given 
distribution. Several different measures are availible which assess how far the 
distribution is from that point at which each student in the distribution would receive the 
same dollar amount ( e.g. perfect equality). Three measures, the Coefficient of Variation 
(CV), the Federal Range Ratio (FRR), and the McLoone Index (MI) were selected to 
assess the degree of disparity of per-pupil revenues for special education.
Coeficient of Variation
The coefficient of variation (CV) utilizes the entire distribution, standardizes the 
data (Hickrod, 1985), and is considered sensitive to transfers from the upper level of the
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distribution to the lower level, “in that it would show more equality (decrease in value) if 
such a redistribution occurred” (Odden, Berne & Stiefel, 1979, p. 22). The CV is 
defined as the square root of the variance of per-pupil revenues (standard deviation) 
divided by the mean per-pupil revenue. The further the CV moves from 0, the more 
inequitable is the state school financing system (Berne & Stiefel, 1984). The algebraic 
expression of the CV may be found in Appendix F.
Federal Range Ratio
The federal range ratio was included since it is the designated measure used in 
federal school regulations which apply to the distribution of state financial aid (Lacost, 
1988). It is defined as the difference between the 95th and 5th percentiles of the 
distribution of per-pupil revenues divided by the per-pupil revenues at the 5th percentile. 
The upper and lower five percentiles are not included, since they could be construed as 
unrepresentative of the norm (Lacost, 1988). As the value moves closer to 0, the 
distribution of per-pupil revenues approaches equality. The calculation of the FRR is 
included in Appendix F.
McLoone Index
The McLoone Index focuses only on the school revenue distribution below the 
median. The rationale for its inclusion was that “bringing up low spending school 
divisions” should be at least the minimum goal of an equalization formula (McLoone, 
1974). The McLoone Index is the ratio of per-pupil revenues below the median to the
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sum of per-pupil revenues that would exist if each pupil below the median received the 
median per-pupil revenue. The values range from 0 to 1. This measure differs from the 
other two measures in that the closer the MI is to 1.0, the greater the equality for the 
pupils below the median. The algabraic expression of the MI is included in Appendix F.
Special Education Finance Models
Finance models for special education must be developed in order to demonstrate 
how the state financing system may monitor special education costs, monitor enrollment 
fluctuations in disability categories over time, increase equality of per-pupil revenues 
among the local districts, and increase funding for severely handicapped students. 
Specifically, these models should attempt to bring more districts closer to an established 
median level of funding which already exists in the current state financing formula. This 
median level is chosen due to the existing financial framework of limited resources and 
the “no new taxes” philosophy of local districts.
For these models, special education funding will be conceptually defined as 
excess costs. Excess costs in general are defined as the additional costs of educating 
students in special education beyond the cost of educating those students in regular 
education. For this study, excess costs were conceptualized as “the supplemental costs 
for a special education student for services outside the realm of regular education 
(Moore, Strang, Schwartz, & Braddock, 1988) .” They are defined in terms of programs 
and services provided by districts rather than the expenditure difference between cost per 
student of special and regular education (Hartman, 1988).
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Special education categories of disabilities listed by the LDE would be 
categorized as supplemental programs or replacement programs. Supplemental 
programs are programs and services provided in addition to the regular education 
program received by the student. Replacement programs are programs and services 
provided instead of the regular education program received by the student (Hartman,
1990). For example, the milder disabilities such as Speech Impaired, Learning Disabled, 
and Non-Categorical Preschool would be classified as being in supplemental programs 
because these students are mainstreamed into the regular education classes.
Replacement programs would include disabilities such as Autism, Traumatic Brain 
Injury, and Deaf-Blind students because these students are served in self-contained 
classrooms instead of regular education classrooms.
All sixteen categories of disabilities listed by the LDE would be defined either 
supplemental or replacement according to the severity of the disability. Students in 
supplemental programs would receive one weight. For example, a weight of 1.5 would 
generate fifty percent more revenues. Students in replacement programs would receive a 
larger weight. The definitions of programs and the weights may be manipulated in order 
to determine how a particular formula will impact local districts. In addition, the cost of 
implementing these models to the state may be projected.
Fiscal Capacity, Enrollments, and Per-Pupil Revenues
In order to assess the relationships of research questions four, five, and six, 
bivariate correlations were set up between fiscal capacity (defined as district per-capita
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income and the RTS index) and per-pupil revenues, fiscal capacity and district special 
education enrollments, and district special education enrollments and per-pupil revenues. 
Bivariate correlations reveal whether or not a relationship exists between two variables.
A quantitative index may be computed which is called a correlation coefficient. This 
statistic describes the extent to which the two variables are related. The correlation 
coefficient can take on values of between-1.0 and + 1 0  inclusive. The sign indicates the 
direction of the relationship, so a plus sign indicates a positive relationship and a minus 
sign indicates a negative relationship. The absolute value of the coefficient indicates the 
magnitude of the relationship. A correlation coefficient o f+.10 or -.10 indicates there is 
little relationship between the variables, whereas a coefficient of +.90 or -.90 indicates a 
strong relationship. When there is no relationship between the variables, the correlation 
coefficient is 0 (Hinkle, Wiersma, & Jurs, 1988, pp. 106-107).
Data Collection
McLaughlin and Owings (1989) offered conceptions of how extant data could 
be reformatted in order to study implementation o f special education financing programs. 
Three databases were created according to the specific needs of each of the three 
components of the study. The necessary financial and demographic information needed 
for this study was obtained from the Louisiana Financial and Statistical Report published 
by the Louisiana Department of Education(LDE), budget letters sent to each district by 
the LDE, and a database containing per-capita income data published by the U.S. 
Government. Data were collected for selected years 1980, 1985,1990, and 1993.
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These years were chosen because they provided data throughout the time period of most 
of the special education legislation and reforms in the United States.
The data for examination of per-pupil revenues included the name of each local 
district in Louisiana from the Louisiana Financial and Statistical Report, the total district 
special education enrollment for years 1980,1985, 1990, and 1992 from the Louisiana 
Financial and Statistical Report, the total special education allotment for each district 
from the budget letters for years 1980, 1985,1990, and 1992, and finally, the per-pupil 
revenue for each district for years 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1992. The per-pupil revenue 
for each district was calculated by dividing each district’s special education enrollment 
into the special education allocation.
The database for the special education models consists of all data for year 1992 
contained in the first component. In addition, the per-pupil funding outlined in the 
1994 budget letter was listed. Also, the student enrollment for each of the sixteen 
disability categories as defined by the LDE in the Regulations For Implementation of the 
Exceptional Children’s Act is given. The definition of category by the LDE determines 
the weight given by the different special education finance models.
Mild Mental Retardation (MMR) is defined as significantly subaverage general 
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior 
and manifested during the developmental period (Regulations for Implementation 
of the Exceptional Children’s Act, 1994, p. 103).
Speech Impaired (SI) is defined as a communication disorder, such as stuttering, 
impaired articulation, a language impairment, or a voice impairment which 
adversely effects a student’s educational performance (Regulations for 
Implementation of the Exceptional Children’s Act, 1994, p. 110).
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Emotional/Behavior Disorder (ED) means a disability characterized by 
behavioral or emotional responses so different from appropriate age cultural, and 
ethnic norms that they adversely affect performance. Performance includes 
academic, social, vocational or personal skills. Such a disability is more than a 
temporary, expected response to stressful events in the environment; is 
consistently exhibited in two different settings; and persists despite 
individualized intervention within general education and other settings. This 
disorder can co-exist with other disorders (Regulations for Implementation o f the 
Exceptional Children’s Act, 1994, p.99).
Learning Disabled (LD) are severe and unique learning problems as a result of 
significant difficulties in the acquisition, organization, or expression of specific 
academic skills or concepts. These learning problems are typically manifested I 
school functioning as significantly poor performance in such areas as reading, 
writing, spelling, arithmetic reasoning or calculation, oral expression or 
comprehension, or the acquisition of basic concepts. The term includes such 
conditions as attention deficit, perceptual handicaps or process disorders, 
minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, developmental aphasia, or sensorimoter 
dysfunction, when consistent with these criteria. The term does not include 
students who have learning problems which are primarily the result of visual, 
hearing, or motor impairments; of mental disabilities; of a behavior disorder; or 
of motor impairments; of mental disabilities; of a behavior disorder; or of 
environmental, cultural, educational, or economic disadvantage (Regulations for 
Implementation of the Exceptional Children’s Act, 1994, p. 103).
Non-Categorical Preschool (NC) is an exceptionality in which students three 
years through age five, but not enrolled in a state approved kindergarten, are 
identified as having a disabling condition which is described, according to 
functional or developmental levels. Students with disabilities who will turn three 
during the school year may also be identified as Non-Categorical Preschool 
(Regulations for Implementation of the Exceptional Children’s Act, 1994, p.
104).
Hearing Impairment (HH) is a hearing loss that significantly interferes with 
educational performance. It includes students who are Deaf or Hard of Hearing 
or who have Unilateral Hearing Loss or High Frequency Hearing Loss 
(Regulations for Implementation of the Exceptional Children’s Act, 1994, p.
100).
Deaf (D) the same definition is used for hearing impairment.
Visually Impaired (VI) is an impairment which, even with correction, adversely 
affects a student’s educational performance. The term visual impairment includes 
students who have blindness and partial seeing (Regulations for Implementation 
o f the Exceptional Children’s Act, 1994, p. 112).
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Orthopedic impairment (01) is a severe orhtopedic impairment which adversely 
affects a student’s educational performance. The term includes disabilities 
caused by congenital anomaly (e.g., clubfoot, absence of some member); 
impairments caused by disease (e.g., poliomyelitis, bone tuberculosis); and 
disabilities from other causes (e.g., cerebral palsy, amputations, and fractures or 
bums which cause contractures) (Regulations for Implementation of the 
Exceptional Children’s Act, 1994, p. 105).
Other Health Impairment (OKI) means limited strength, vitality, or alertness, due 
to chronic or acute health problems such as a heart condition, tuberculosis, 
rheumatic fever, nephritis, asthma, sickle cell anemia, hemophilia, epilepsy, lead 
poisening, leukemia, diabetes, ventilator assistance, traumatic head injury or 
attention deficit disorder (Regulations for Implementation of the Exceptional 
Children’s Act, 1994, p. 104).
Deaf-blindness (DB) is concomitant hearing and visual impairments, the 
combination of which causes such severe communication and other 
developmental and educational problems that such students require specific 
special education services to meet the needs resulting fi-om both impairments 
(Regulations for Implementation of the Exceptional Childrens Act, 1994, p. 98). 
Multiple Disabilities (MH) is concomitant impairments (such as mental 
disabilities-blind; mental disabilities-orthopedic impairment), the combination of 
which causes such severe educational problems that these pupils cannot be 
accommodated in special education programs for one of the impairments. The 
term does not include students with deaf-blindness nor may Noncategorical 
Preschool be used as one of the two impairments to classify for multiple 
disabilities (Regulations for Implementation of the Exceptional Childrens Act, 
1994, p. 103).
Autism (A) is a developmental disability significantly afifecting verbal and 
nonverbal communication and social interaction, generally evident before age 3, 
that adversely affects a student’s educational performance. Other characteristics 
often associated with autism are engagement in repetitive activities and 
stereotyped movements, resistance to environmental change or change in daily 
routines, and unusual responses to sensory experiences. The term does not apply 
if a student’s educational performance is adversely affected primarily because the 
student has a serious emotional disturbance (Regulations for Implementation of 
the Exceptional Childrens Act, 1994, p. 97).
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is an acquired injury to the brain caused by an 
external physical force, resulting in total or partial functional disability or 
psychosocial impairment, or both, that adversely affects a student’s educational 
performance. The term applies to open or closed head injuries resulting in 
impairments in one or more areas, such as cognition, language, memory, 
attention, reasoning, abstract thinking, judgement, problem solving, sensory.
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perceptual, or motor abilities, information processing and speech. Traumatic 
brain injury does not apply to brain injuries that are congenital or degenerative, 
or brain injuries induced by birth trauma (Regulations for Implementation of the 
Exceptional Childrens Act, 1994, p. 112).
Gifted & Talented (G&T) are demonstrated abilities that give evidence of high 
performance in academic and intellectual aptitudes and possession of measurable 
abilities that give evidence of unique talent in visual or performing arts, or both 
(Regulations for Implementation of the Exceptional Childrens Act, 1994, p. 100, 
1 1 1 ).
Educationally Handicapped (EH) is a rate of acquisition and/or degree of 
retention of information or educational skills significantly slower than the rate 
expected for students of the same age. This definition applies only to those 
students classified as educationally handicapped/slow learner prior to July 28, 
1983 (Regulations for Implementation of the Exceptional Childrens Act, 1994, p. 
99).
In order to determine relationships to fiscal capacity, per-capita income figures 
for each district for all of the years were included. In addition, the RTS data for fiscal 
capacity of each district was included for year 1992. This year was the only year for this 
type of data to be available.
Unit of Analysis
This study included the special education population of students enrolled in the 
sixty-six public school city/parish systems in Louisiana and was restricted to the 
provision of services of special education preschool through grade twelve. The 
individual school district was the specific unit of analysis for all distributions of data.
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Primary Data Analyses
Analysis of the disparity in per-pupil revenues yielded twelve distributions of 
data. Each distribution consisted of sixty-six pieces of data representing each local 
school district. The distribution category titles were Special Education Enrollments, 
Special Education Allotments, and Per-Pupil Revenues for each of the selected years 
1980,1985,1990, and 1992. Descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations, and 
ranges) were calculated for each of these distributions. The degree of disparity in per- 
pupil revenues was analyzed by assessing the tendency of the per-pupil revenues to move 
towards or away from equality through four assessment years from 1980 until 1992.
Data for the special education finance models consisted of the twelve 
distributions used to analyze special education per-pupil revenue disparity, as well as 
seventeen other distributions for a total of twenty nine distributions. The additional 
seventeen distributions consisted of the sixteen distributions of data representing the 
disability categories and one column consisting of the per-pupil revenue amount 
established by the Louisiana Department of Education (LDE). This column of one 
amount of revenue was included so that calculations could be made when the different 
pupil weights were manipulated. The different financing models were derived by 
manipulating the weights of these various categories and analysing the result of this 
manipulation on the individual districts.
The examination of relationships between district fiscal capacity, enrollments, and 
per-pupil revenue yielded seventeen distributions of data. The distributions used in the 
pupil revenue disparity analysis were utilized in addition to four more distributions of
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per-capita income data. For the 1992 year, the RTS fiscal capacity index was included 
to compare the results of the correlational measures by different methods of assessing 
district wealth. In order to determine whether relationships existed between district 
special education enrollments and per-pupil revenues, district special education 
enrollments and fiscal capacity, and special education per-pupil revenues and fiscal 
capacity, the correlational measures were used.
Ancillary Data Analyses
The format in which the raw data was collected enabled other analyses to be 
undertaken. The enrollments of each mild disability category may be examined in order 
to determine whether or not a significant difference of enrollment is occurring in each 
category over time. To accomplish this analysis, enrollments of the mild disability 
categories would be expressed as percentages of the total special educaiton enrollment 
for each district for assessment years 1980, 1990, and 1992. The year 1985 is omitted 
due to the fact that Noncategorical Preschool enrollments were not reported that year. 
An ANOVA would be computed for each mild disability category to determine whether 
or not there were significant differences in the enrollment of each mild disability 
category. The alpha level was set at .05 because of the exploratory nature of this study.
Significant differences of enrollments in the mild disability categories may be due 
to poor definition of disability. Hallahan, Keller, and Ball’s (1986) methodology have 
enabled researchers to compare the variability of prevalence rates from district to district 
for each of the categories of special education under the assumption that variability of
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prevalence rates is one index of how consistently a category is defined and how 
consistently identification procedures are followed.
This method would involve calculating the variance of the prevalence rates across 
districts for each of the mild disability categories and testing for the homogeneity of 
variance for these various categories. One problem, however is that the means among the 
categories are widely discrepant. Since these means are widely discrepant and the 
variances need to be compared, and the sizes of the variances are related to the size of 
the means, the Coefficient of Variation (Friedman, 1972) may be used. The Coefficient 
of Variation (CV) previously discussed, is the ratio of the standard deviation of a 
distribution to the mean of the distribution. In this data analyses, the CV will be 
expressed as a percentage.
To accomplish this analysis, the five categories of mild disability (MMR, SI, ED, 
LD, NC) will be expressed as percentages of total special education enrollments for each 
district. Descriptive statistics will be calculated and the CV calculated. The disabilities 
will be ranked by their CV with the lower value of the CV the better defined category.
The assessment of whether or not special education funding increased or 
decreased at the same rate of regular education funding was accomplished by calculating 
the rate of change for each category of data among the four assessment years and then 
determining whether or not these rates were equivalent. The assessment of the growth 
of special education enrollment in relation to regular education enrollment was 
accomplished by expressing special education enrollment as a percentage of regular
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education enrollment and determining whether this percentage increased or decreased 
throughout the period of study.
ANOVA’s were computed for each disability category of special education to 
determine whether or not there were significant differences in enrollments for each 
category over the period of the study.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the conceptual framework which 
guided this study. The methodology used to analyze the data was presented which 
included statistical methods to be used. Finally, a format for presenting the results for 
the analyses was presented.
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
This chapter presents findings associated with the costs and equity of 
Louisiana’s special education finance system. The first section compares the costs of 
regular education and special education by examining the rates of increase in both 
areas across school districts. The cost of special education is also considered by 
monitoring the enrollments over time of students with mild disabilities. The second 
section presents the findings of the disparity in special education per-pupil revenues 
across school districts. The third section examines the effects of four different special 
education finance models on the costs and equity of Louisiana’s special education 
program. The fourth section presents findings concerning relationships between 
district fiscal capacity and special education per-pupil revenues, district fiscal capacity 
and special education enrollments, and district enrollments and special education per- 
pupil revenues. The final section revisits the cost issue by examining the variability of 
prevalence rates for the mild disability categories.
Per-Pupil Revenues For Regular and Special Education
Table 4-1 presents a comparison between the mean district per-pupil revenues
for special education and regular education in Louisiana for the years 1980, 1985,
1990 and 1992. Specifically, the first research question asked:
What is the ratio of costs between regular education and special education 
from 1980 to 1992 and has this ratio increased or decreased over the period 
examined?
75
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Special education per-pupil revenues increased at a much greater rate than did regular 
education per-pupil revenues. From 1980 to 1985, regular education per-pupil
Table 4-1. District Mean Per-Pupil Revenues and Average Annual Percent Increase 
For Regular Education and Special Education in Louisiana For Years 1980, 1985, 
1990, and 1992 in Constant 1993 Dollars.
Year
Mean PPREV 
Regular Ed.
Average Annual 
Percent Increase
Mean PPREV 
Special Ed.
Average Annual 
Percent Increase
1980 $3598 $1856
1985 $3892 2% $2474 6%
1990 $4088 1% $3453 7%
1992 $4385 4% $4097 9%
Average Annual Percent 
Increase 1980-1992 1.7% 6.8%
PPREV = Per-Pupil Revenue
revenues increased at an average rate of 2% annually and special education per-pupil 
revenues increased at an average rate of 6% annually. From 1985 to 1990 regular 
education per-pupil revenues increased at an average rate of 1% annually and special 
education per-pupil revenues increased at an average rate of 7% annually. Between 
1990 and 1992, regular education per-pupil revenues increased at an average rate of 
4% annually and special education per-pupil revenues increased at an average rate of 
9% annually. The average overall annual rate of increase from 1980 to 1992 for 
regular education and special education per-pupil revenues was 1.7% and 6.8%
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respectively. Expressed as a ratio, the increase in per-pupil revenue for special 
education versus regular education was 4:1. In other words, special education per- 
pupil revenues increased 4 times the rate of regular education per-pupil revenues from 
1980 until 1992.
Examining the 1990-1992 data, special education per-pupil revenues increased 
2.5 times the rate o f regular education per-pupil revenues. This decrease in the ratio 
of per-pupil revenue increases in special education versus regular education was 
attributed to increases in regular education per-pupil revenues, not decreases in 
special education per-pupil revenues. This finding that the decrease in the ratio of per- 
pupil revenue for regular and special education implied the “placeholder” formula 
instituted in 1990 did not reduce costs. This formula took districts’ special education 
expenditures less capital outlay from the previous year, calculated 2% of these 
expenditures and added this amount to the previous year expenditures. The sum of 
special education per-pupil expenditures less capital outlay and the 2% calculation 
was the special education allotment for the following year. Per-pupil revenue 
increases for special education continued to escalate compared to regular education.
Increased enrollments of mild disability students contributed to the increases 
in special education costs because the number o f students determine the amount of 
money a district receives from the state. Table 4-2 displays average district mild 
disability enrollment means for years 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1992 and their increase 
or decrease for this time period. These five disability categories make up 93% of 
Louisiana’s total special education enrollment. Major increases in special education
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enrollments occurred in two of the mild disability categories from 1980-1992. The 
Emotional/Behavior Disorder category increased 53 percent and the Noncategorical 
Preschool category increased 725 percent. The Mild-Mental Retarded category 
declined 4 percent, the Speech Impaired category increased 4 percent, and the 
Learning Disabled category increased 5 percent.
Table 4-2. Average District Enrollments in Mild Disability Categories in Louisiana 
For Years 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1992 and Percent Increase or Decrease.
Percent Increase/Decrease
Category 1980 1985 1990 1992 1980-1990 1990-1992 1980-1992
MMR 174 144 156 167 -10% +7% -4%
SI 252 314 257 262 +2% +2% +4%
ED 47 55 62 72 +32% +16% +53%
LD 468 489 424 489 -10% +15% +5%
NC 16 NR 103 132 +543% +28% +725%
MMR= Mild/Mental Retarded; SI = Speech Impaired;
ED= Emotional/Behavior Disorder; LD= Learning Disabled; 
NC= Noncategorical Preschool; NR= Not Reported
Comparing increases and decreases in categorical enrollments between 1980- 
1990 and 1990-1992 reveal other changes. Mild Mental Retarded enrollments 
increased from -10 percent to +7 percent. Learning Disabled enrollments increased 
from -10 percent to +15 percent. Emotional/Behavior Disorder and Noncategorical
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Preschool continued to show increases of 16 percent and 28 percent respectively. 
Taken together, these findings indicate that the only disability that remained constant 
over time was Speech Impaired.
Changes in Disparities of Per-Pupil Revenues
This study addresses the issue of disparities in per-pupil revenues for special
education among the sixty-six school districts in Louisiana. Greater equality among
pupils is believed to exist when there is less disparity in per-pupil revenues across
districts. This notion of equity rests on the belief that students with comparable needs
should receive equal shares of revenue, such that a student in district one would
receive the same amount of funding as students in districts two through sixty-six.
Specifically, the second research question asked:
Has the degree of disparity in per-pupil revenues for special education among 
the sixty-six school districts in Louisiana changed over the last decade, 
and if so, how?
First, the standard deviation and range of special education district per-pupil revenues 
were compared to that of regular education. Second, the Coefficient of Variation 
(CV), the Federal Range Ratio (FRR), and the McLoone Index (MI) were used to 
measure changes in the disparity in per-pupil revenues for special education.
Standard Deviation and Range
Table 4-3 presents comparisons between the standard deviations and ranges of 
district per-pupil revenues for regular education and special education in Louisiana for
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the years 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1992. The standard deviations revealed that 
disparities in special education per-pupil revenue across districts increased at a greater 
rate than did disparities in regular education per-pupil revenues from 1980 until 1992. 
The largest increase in the standard deviation for special education occurred between 
1990 and 1992 ( SD = 592 in 1990 to SD = 1050 in 1992), whereas the largest 
increase for regular education occurred between 1980 and 1985 ( SD = 288 in 1980 
to SD = 466 in 1985).
Table 4-3. Standard Deviations and Ranges For Special Education and Regular 
Education District Per-Pupil Revenues For Years 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1992.
Year 1980 1985 1990 1992
PPREV. SPECIAL EDUCATION
Standard Deviation 197 374 592 1050
Range 988 1750 2607 6465
PPREV. REGULAR EDUCATION
Standard Deviation 288 466 523 686
Range 1578 2928 2972 3597
PPREV = Per-Pupil Revenue
The range for special education per-pupil revenues also increased at a greater 
rate than did the range for regular education per-pupil revenues. In 1980, the range 
for special education per-pupil revenues was $988, and by 1992 this range had 
increased to $6465. In contrast, over this same period the range of regular education 
per-pupil revenues increased from $1578 to $3597. In other words, the range of 
special education per-pupil revenues increased by 554% between 1980 and 1992 and
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the range of regular education per-pupil revenues increased 128% over the same 
period.
This increase in the standard deviation and in the range of per-pupil revenues 
was due to the “placeholder” formula for special education which went into effect in 
1990. Special education funding from the state to the local districts was limited by 
this formula. Consequently, the burden of finding additional revenues to fund the 
increasing cost of special education was shifted fi"om the state to the local districts. 
Some districts were able to meet the challenge of providing this additional funding for 
their special education programs, while others were not. The change of disparity in 
per-pupil revenues between 1990 and 1992 reflected the reality of some districts’ 
ability to absorb this added burden of funding special education and some districts’ 
inability to absorb this added burden.
Coefficient of Variation
The Coefficient of Variation (CV) is a measure of the variability in a 
distribution of per-pupil revenues for special education. The CV is calculated by 
dividing the standard deviation by the mean value of the distribution. The quotient 
reveals the variation of per-pupil revenues for special education students. The higher 
the value of the CV, the greater the inequality that exists among the school districts in 
their per-pupil revenues for special education. For example, a CV equal to zero 
would indicate that two-thirds of the state’s special education students receive 
revenues equal to the statewide mean value of per-pupil revenues. If the mean per-
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pupil revenue were $2000 and the CV were zero, the middle sixtv-six percent of the 
students in the state would each be receiving $2000. This is the criterion for perfect 
equality as measured by the CV. Conversely, the further away the CV moves from 
zero, the greater the inequality in the local districts’ per-pupil revenues.
Table 4.4 presents the Coefficients of Variation (CV), statewide mean, and 
maximum dollar distance from the mean for two-thirds of the students in Louisiana. 
The range of dollars received by two-thirds of the students, and the difference in this 
range for school years 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1992 are also included. Although the
Table 4-4. Coefficient of Variation, Statewide Mean Per-Pupil Revenues For Special 
Education, and Dollar Distance From the Mean In Louisiana For School Years 1980, 
1985, 1990, and 1992.
Year CV
Statewide
Mean
Per-Pupil Revenues
Range of
Maximum Dollar Dollars 
Distance From the Received by 
Mean for 2/3 of 2/3 of the 
Students Students Difference
1980 183 SI 079 $197 $882-1276 $394
1985 198 $1890 $374 $1516-2264 $748
1990 .185 $3196 $591 $2605-3787 $1182
.. 1992 263 $4000 $1052 $2948-5052 $2104
CV = Coefficient of Variation
CV decreased between the 1985 and the 1990 school years, per-pupil revenues for 
special education based on this measure were more equal among the sixty-six districts 
in 1980 than in 1992. This increase in the CV overall (from 183 to .263) indicates
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that per-pupil revenue disparity has increased among the districts since 1980, with the 
most dramatic increase occurring since the 1990 school year.
Multiplying the Coefficient of Variation in 1980 (.183) times the mean value 
($1079) provides the amount of dollar variation from the mean for that year ($197). 
This variation is equal to one standard deviation from the mean. By subtracting $197 
from $1079, then adding $197 to $1079, the range of per-pupil revenues received by 
two-thirds of the special education students may be determined ($882 - $1276). By 
subtracting $882 from $1276, the difference may be determined. This difference in 
the ranges of the distribution is another way of examining the growth of the per-pupil 
revenue disparity. Between 1985 and 1990, the CV decreased, but the range of 
revenues for special education continued to increase as shown by the higher difference 
value of $1182 in 1990 compared to $748 in 1985. The range also indicates that the 
per-pupil revenue disparity accelerated between the years 1990 and 1992.
Louisiana enacted a “placeholder” formula in 1990 which operated by taking 
district special education per-pupil expenditures from the previous year less capital 
outlay and adding 2%. This amount was the per-pupil revenue for the following year. 
Districts had to absorb any additional special education costs. Some districts were 
able to generate more revenue for special education and others were not. The ability 
or inability of local districts to generate more revenue for special education is 
reflected by the increasing per-pupil revenue disparity indicated by the CV.
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Federal Range Ratio
The Federal Range Ratio (FRR) represents the difiference in district per-pupil 
revenues between the ninety-fifth and fifth percentiles divided by district per-pupil 
revenues at the fifth percentile. Exclusion of the values above the ninety-fifth 
percentile and below the fifth percentile is based on the premise that these values may 
distort results. A FRR value of zero represents perfect equality and occurs when the 
special education district per-pupil revenue at the ninety-fifth percentile and the fifth 
percentile are equal. The further the FRR value is from zero, the greater the disparity 
in the distribution of district per-pupil revenues in Louisiana. Table 4-5 reports the 
Federal Range Ratios, district per-pupil revenues at the ninety-fifth and fifth 
percentiles, and the resulting restricted range for school years 1980, 1985, 1990, and 
1992.
Table 4-5. The Federal Range Ratio, Values of the Fifth and Ninety-Fifth 
Percentile, District Per-Pupil Revenues, and the Restricted Range For School Years 
1980, 1985, 1990, and 1992 For Special Education in Louisiana.
District Per-Pupil Revenues
5th 95th Restricted
Year FRR Percentile Percentile Range
1980 .808 $800 $1440 $640
1985 .906 $1355 $2582 $1227
1990 .981 $2239 $4315 $2076
1992 1.509 $2323 $5829 $3506
FRR = Federal Range Ratio
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As the table reveals, there was a consistent increase in the FRR, values as well 
as a consistent increase in the restricted range between the ninety-fifth and fifth 
percentiles throughout the period examined. These measures indicated increased 
disparity among the districts’ per-pupil revenues for special education in 1992. The 
most noticable increase in the FRR occurred between the 1990 and 1992 school 
years. This increase reflects the negative effect of the provision in the 1990 
“placeholder” formula in regard to the equal distribution of per-pupil revenue across 
the sixty-six local school districts.
McLoone Index
The McLoone Index (MI) was designed to determine the degree of inequality 
in distributions below the median. The primary intent of the MI is to determine the 
amount of funding that is required to bring per-pupil revenues below the median up to 
the state median level of per-pupil revenue. An index of 1.0 represents equality, 
whereas an index of 0 indicates total inequality.
The increased percentage of per-pupil revenues needed to equalize the lower 
half of the distribution to the median per-pupil revenue may be calculated by 
subtracting the MI value from i .0 and converting this number into a percentage. This 
value is then multiplied by the number of students in the lower half of the distribution 
in order to arrive at the dollar amount required for the state to level up students 
below the median to the median level. Assume that the median per-pupil revenue was 
$1000, the MI is .90, and the student enrollment below the median is 6000. The
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amount needed by the state to bring sub-median students up to the median level of 
$1000 would be equal to six hundred thousand dollars, (i.e., 1.0 - .90 = .10; .10 x 
$1000 = $100; $100 X 6000 students = $600,000).
The McLoone Indices for each year of the study are presented in Table 4-6 
along with the increased percentage of special education per-pupil revenues needed to 
level up to the median. Also displayed for each year are the median per-pupil 
revenues, the amount of per-pupil revenue required to level up to the median, the 
number of students below the median, and the total cost to bring per-pupil revenue up 
to the median level.
Table 4-6. The McLoone Indices, Increased Per-Pupil Percentages, Median Per- 
Pupil Revenue, and the Total Cost to Level Up to the Median For Special Education 
in Louisiana For Years 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1992.
Year Index
Percent to 
Equalize to 
the Median 
Level
Median
Per-Pupil
Revenue
Per-Pupil 
Revenue 
Required 
to Level 
up to the 
Median
Number of 
Students 
below the 
Median
Total Cost to 
Level up to 
the Median
1980 .900 10.0% $1059 $106 32,273 $3,417,711
1985 .901 9.9% $1788 $177 43,312 $7,666,744
1990 .876 12.4% $3103 $385 26,132 $10,054,862
1992 .817 18.3% $3877 $710 24.736 $17,549,969
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From 1980 to 1985, the degree of disparity in per-pupil revenues remained the same 
with indices of .900 and .901 respectively. The magnitude of special education per- 
pupil revenue disparity increased between 1985 and 1990, showing an index of .876.
The greatest special education per-pupil revenue disparity occurred between 
the 1990 and 1992 school years with an index of .817. Moreover, districts which 
were below the median per-pupil revenue in 1990 were fiirther below the median per- 
pupil revenue in 1992. The increased 1992 per-pupil revenue (S710) required to 
bring districts up to the median almost doubled from the 1990 per-pupil revenue 
amount ($385), indicating that districts having below median per-pupil revenue were 
unsuccessful in generating additional revenue. This disparity reflects the unequal 
results of local districts to increase funding for special education without additional 
assistance from the state due to the “placeholder” formula.
In 1980, the state plan for funding special education allowed a 10% shortage 
in funding for each student below the median at the median dollar value of $1059.
The shortage actually decreased slightly to 9.9% by the 1985 school year, then grew 
to 12.4% in the 1990 school year. The largest increase to 18.3% occurred in the 
shortest period of time between the 1990 and 1992 school years. In other words, the 
cost of bringing districts up from the lower per-pupil revenue to the median level 
grew from approximately $10,000,000 in 1990 to $17,550,000 in 1992. To put this 
cost ($17,550,000) in perspective, the difference in the cost of bringing district per- 
pupil revenue up to the median from 1980 to 1990 was $6,637,152. The difference in 
the cost of bringing district per-pupil revenue up to the median from 1990 to 1992
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
88
was $7,495,107. This cost ($7,495,107) is greater for two years than for the previous 
decade. When local districts were left to generate their own revenues without 
assistance from the state, disparities in special education per-pupil revenues increased, 
as well as the overall cost to equalize special education per-pupil revenues across 
districts.
Summary of Changes In Disparities o f Per-Pupil Revenues
A summary of the findings utilizing the three measures of distributional 
inequality is reported in Table 4-7. The table lists the values for each measure for 
each examination period. A directional evaluation of the changes in disparities of per- 
pupil revenues from 1980 until 1992 is given in the final column.
Table 4-7. Summary of Findings of Changes of Disparities of Per-Pupil Revenues 
For Special Education For Years 1980,1985, 1990, and 1992 in Louisiana.
Degree of
Measure 1980 1985 1990 1992
1992 Versus 
1980
Coefficient of 
Variation .183 .198 .185 .263
Increased
Disparity
Federal 
Range Ratio .808 .906 .981 1.509
Increased
Disparity
McLoone
Index .900 .901 .876 .817
Increased
Disparity
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When the entire distribution was examined with the Coefficient of Variation, there 
was fluctuation in disparity, but overall, an increase in disparity for the period of time 
examined. The largest increase in per-pupil revenue disparity occurred between 1990 
and 1992. When per-pupil revenues for the upper and lower five percent o f the 
distribution were eliminated by using the Federal Range Ratio, there was an 
increasing trend toward greater disparity. The largest increase in per-pupil revenue 
disparity occurred between the 1990 and 1992. Finally, the McLoone Index 
measured a tendency toward greater per-pupil revenue disparity with the largest 
increase again noted between 1990 and 1992.
All three measures capture the negative effect the “placeholder” formula has 
on special education per-pupil revenue equality. The CV indicated that equity of per- 
pupil revenues decreased among the middle 66% of the special education students, 
and the FRR indicated widening disparity of per-pupil revenues among a restricted 
range between the 5th and 95th percentiles. The MI indicated that districts below the 
median per-pupil revenue fell further below the median per-pupil revenue over time. 
Also, the MI indicated the cost to bring districts up to the median per-pupil revenue 
level increased over time.
Special Education State Finance Models
The second component of this study presents four special education finance 
models. These models monitor special education costs, decrease per-pupil revenue 
disparity among the sixty-six local districts, raise lower levels of per-pupil revenue to
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the median level, and increase funding for students having severe disabilities. 
Specifically, the following two research questions are addressed:
1) Can improvements be made to special education finance models which can 
help monitor costs in Louisiana?
2) Can special education finance models be developed which will lessen the 
degree of disparity in per-pupil revenues among local districts in 
Louisiana?
These special education finance models use pupil weighting schemes featuring 
one or two weights. The weights were assigned according to the definition of a given 
disability category. Sixteen disabilities identified by the Louisiana Department of 
Education (LDE) were placed in one of two categories of excess costs. Excess costs 
are the additional costs of educating students in special education beyond the cost of 
educating those students in regular education and are classified in terms of programs 
and services provided by districts (Hartman, 1988). The categories of excess costs 
are supplemental costs and replacement costs.
Supplemental costs are programs provided in addition to the regular education 
program received by the student. These students are mainstreamed into the regular 
education program for the majority o f the school day, only using special education 
services for short periods of time. Examples of disabilities classified as supplemental 
costs for these models include Mild-Mental Retarded (MMR), Speech Impaired (SI), 
Emotional/Behavior Disorder (ED), Learning Disabled (LD), Noncategorical 
Preschool (NC), and Gifted and Talented (G&T).
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Replacement costs are programs provided instead of the regular education 
program. Examples o f disabilities classified as replacement costs for these models 
include Hard of Hearing (HH), Deaf (D), Visually Impaired (VI), Orthopedic 
Impaired (01), Other Health Impaired (OHI), Deaf-Blind (DB), Multiple Handicaps 
(MH), Autism (A), Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), and Educationally Handicapped 
(EH). These students use special education services instead o f regular education 
services for the majority, if not all, of the school day. In addition, many of these 
students require specialized equipment (e.g. braille books, large print books, 
audiovisual aids), teachers with special capabilities (e.g. sign language), and medical 
equipment at the school site.
Definitions of supplemental and replacement programs, as well as their 
assigned weights, may be manipulated in order to determine how a particular model 
will impact total special education costs, per-pupil revenue disparities, and revenues 
for the more severe disabilities among the local districts. For example. Models I and 
II feature two different weights, one weight for supplemental costs and a larger 
weight for replacement costs. Models III and IV feature one weight, defining all 
costs as supplemental costs. The weights used in the models were derived fi’om the 
literature which suggests that costs are about twice as much for programs and 
services for special education students. Therefore, if a regular education student 
receives a weight of 1, then a special education student receiving a weight of 2.0 
receives 100 percent more revenue than the regular education student.
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In Models I and II which feature two weights, the use of a lower weight was 
justified by identifying the mild disability categories as supplemental costs since many 
of these special education students are mainstreamed into the regular education 
setting for the majority of the school day. The more restrictive settings for the low- 
incidence disabilities result in higher costs and provided the rationale for a higher 
weight. For Models III and IV which feature one weight, the weight was determined 
by considering two factors; 1 ) that there needed to be a larger weight to generate 
more revenue for the severe disabilities and 2) that the greater number of mild 
disability students received greater revenue, thus creating higher total district per- 
pupil revenue.
The four models were compared to 1992 actual data for special education 
using the following criteria: 1) total cost, 2) per-pupil revenue disparity, and 3) 
amount of per-pupil revenue, including revenue for students having severe disabilities. 
The total cost of each model is the sum of the total special education revenue for the 
sixty-six local districts. The total special education revenue is determined by 
multiplying district per-pupil revenue by the total district special education 
enrollment. This makes the comparison of the four models straightforward. The 
McLoone Index (MI) was used to determine the cost of bringing per-pupil revenues 
up to the median level. Per-pupil revenue disparity and median per-pupil revenue may 
be compared using descriptive statistics, as well as the Coefficient of Variation (CV), 
Federal Range Ratio (FRR), and McLoone Index (MI). Revenue for students in the
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more severe disability categories may be compared by multiplying the student 
enrollment of these categories by the per-pupil revenue generated by each model.
Actual 1992 Data For Special Education
Table 4-8 displays the 1992 data which were used to compare the four special 
education finance models. The mean per-pupil revenue was $4000 and the median
Table 4-8. Descriptive Statistics, Univariate Measures, and Costs of Louisiana’s 
Special Education Per-Pupil Revenues For 1992.
1992 Actual Data
Total Cost of Special Education $371,626,991
Mean Per-Pupil Revenue $4000
Median Per-Pupil Revenue $3877
Per-Pupil Revenue Disparity
Range $6465
Standard Deviation $1050
Coefficient of Variation .263
Federal Range Ratio 1.509
McLoone Index .817
Total Severe Handicap Revenue $30,957,953
per-pupil revenue was $3877. Measures of dispersion and the three univariate 
measures all revealed per-pupil revenue disparity. The standard deviation was $1050 
and the range was $6465. The CV was .263, the FRR was 1.509, and the MI was 
.817. The total per-pupil revenue for the severe disabilities was $30,957,953. Finally, 
the total cost of special education per-pupil revenues was $371,626,991.
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Description of Models
The four models use pupil weighting schemes featuring different weights. 
These weights were applied to the Louisiana Department of Education (LDE) base 
amount of per-pupil revenue of $2259. Louisiana's Minimum Foimdation Program 
(MF?) provides this base amount to all students, both regular education and special 
education. This base amount was contained in the budget letter sent to all local 
districts (LDE, No. 882). The budget letter contains a spreadsheet of the MFP 
program, including special education. Each district's total special education revenue 
for the following fiscal year is given. Comprehensive simulations of the finance 
models may be found in Appendices G, H, I and J.
In model I, disability categories which were defined as supplemental costs, 
were given a weight of 1.5. A second weight of 4.0 was given to the disabilities 
defined as replacement costs. For model II, the weights were changed to 1.6 for the 
supplemental costs and 3.5 for the replacement costs. Model III defined all costs as 
supplemental costs and assigned one weight of 2.25.
Model IV was a modification of the third model. The purpose of Model IV 
was to provide incentives for local districts to share the burden for the financing of 
their special education financing systems. The 1992 data and per-pupil revenue 
amounts from Model III were divided into three levels. These levels were designated 
as: Level 1 which was $3877, the median per-pupil revenue for 1992, Level 3 which 
was $5062 per-pupil revenue as specified by Model III, and Level 2 which was the 
midpoint between Level 3 of $5062 and Level 1 of $3877. The sixty-six local school
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districts were then ranked according to the Representative Tax System (RTS) Tax 
Effort Index. This index is based on calculations which determine how much effort 
each local district is exerting to fund its educational program relative to its tax base or 
fiscal capacity.
The RTS effort index ranks districts from one to sixty-six with the district 
ranked first being the one that exerts the most effort to fund its education program 
and the district ranked sixty-sixth being the one that exerts the least effort to fund its 
education program. Districts ranked 1-21 were funded at Level 3 per-pupil revenue 
of S5062. Districts ranked 22-43 were funded at Level 2 of $4470 per-pupil revenue. 
Finally, districts ranked 44-66 were funded at $3877 per-pupil revenue. The total 
per-pupil revenue for each district was calculated by multiplying the total district 
enrollment by the revenue amount designated by the RTS effort ranking.
Comparison of the Four Special Education Finance Models
The four special education finance models were compared according to three 
dimensions: 1) total cost, 2) per-pupil revenue disparity, and 3) amount of per-pupil 
revenue for both mild and severe disabilities. Table 4-9 presents an overview of costs 
and per-pupil revenue for the four special education models as well as the 1992 data. 
Further analyses were offered regarding each specific dimension. The first dimension 
compared the four models by comparing total costs and the data generated by the 
McLoone Index (MI). The second dimension compared the models by examining 
per-pupil revenue disparity using descriptive statistics and univariate measures. The
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third dimension compared the models by using measures of central tendency and total 
per-pupil revenue for the severe disabilities.
Table 4-9. Summary of Costs and Per-Pupil Revenue For Special Education Models 
and 1992 Actual Data in Louisiana.
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 1992 Data
Dimension I 
Total Cost S390M $40IM S527M $472M $372M
Dimension II 
Range Per- 
Pupil Revenue $596 $383 $105 $1185 $6465
Standard
Deviation $112 $76 $22 $487 $1050
CV .030 .020 .004 .109 .263
FRR .099 .069 .014 .306 1.509
MI .988 .980 .965 .850 .817
Dimension III 
Mean Per- 
Pupil Revenue S3 706 $3824 $5062 $4451 $4000
Median Per- 
Pupil Revenue $3700 $3815 $5066 $4470 $3877
Severe Handicap 
Revenue S24M S25M $32M $29M $31M
CV = Coefficient of Variation FRR = Federal Range Ratio MI = McLoone Index 
M = Millions of Dollars
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Total Cost
The cost of the four models was compared using two methods. The first 
method used the entire distribution of special education per-pupil revenue and simply 
noted the total costs of each model. The second method examined the lower half of 
the distribution and used data generated by the McLoone Index (MI). These data 
were called the total cost to “level up” to the median. In other words, this amount 
took into consideration the total number of special education students that were 
receiving per-pupil revenue less than the median per-pupil revenue and gave the cost 
of elevating the per-pupil revenue up to the median level.
Table 4-10 offers comparisons of the total costs of the models, as well as of 
the cost to bring district per-pupil revenue up to the median per-pupil revenue. Model 
I exhibited the lowest cost of $389,120,656. The second model costs $400,531,391 
followed by Model IV at $472,319,523. Model III exhibited the highest cost of 
$527,485,271. Examining the models from the standpoint of cost to bring district per- 
pupil revenue up to the median. Model I indicated the lowest cost of $1,892,284. 
Models II, III, and IV indicated successively higher costs ( $3,085,954; $10,062,342; 
and $19,085,782). From strictly a cost perspective alone, both total costs and the 
McLoone Index indicate that the first model would be the most economical to 
implement. This perspective, however, does not take into consideration the overall 
equity of the models in regard to per-pupil revenue disparity.
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Table 4-10. Total Cost and Cost to Bring Special Education Per-Pupil Revenue to 
the Median For Models I, II, III, and IV.
Model Total Cost
Cost to Bring Per-Pupil 
Revenue up to the Median
I $389,120,656 $1,892,284
II $400,531,391 $3,085,954
HI $527,485,271 $10,062,342
IV $472,319,523 $19,085,782
Per-Pupil Revenue Disparity
The equity of the four special education finance models was examined fi’om 
the perspective of per-pupil revenue disparity. Descriptive statistics (e.g. range, 
standard deviation) were used to describe per-pupil revenue disparity. Three 
univariate measures, the Coefficient of Variation (CV), Federal Range Ratio (FRR), 
and McLoone Index (MI) were used to examine the equity o f the four models.
Table 4-11 displays the ranges and standard deviations of special education per-pupil 
revenues for the four models. Model III indicated the most equity (R = $105; SD = 
$22), followed by Model II (R = $383; SD = $76). The first model ranked third in 
equity (R = $596; SD = $112), and Model IV indicated the greatest disparity in 
special education per-pupil revenues (R = $1185; SD = $487). All models improved 
equity compared to the 1992 data (R = $6465; SD = $1050). According to these 
findings, the most equity of per-pupil revenues across school districts in Louisiana 
would be achieved when one weight is applied (e.g. Model III at 2.25), and the
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Table 4-11. Range and Standard Deviation of Per-Pupil Revenue For Special 
Education Finance Models in Louisiana.
Model Range Standard Deviation Rank
1 $596 $112 3
11 $383 $76 2
111 $105 $22 1
IV $1185 $487 4
weight is not linked to local effort to raise revenue by the districts (e.g. Model IV).
Table 4-12 displays the Coefficient o f Variation (CV), statewide mean, and 
maximum dollar distance from the mean for two-thirds of the students in Louisiana. 
The range of dollars received by two-thirds of the students and the difference in this 
range for the four special education models are also included. These resulting CV 
values are consistent with the range and standard deviation results. Model 1 indicated 
a CV of .030, followed by Model 11 (CV = .020). Model 111 indicated the most equity 
(CV = .004), and Model IV indicated the most disparity in special education per-pupil 
revenue (CV = . 109). All models indicated enhanced equity of special education per- 
pupil revenues over the 1992 actual data (CV = .263). These findings also support 
the observation that one weight (i.e. Model 111) which is not linked to local effort (i.e. 
Model IV), is the most equitable. In addition, the statewide mean reveals that the one 
weight of Model HI generated the most special education per-pupil revenue.
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Table 4-12. Coefficient of Variation, Statewide Mean Per-Pupil Revenues For 
Special Education, and Dollar Distance From the Mean For Special Education 
Finance Models.
Coefficient
of
Per-Pupil Revenues
Range of
Maximum Dollar Dollars 
Distance From Received by 
Statewide the Mean for 2/3 2/3 of the
Model Variation Mean of Students Students Difference
I .030 $3706 $111 $3595-$3817 $222
II .020 $3824 $76 S3748-S3900 $152
III .004 $5062 $20 $5042-$5082 $40
,_LV ... 1Q2L_ $4451 $485 ..... $1966_$4936 $970
The Federal Range Ratio (FRR) examined per-pupil revenues between the 
fifth and ninety fifth percentiles. Calculations of the FRR supported the findings of 
the Range, Standard Deviation, and CV. Table 4-13 reports the FRR, the per-pupil 
revenues at the ninety-fifth and fifth percentile, and the resulting restricted range for 
the four special education models. All models indicated enhanced equity in 
comparison to the 1992 data (FRR = 1.509). The least disparity in per-pupil revenue 
across the sixty-six districts was indicated by Model III with a FRR of .014 and a 
restricted range of $69. The most disparity in per-pupil revenue was indicated by 
Model IV with a FRR of .306 and a restricted range of SI 185. Model II indicated a 
FRR of .069 and a restricted range of $256, and Model I indicated a FRR of .099 
with a restricted range of $350.
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Table 4-13. The Federal Range Ratio, Values of the Fifth and Ninety Fifth 
Percentiles, and the Restricted Range For Special Education Models in Louisiana.
Per-Pupil Revenues
Model FRR
5th
Percentile
95th
Percentile
Restricted
Range
I .099 $3522 $3872 $350
II .069 $3696 $3952 $256
III .014 $5015 $5084 $69
IV .306 $3877 $5062 $1185
FRR = Federal Range Ratio
The McLoone Index (MI) examined the lower half of the distribution of 
special education per-pupil revenues, whereas the previous measures examined the 
entire distribution. When special education per-pupil revenues were examined from 
this perspective, another set of findings emerged. Unlike the other measures, the MI 
indicated Model I (.988) to be the most equitable, followed by Models II (.980), III 
(.965), and IV (.850) respectively. Table 4-14 displays the McLoone Indices, 
increased per-pupil percentages, median per-pupil revenue, and the cost to bring 
district per-pupil revenues up to the median for the four special education models. 
Wider disparity of per-pupil revenue indicated by lower values of the MI, indicated 
greater cost to bring district per-pupil revenue to the median. From this perspective. 
Model I indicated greater equity of per-pupil revenue below the median, thus the 
reduced cost to bring these districts up to the median per-pupil revenue.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
Table 4-14. The McLoone Indices, Increased Per-Pupil Percentages, Median Per- 
Pupil Revenue, and Cost to Bring District Per-Pupil Revenue to the Median For 
Special Education Models in Louisiana.
Model Index
Percent to 
Level up to 
Median
Median
Per-Pupil
Revenue
Per-Pupil 
Revenue 
Required 
to Level 
up to the 
Median
Number of 
Students 
below the 
Median
Total Cost to 
Level up to 
the Median
I .988 1% $3700 $44 42,619 $1,900,000
II .980 2% $3815 $76 40,445 $3,000,000
III .965 3% $5066 $177 56,750 $10,000,000
IV .850 15% $4470 $670 28.465 $19,000,000
When only the number of students below the median was examined, still 
another finding emerged. From this perspective. Model IV was the most equitable 
because it resulted in the smallest number of students below the median. Model III 
would be the most inequitable because it resulted in the most students below the 
median per-pupil revenue. This finding indicated that two weights produce greater 
equity in the lower half of the per-pupil revenue distribution than a single weight.
The actual per-pupil amount of revenue was compared by examining mean 
per-pupil revenue, median per-pupil revenue, and total revenue generated for severe 
handicapped students by the four models. Table 4-15 displays the mean, median, and 
severe handicapped per-pupil revenue for the four models. Model III generated the 
most revenues for both supplemental and replacement costs, followed by Models IV,
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II, and I respectively. When compared to the 1992 data (Mean = $4000; Median = 
$3877, and Severe Handicapped = $30,957,953), only the third and fourth models
Table 4-15. Mean and Median Per-Pupil Revenue and Severe Handicapped Revenue 
For Special Education Models in Louisiana.
Model
Mean Per-Pupil 
Revenue
Median Per-Pupil 
Revenue
Severe Handicapped 
Revenue
I $3706 $3700 $23,937,805
II $3824 $3815 $24,588,032
III $5062 $5066 $32,248,852
IV $4451 $4470 $28,708,627
generated more revenue. This supported the findings of the other measures that a 
single weight generated the most per-pupil revenue. In addition, a single weight 
generated more per-pupil revenue for those students who were enrolled in the more 
severe disability categories. This was due to the fact that so many mild disability 
students generated the additional revenue.
Summary of Per-Pupil Revenue Disparity
Examination of the data reveal that Model III generated the most revenue per- 
pupil, the most revenue for severely handicapped students, and was the most 
equitable model in regard to the CV and FRR. This model however, was the highest
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in terms o f the total cost to implement. The MI indicated that Model I was the most 
equitable model.
The measures of central tendency (mean and median), dispersion (range and 
standard deviation), as well as univariate measures (CV, FRR, and MI) pointed to an 
important finding which needs to be considered regarding pupil weighting schemes.
A single weight may produce more per-pupil revenues, as well as greater equity 
across the entire per-pupil distribution, but it also may produce greater per-pupil 
revenue disparity in the lower half of the distribution.
Fiscal Capacity, Per-Pupil Revenues, and Enrollments
The third component of this study examined relationships between school 
district fiscal capacity and per-pupil revenues for special education, district fiscal 
capacity and special education enrollment, and district enrollments of special 
education students and per-pupil revenues for special education. Greater equality 
among special education pupils is believed to exist when students with comparable 
needs receive equal shares of revenue regardless of the fiscal capacity of the district or 
that district’s identification procedures. In addition, this notion of equity rests on the 
belief that poor districts should have the same opportunities and resources for 
identifying special education students as wealthier districts.
The following research question was designed to explore whether or not these 
relationships existed:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
105
1) Are there relationships between Louisiana’s local school districts’ fiscal 
capacity and special education per-pupil revenues, fiscal capacity and 
district special education enrollment, and district special education 
enrollment and per-pupil revenue, and have these relationships changed 
over the last decade, and if so, how?
The Pearson F*roduct-Moment Correlation Coefficient is an index that 
describes whether a relationship exists between two variables. This index can take on 
values between -1.0 and +1.0 inclusive. The sign indicates the direction of the 
relationship and the absolute value of the coefficient indicates the magnitude of the 
relationship. If there is no relationship between the variables, the absolute value of 
the correlation coefficient is 0.
Table 4-16 displays the correlation coefficients for district fiscal capacity and 
per-pupil revenues, district fiscal capacity and district enrollment, and district 
enrollment and per-pupil revenues. For the year 1992, district fiscal capacity was 
alternatively defined as per-capita income and as the Representative Tax System 
(RTS) index. The RTS index correlation coefficient is found in parentheses with the 
other 1992 correlation coefficients. Correlation coefficients indicated that the only 
noteworthy relationship over all selected years occurred between the variables of 
district fiscal capacity and enrollment when the district fiscal capacity was defined as 
per-capita income (1980 r = .61; 1985 r = .69; 1990 r = .72; 1992 r = .75). When 
district fiscal capacity was defined using the RTS index, the strength of the 
relationship between district fiscal capacity and enrollment diminished (r = .27).
The only year in which noteworthy relationships occurred between all pairs of 
variables was 1992. The “placeholder” special education formula had been in effect
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for two years. The relationship between district fiscal capacity and per-pupil revenues 
was of greater magnitude (r = .59) when fiscal capacity was defined as per-capita 
income. This relationship was not noteworthy (r = .30) when district fiscal capacity 
was defined using the RTS index. The moderate relationship between district 
enrollment and per-pupil revenues was noted (r = .58).
Table 4-16. Correlation Coefficients For District Fiscal Capacity and Special 
Education Per-Pupil Revenues, District Fiscal Capacity and Special Education 
Enrollment, and District Special Education Enrollment and Per-Pupil Revenue For 
School Years 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1992.
Year
Fiscal Capacity & 
Per-Pupil Revenue
Fiscal Capacity & 
Enrollment
Enrollment & 
Per-Pupil Revenue
1980 .06 .62 .19
1985 .05 .69 -.05
1990 .28 .72 .20
1992 .59 (RTS .30) .75 (RTS .27) .58
Ancillary Data Analyses 
Other types of analyses were also indicated. The mild disability categories of 
special education were examined in order to determine if significant differences 
existed in the enrollments of these categories. Hallahan, Keller, and Ball’s (1986) 
methodology was utilized in order to determine whether or not significant differences 
in the mild disability categories were due to lack of clarity of definition.
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Table 4-17 presents a summar>' table of the results of the ANOVA for each 
mild disability category. These five mild disability categories of special education were 
examined in order to determine whether or not a significant difference existed 
between the means of the enrollments of each category for school years 1980, 1990, 
and 1992. The year 1985 is not included because there were no data reported for the 
Noncategorical Preschool disability category. The mild disability categories included 
Mild-Mental Retarded (MMR), Speech Impaired (SI), Emotional/Behavior Disorder 
(ED), Learning Disabled (LD), and Noncategorical Preschool (NC). The two mild 
disabilities exhibiting a significant difference between their mean enrollments for the 
three examination years were the Emotional/Behavior Disorder and the 
Noncategorical Preschool categories. The other disabilities did not exhibit any 
significant differences in their means. This analysis supports the observation o f the 
descriptive statistics that the enrollment increases were significant in these disabilities. 
One reason that these categories exhibited such increases in enrollment may be due to 
the lack of clarity of the definition of the categories by the Louisiana Department of 
Education (LDE). The next section discusses the methodology and analysis which 
may determine whether or not the disability categories were defined with enough 
specificity. ,
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Table 4-17. Table of ANOVA Results For Mild Disability Categories For 
Years 1980, 1990, and 1992.
Disability Category F Value F Criterion
Mild-Mental Retarded .18 3.04
Speech Impaired 1.98 3.04
Emotional/Behavior
Disorder 7.06* 3.04
Learning Disability .55 3.04
Noncategorical
Preschool 49.16* 3.04
* Significance .05 Level
The purpose of using Hallahan, Keller, and Ball’s (1986) methodology was to 
compare the variability of prevalence rates from district to district for the mild 
disability categories of special education in Louisiana. The assumption is made that 
variability of prevalence rates is one indicator of how consistently a category is 
defined and how consistently identification procedures are followed. The larger a 
disability category’s coefficient of variation, the less consistently it is defined and the 
less consistently identification procedures were followed by the individual district. 
Table 4-18 displays the coefficients of variation by special education category.
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Table 4-18. Coefficients of Variation by Special Education Category.
Category Coefficient of Variation
Learning Disabled 24.10
Speech Impaired 28.79
Mild/Mental Retarded 43.48
Noncategorical Preschool 83.87
Emotional/Behavior Disorder 94.17
The disability category indicating the smallest coefficient of variation was the 
Learning Disabled category (CV = 24.15). Speech Impaired indicated a slightly 
larger value (CV = 28.79). The Mild/Mental Retarded disability category indicated a 
value almost double that of the Speech Impaired category (CV = 43.48). The CV 
value almost doubled again for the Noncategorical Preschool disability category (CV 
= 83.87). Finally, the highest statistic was reported for the Emotional/Behavior 
Disorder category (CV = 94.17).
The implication of these findings is that learning disabled was the best defined 
category of all the mild disability categories, followed in order by Speech Impaired, 
Mild/Mental Retarded, Noncategorical Preschool, and Emotional/Behavior Disorder. 
A possible explanation for the rise in enrollments for the Noncategorical Preschool 
and Emotional/Behavior Disorder categories and a relatively stable enrollment for the 
other mild disability categories may be a lack of clarity in the definition of these two
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
110
categories. In other words, an unclear definition coupled with sixty-six different 
interpretations could lead to considerable variation in enrollments for that category.
Summary
This chapter presented the results of several analyses of data for Louisiana’s 
special education financing program for school districts from 1980 through 1992. 
Findings associated with the costs and equity of Louisiana’s special education 
financing system were reported. The first section examined per-pupil revenues of 
regular education and special education in order to compare the rates of increase of 
costs. In addition, the cost of special education was examined from an enrollment 
perspective by monitoring enrollment changes of mild disability categories from 1980 
until 1992. The second section presented findings in regard to disparities of per-pupil 
revenues in special education across the sixty-six school districts. Three measures— 
the Coefficient of Variation (C\0, the Federal Range Ratio (FRR), and the McLoone 
Index (M I)- were used to examine the disparity in special education per-pupil 
revenues. The third section presented four special education finance models in order 
to present alternatives for decreasing special education per-pupil revenue disparity 
across districts and to monitor costs of special education. The fourth section 
presented findings concerning relationships between district fiscal capacity and special 
education per-pupil revenues, district fiscal capacity and special education 
enrollments, and special education enrollments and per-pupil revenues. The final 
section revisited the cost issue by examining the mild disability categories to
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determine if there were significant differences in the enrollments of students in these 
categories. An attempt was also made to determine if the mild disability categories 
were well-defined and whether or not identification procedures are followed closely 
by the districts. The coefficient of variation was utilized to make this determination.
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter summarizes the study and provides the conclusions based on the 
data analyses. The summary includes a review of the primary issues addressed by this 
study, the purpose of the study, and an overview of the literature review, conceptual 
framework, and analyses of data. The conclusions are based on findings from data 
generated by descriptive statistics and univariate measures which were detailed in 
Chapter III and utilized in Chapter IV.
Summary
The primary issues addressed by this study were special education costs and 
equity of special education per-pupil revenue among Louisiana’s sixty-six local school 
districts. Annual rates of increase in mean per-pupil revenues between regular 
education and special education were examined from 1980 to 1992 to determine the 
increase in costs of special education versus regular education. Special education 
mean per-pupil revenues from 1980 to 1992 were examined to determine whether or 
not per-pupil revenue disparity existed, and if such disparity existed, to determine 
whether or not these disparities were increasing or decreasing among the sixty-six 
school districts. Four models were formulated and presented which addressed the 
equity issue in regards to special education costs, special education per-pupil revenues 
across districts, and amount of per-pupil revenue for mild and severe disabilities.
1 1 2
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
113
Chapter I introduced the study and provided a background of the problem 
with a discussion of legislation pertaining to special education. Included was a 
discussion of the federal, state, and local governmental role in financing special 
education. Louisiana’s present funding formula was outlined and the problem 
statement presented. The chapter concluded with a discussion of the significance of 
the problem.
Chapter II presented a review of the literature relevant to this study. Section 
One traced the evolution of special education which was divided into three phases 
according to the role played by states in their delivery of special education services. 
These phases were identified as the Benefactor Role, the Programmatic Role, and the 
Facilitator Role. Section Two of the literature review established the legislative 
framework in which special education operates. Included in this section were relevant 
judicial interpretations of special education legislation. Section Three presented 
several issues concerning the cost of special education which included costs of 
categorical programs and examples of state financing formulas. The literature review 
concluded with a brief section dealing with third party billing for special education.
Chapter III presented the conceptual fi-amework, research questions, and 
methodology which guided this study. The conceptual framework outlined the Berne 
and Stiefel (1984) equity framework and defined the variables to be examined. The 
research questions which guided the methodology and statistical measures to be 
utilized were presented. The methodology section outlined the components of the
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Study, data collection procedures, unit o f  analysis, and explained the statistical 
measures.
Chapter IV presented an analysis of the data as well as the subsequent 
findings. The cost of special education was addressed in two ways. First, 
comparisons were drawn between mean regular education and mean special education 
per-pupil revenues to determine if special education costs were increasing at a greater 
annual rate than regular education. This analysis was accomplished by converting the 
data into constant dollars. The comparison was made by calculating the annual rate 
of increase of regular and special education per-pupil revenue. Second, enrollment 
changes in the mild disabilities were monitored over time. This comparison was made 
by comparing mean district enrollments of Mild/Mental Retarded (MMR), Speech 
Impaired (SI), Emotional/Behavior Disorder (ED), Learning Disability (LD), and 
Noncategorical Preschool (^Æ) students for years 1980, 1990, and 1992. The 
percent increase or decrease in each disability was calculated. Also, comparisons 
were made between increases in these enrollments from 1980 to 1990 and 1990 to 
1992.
Berne and Stiefel’s (1984) conceptual framework for measuring equity was 
used to determine appropriate measures for analysis of per-pupil revenue disparity. 
Descriptive statistics and three univariate measures were used in order to determine 
the degree of disparity in the distributions of special education per-pupil revenue for 
selected years between 1980 and 1992. Descriptive statistics used were the range and
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Standard deviation. Univariate measures included the Coefficient of Variation (CV), 
Federal Range Ratio (FRR), and the McLoone Index (MI).
Four special education finance models were presented to 1) monitor the costs 
of special education, 2) condense the range of per-pupil revenues among the sixty-six 
local school districts and 3) increase per-pupil revenue for both mild and severe 
disabilities. Fiscal accountability is achieved by monitoring costs, greater equity is 
achieved by condensing the range of per-pupil revenue, and educational opportunities 
for special education students are increased with greater per-pupil revenue. The 
models used pupil weighting schemes. Two models featured two different weights, 
one model featured one weight, and one model featured one weight and linked per- 
pupil revenue to the amount of local tax effort exerted by the district.
Relationships between special education district fiscal capacity and per-pupil 
revenues, district fiscal capacity and district special education enrollments, and district 
special education enrollments and per-pupil revenues were examined. Bivariate 
correlations between each pair of variables were analyzed.
Finally, ancillary data were analyzed to determine if significant differences 
occurred in means of districts’ mild disability categories, and if significant variability 
of prevalence rates among the nfild disabilities existed. Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) enabled conclusions to be drawn concerning significant differences in 
means of mild disability categories. The Coefficient of Variation (CV) enabled 
conclusions to be drawn concerning variability of prevalence rates among the mild- 
disabilities.
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Conclusions
The conclusions associated with the analyses of each component of the study 
are presented here. The research question which guided that portion of the analyses 
is stated, followed by the conclusion for that portion, as well as other observations 
concerning the data.
Costs
Mean per-pupil revenues for regular education and special education were
compared for years 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1992. One general conclusion regarding
this comparison was reached and was associated with the following research question:
What is the ratio of costs between regular education and special education 
from 1980 to 1992 and has this ratio increased or decreased over the 
period examined?
Mean per-pupil revenues for special education increased at a greater annual rate than 
did mean per-pupil revenues for regular education. Louisiana, like many other states 
experienced accelerated increases in the overall cost of its special education program 
when compared to the cost of regular education. Between the years 1980 and 1992, 
special education per-pupil revenues increased at four times the rate of regular 
education per-pupil revenues. From 1990 to 1992, special education annual per-pupil 
revenues continued to escalate. Special education per-pupil revenues increased at a 9 
percent annual rate from 1990 to 1992 compared to 6 percent annual rate from 1980 
to 1985 and 7 percent annual rate from 1985 until 1990.
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This acceleration of special education cost in comparison to that of regular 
education was attributed to increased numbers of students enrolled in special 
education. Mild disability enrollments were examined over time to determine whether 
there were substantial enrollment increases. Students having these disabilities made 
up 93 percent of Louisiana’s total special education enrollment during the period 
studied. Examination of this data led to two conclusions. First, enrollments o f all 
mild disabilities with the exception of Speech Impaired increased at a significant rate. 
The Emotional/Behavior Disorder (ED) category increased 53 percent and the 
Noncategorical Preschool (NC) category increased 725 percent fi’om 1980 until 1992. 
Second, enrollments of the Mild-Mental Retarded (MMR), and Learning Disabled 
(LD) categories decreased somewhat from 1980 to 1992 (-10%), but increased 
significantly between 1990 and 1992 (+7% and +15% respectively). Increases in 
enrollments of all mild disabilities with the exception of Speech Impaired contributed 
significantly to increases in costs of special education in Louisiana. These data 
suggest that Louisiana, like many other states, is experiencing the problem of 
overidentification in the mild disabilities.
Per-Pupii Revenue Disparity
This study addressed the issue of per-pupil revenue disparities among the
sixty-six school districts in Louisiana. Two conclusions were drawn from the data
analysis associated with the following research question:
Has the degree of dispaiity in per-pupil revenues for special education in 
Louisiana among the sixty-six local districts changed over the last decade, 
and if so, how?
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The first conclusion was that per-pupil revenues for special education in 
Louisiana among the sixty-six local school districts had changed over the last decade. 
Descriptive statistics indicated an increase in the disparity of per-pupil revenues 
among the local school districts. Standard deviations revealed this disparity among 
school districts in special education per-pupil revenues increased from 1980 until 
1992. The largest increase in the standard deviation occurred between 1990 and 
1992. The range of special education per-pupil revenues among the districts increased 
from $988 in 1980 to $6465 in 1992. In addition, univariate measures revealed that 
these disparities increased throughout the period of time examined. The Coefficient of 
Variation, Federal Range Ratio, and the McLoone Index all indicated increasing 
disparity of per-pupil revenues among the sixty-six local school districts. These 
observations led to the second conclusion that disparity in per-pupil revenues among 
the sixty-six school districts in Louisiana was increasing in magnitude.
Observations Associated With Per-Pupil Revenue Disparitv
Louisiana enacted a “placeholder” funding formula for special education in 
1990 until a new formula could be developed. Basically this formula took the school 
districts’ expenditures from the previous year, less capital outlay, and added 2% for 
inflation. The resulting figure became the state’s special education allocation to 
school districts. The data indicate that this “placeholder” formula produced larger 
disparities in per-pupil revenue among the sbcty-six local school districts when 
compared to the previous decade. The Coefficient of Variation, Federal Range Ratio,
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and the McLoone Index, as well as the descriptive statistics, indicated that per-pupil 
revenue disparity increased at a greater rate than under the previous formula. Three 
figures depict this increase in per-pupil revenue disparity. Figure 1 depicts the 
increase in the Coefficient of Variation, Figure 2 depicts the increase in the Federal 
Range Ratio, and Figure 3 depicts the decrease in the McLoone Index.
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Figure 1. Coefficient of Variation From 1980 to 1992.
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Figure 2. Federal Range Ratio From 1980 to 1992.
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Figure 3. McLoone Index From 1980 to 1992.
One possible cause for larger special education per-pupil revenue disparities 
was that the “placeholder” formula only added 2% of the previous annual district 
expenditures for special education at the state level. In other words, the burden of 
finding additional funding was shifted to the local district. Many districts shifted 
dollars previously appropriated for regular education to special education in order to 
comply with the stringent federal regulations of special education. Some districts 
were able to appropriate more dollars to special education than other districts due to 
district wealth. Other districts were able to appropriate more dollars to special 
education by using creative methods of accounting, or by reducing spending in other 
areas, such as maintenance, conservation of energy, and limiting travel for personnel. 
Still other districts asked teachers to use their planning period to teach classes in the 
absence of the regular teacher, or used volunteers to teach the classes instead of
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hiring substitutes. Finally, other districts renegotiated changes in health and medical 
insurance coverage.
Special Education Models
The second component of the study offered alternative special education
models which addressed the following objectives; I) to monitor special education
costs, 2) to encourage more equity in per-pupil revenues among the sixty-six school
districts and, 3) to increase per-pupil revenue for both mild and severe disabilities.
The conclusions regarding these objectives were drawn from the four special
education finance models and were associated with the following research questions:
Can improvements be made to a special education finance model which 
can monitor costs in Louisiana?
Can special education finance models be developed which will lessen the 
degree of disparity in per-pupil revenues among local districts in 
Louisiana?
Costs
Two methods were used to compare costs of the special education models. 
The first method summed all per-pupil revenues for special education across the sixty- 
six local districts. The second method used data generated by the McLoone Index 
(MI) called the total cost to bring per-pupil revenue to the median per-pupil revenue 
for special education. Examination of costs using these methods revealed the 
following conclusions. First, models could be developed that monitored costs of 
special education. Second, models could be developed that were more economical to
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implement than the finance system currently used by Louisiana: the level of per-pupil 
revenue, however, would be less than current levels of per-pupil revenue and could 
have legal implications since the courts consider per-pupil revenue as “prima facie” 
evidence in determining equity in a state school finance system. The overall cost of 
each model was higher than the 1992 actual data. This finding led to the third 
conclusion that a more equitable finance program will be more costly than the 
program now in use. Increased costs will be due to the costs to bring lower districts 
up to the median per-pupil revenue. The 1992 actual mean per-pupil revenue needs 
to be monitored due to the legal implications mentioned above.
These data however, did not indicate how equitable the models were nor the 
extent of provision for students with severe disabilities. This observation led to the 
fourth conclusion that the most economical model in regard to cost may not be the 
most equitable model in regard to per-pupil revenue across districts or level of per- 
pupil revenue for mild and severe handicapped students.
Per-Pupil Revenues
The four special education models were examined according to how per-pupil 
revenue disparities across districts were addressed. Two descriptive measures (Range 
and Standard Deviation) and three univariate measures ( Coefficient of Variation, 
Federal Range Ratio, and McLoone Index) were used. The first conclusion was that 
all four models decreased per-pupil revenue disparity according to all measures. In 
other words, all four models were more equitable than the current financing program.
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These different measures examined the models from different perspectives.
The descriptive measures examined the entire distribution of mean per-pupil revenues. 
The Coefficient of Variation (CV) examined the middle sixty-six percent of the 
distribution of per-pupil revenues. The Federal Range Ratio (FRR) examined per- 
pupil revenues from the fifth to the ninety-fifth percentiles, and the McLoone Index 
(MI) examined the lower half of the distribution. Examination of the models from 
different perspectives produced different conclusions regarding the equity of each 
model.
From the perspective of measures that examined both the upper and lower 
halves of the distribution (R, SD, CV, FRR) two conclusions were reached. First, 
Model III was the most equitable model because it produced the lowest disparity in 
district special education per-pupil revenue according to all measures. Model III used 
one weight. The second conclusion was that one weight not linked to local effort was 
a reliable method of maintaining equity in Louisiana’s special education finance 
program because the range of district per-pupil revenues across districts was the 
lowest of the four models. In addition, this model equalized tax bases across the 
school districts. In other words, all special education students generated equal 
amounts of revenue regardless of the wealth of the district.
The MI examined only the lower half of the per-pupil revenue distribution. 
Examination of the equity of per-pupil revenues across districts using the MI 
produced different conclusions concerning the equity of the four special education 
finance models. Model I was the most equitable model because less disparity in
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district special education per-pupil revenues occurred in districts below the district 
median special education per-pupil revenue. This model featured two weights which 
led to the second conclusion that two weights produced less per-pupil revenue 
disparity in the lower half of the per-pupil revenue distribution. Models with two 
weights have the potential to equalize any distribution better than one weight if the 
weights are chosen in relationship to a single weight. In this study for example, the 
weights of 1.0 and 4.0, and 1.5 and 3.5 were chosen in relationship to the single 
weight of 2.25. This finding may be generalized to any distribution. Two constants 
equalize distributions better than one constant if the two constants are chosen in 
relationship to the single constant.
The implication o f this finding is that a two place weighting system has the 
potential to provide more flexibility than a one place weighting system because one 
weight can always be set to zero. In other words, if a pupil weighting system is 
utilized by a state, it is more beneficial to use a multiple weighting system because a 
single weighting system is always included inside the multiple weighting system 
because all weights may be set to zero except for a single weight.
Other data generated by the McLoone Index were “numbers of students 
below the median”. Tins data led to the conclusion that Model IV was the most 
equitable because it produced the lowest number of students below the median district 
special education per-pupil revenue. The model featured one weight which was tied 
to a local effort index (e.g. RTS effort index). This feature o f Model IV led to
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another conclusion that one weight tied to the RTS effort index produced less 
numbers of students below the median per-pupil revenue in Louisiana.
Synthesis of these various findings produced two general conclusions 
regarding pupil weighting schemes. First, a single weight may produce more per- 
pupil revenue and greater equity across districts, but may produce greater per-pupil 
revenue disparity in the lower half of the per-pupil revenue distribution. Second, 
different measures produce different conceptions o f equity.
Summarv and Recommendations
The four special education finance models presented are pupil weighting 
schemes. All four models effectively reduced the disparity of per-pupil revenues for 
special education among Louisiana’s sixty-six local school districts. In addition, the 
cost of special education could be monitored by manipulation of the weights of the 
disability categories. Models I and II featured two weights and Models III and IV 
featured one weight. The weights were assigned according to the definition of each 
disability as being supplemental costs or replacement costs.
Since all four models accomplish the stated objective of reducing per-pupil 
revenue disparity, the primary considerations are those of 1) the cost to the state to 
implement the model, and 2) the level of mean special education per-pupil revenue 
among the sixty-six local districts, and 3) whether or not students with more severe 
disabilities are provided additional funding.
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The 1992 median per-pupil revenue was exceeded by Models III and IV. The 
additional costs over the present costs to implement these models are great because 
greater numbers of students are generating more revenue due one weight placed on 
all disabilities. The cost to implement Model III exceeds the present cost by 
$155,858,280 per year, and the cost to implement Model IV exceeds the present cost 
by $100,692,532 per year. Both of these models featured one weight, meaning that 
all special education students would be funded equally regardless of the severity of 
the disability. In other words, students with the more severe disabilities would not 
generate more dollars, but more dollars would be generated due to the large increase 
in the number of mildly handicapped students receiving this larger weight. From the 
perspective having the least variation of district per-pupil revenues across the entire 
distribution without regard to costs. Model III is the most equitable model.
In contrast. Models I and II utilized two weights to provide for those students 
who were more severely handicapped. Model I produced mean per-pupil revenue of 
$3706 which was $171 below the current median of $3877 per-pupil revenues.
Model II produced mean per-pupil revenue of $3824 which was $53 below the 
current median of $3877 mean per-pupil revenue. The additional cost to the state to 
implement Model I is $17,493,665, and the additional cost to the state to implement 
Model II is $28,904,400. Although the mean per-pupil revenue of Model I is $171 
below the current median level of $3877, the reduction of per-pupil revenue 
disparities below the median per-pupil revenue, and the smallest additional cost of this 
model among all four models, makes this the most feasible model in which to employ.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
127
It would be beneficial for Louisiana to consider using a multiple weighting 
system due to the increased flexibility a multiple weighting system provides. A single 
place weighting system is always contained inside a multiple place weighting system. 
This is not the case, however, when a single place weighting system is adopted. In 
order to utilize more weights, a single place weighting system would have to be 
scrapped, then a multiple weighting system devised. A single place weighting system 
could always be adopted after a multiple place weighting system is devised by setting 
all weights except for a single weight to zero. These observations indicate that it 
would be much more fiscally responsible for Louisiana to adopt a multiple place 
weighting system.
Fiscal Capacity, Per-Pupil Revenue, and Enrollment 
The third component of the study addressed the issues of whether or not there 
were relationships between district fiscal capacity and per-pupil revenues for special 
education, district fiscal capacity and special education enrollment, and school district 
enrollment of special education students and per-pupil revenues for special education, 
and whether or not these relationships had changed over the last decade. Several 
conclusions were drawn from the data and were associated with the following 
research question;
Are there relationships between Louisiana’s local school districts’ fiscal 
capacity and special education per-pupil revenues, fiscal capacity and 
district special education enrollment, and district special education 
enrollment and per-pupil revenue, and have these relationships changed 
over the last decade, and if so, how?
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The first conclusion was that when fiscal capacity was defined as per-capita 
income, there was no relationship between local district fiscal capacity and per-pupil 
revenues for special education students in the years 1980,1985, and 1990. In 1992, 
however, the relationship became noteworthy (r = .59). Figure 4 indicates the increase 
in the magnitude of the relationship between district fiscal capacity defined by per- 
capita income and per-pupil revenues over the time period examined.
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Figure 4. Relationship Between Fiscal Capacity and Per-Pupil Revenues.
A probable cause for the increase in magnitude of this relationship was the 
assumption of most of the burden of financing special education by the individual 
districts. Wealthier districts were able to subsidize their special education program 
more than poorer districts as is reflected by the per-capita income of these districts. 
Higher per-capita income areas are generally areas of commercial businesses which in 
turn generate higher sales taxes. The sales taxes stay in the district and provide for
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district (school, special education) enhancements, regardless of where the dollars 
originated. In other words, if people live in district A and travel to district B and 
purchase goods, the sales tax charged on those goods in district B will remain in 
district B.
This research question yielded the conclusion that there is and has been a 
relationship between special education district fiscal capacity and special education 
enrollment when fiscal capacity is defined as per-capita income. The magnitude of the 
relationship was statistically significant in 1980 and increased every year of the study. 
Figure 5 indicates the magnitude of the relationship between district fiscal capacity 
and special education enrollment.
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Figure 5. Relationship Between Fiscal Capacity and Special Education Enrollment.
When fiscal capacity was defined using the RTS data, which is now the case, there 
was no significant relationship between fiscal capacity and special education 
enrollment (r = .27).
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Another conclusion drawn from this research question was that there was not 
a significant relationship between special education enrollment and per-pupil revenue 
in the years 1980,1985, and 1990. The correlation coefficients, however, indicated 
that this relationship changed over the time period examined. Another conclusion was 
that there was a strengthening of the relationship between school district enrollment 
of special education students and per-pupil revenues, but the relationship did not 
reach a significant level until 1992. Figure 6 indicates the increase in the magnitude of 
the relationship between enrollment of special education students and per-pupil 
revenues.
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Figure 6. Relationship Between Enrollment and Per-Pupil Revenues.
Observations Associated With the Relationships
The only year in which all relationships were statistically significant was the 
year 1992. Drawing 1990 as a base (the year the “placeholder” formula was put in
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place) it is observed that the relationships between fiscal capacity and per-pupil 
revenue and enrollment and per-pupil revenue increased in magnitude. This may be 
due to the ability of wealthier districts to generate more revenues and the increases of 
enrollment may be due to the fact that student special education dollars are directly 
tied to student special education enrollment.
The results of the analyses of relationships between fiscal capacity and per- 
pupil revenues and fiscal capacity and enrollment when district fiscal capacity is 
defined as per-capita income support the observations that wealthy districts “win” in 
the game of attracting and maintaining resources. Wealthier districts are more 
successful in obtaining maximum reimbursements from a broad range of federal and 
state sources to support their programs, and generally have a number of income 
sources, as well as highly specialized staffs and programs. Because of these 
advantages, wealthier districts are better able to mobilize to find new and legitimate 
support for their ongoing special education programs.
It is noted however, that when the RTS index is used to define district fiscal 
capacity, the relationships are no longer significant. This is due to the fact that the 
RTS index takes into consideration both ability to pay and fiscal effort that indicate 
the available wealth of a particular district. Given the disparity of per-pupil revenues, 
the RTS index implies that low per-pupil revenue districts may not be exerting enough 
local tax effort in order to fund their special education system. In other words, 
wealthier districts may exert more sales tax effort because their constituency has the
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ability to pay and poorer districts may exert less sales tax effort because of their 
constituency’s lack of ability to pay.
This argument may be reversed and extended to the use of property taxes. 
Wealthier districts may collect more property taxes than poorer districts due to the 
fact that property values are greater and do not fall under Louisiana’s homestead 
exemption. Wealthier districts, in fact, may exert less tax effort than poorer districts 
because o f Louisiana’s homestead exemption. Due to these discrepancies, the 
argument may be made to utilize per-capita income as the index to district wealth 
until the tax structure of Louisiana is altered.
Conclusions Concerning Ancillary Data 
The format in which the data was collected enabled other types of analyses to 
be undertaken. The five mild disability categories were examined in order to 
determine if significant differences existed among their means, and an examination of 
the variability of prevalence rates of the mild disability categories was undertaken.
Mild Disability Category Means
Data analyses yielded the following conclusions regarding the means of the 
mild disability categories of special education. The first conclusion was that there 
was no significant difference between the means of enrollments of the following mild 
disability categories; Mild-Mental Retarded (MMR), Speech Impaired (SI), and 
Learning Disabled (LD). The F criterion at the .05 level of significance was 3 .04.
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The F statistics for the following disabilities were, MMR,. 18, SI, 1.98; and LD .55. 
These data support the observation drawn from the descriptive statistics that these 
enrollments had remained relatively stable throughout the time period examined. The 
second conclusion was that there were significant differences between the means of 
enrollments of the ED and NC categories. The F criterion at the .05 level of 
significance was 3.04. The F statistic for ED was 7.06 and for NC was 49.16. This 
data also supported the observation drawn from the descriptive statistics that there 
were dramatic increases in enrollments of these categories.
Variability of Prevalence Rates
One conclusion was drawn regarding the variability of prevalence rates. The 
two disabilities with the greatest discrepancy of enrollments were the Noncategorical 
Preschool (NC) category and the Emotional/Behavior Disorder (ED) category. One 
explanation of why such large discrepancies in the enrollments of the ED and NC 
category occurred was that the categories were not defined with enough specificity. 
A logical assumption is made that if a disability category exhibits large discrepancies 
in enrollments among the districts, the greater the latitude of the interpretation of the 
definition of that category by each local district. In other words, it is logical to 
assume that districts in general, should have the same proportion of students eligible 
to be identified under a particular category and that practitioners across districts will 
identify approximately the same percentage of students having a particular type of 
handicap.
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This, however, was not the case with these two disability categories. Lack of 
definition was considered to be the reason because phrases in each definition left 
broad areas of interpretation by practitioners in the sixty-six school districts. For 
example, Noncategorical Preschool students are identified as “having a disabling 
condition according to functional or developmental levels.” “Functional or 
developmental levels” give practitioners a wide latitude of interpretation when making 
assessment decisions for children between three and five years of age. The entire 
definition of Emotional/Behavior Disorder gives practitioners wide latitude in 
placement decisions. Basically, the definition says that if a child acts abnormally from 
his/her age, cultural, and ethnic norms in academic, social, vocational, or personal 
settings, and persists, the child may be designated Emotional/Behavior Disorder (ED). 
The definition is broadened further by the definition saying that this disorder can 
coexist with other disorders.
These data support the notion that a large number of our “handicapped” 
population have a socially constructed disability. This conclusion, in itself, should not 
startle special educators, who over the years have questioned the labeling of 
handicapped, large numbers of minorities, males, and others who may be perceived as 
educational “misfits” (Noel and Fuller, 1985). From its beginnings, special education 
has included those children whose only handicap was that they strayed outside the 
mainstream of what was expected or tolerated in the schools (Lazerson, 1983).
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Findings from anciliaiy data suggest that the cost of special education may 
be reduced by narrowing the scope of definition of Noncategorical Preschool and 
Emotional/Behavior Disorder. These two categories grew a combined 778 percent 
which contributed greatly to the 6 .8 percent annual increase in the cost of special 
education from 1980 to 1992. Since Louisiana uses a financing mechanism which is 
driven by pupil counts, the costs would be reduced by narrowing the definition so that 
students exhibiting behaviors outside the norm will not automatically be classified as 
needing special education services.
Summary and Implications For Further Research 
This chapter presented a summary of the study, as well as observations and 
conclusions that Louisiana’s present special education finance system is increasing in 
costs and has become less equitable in the distribution of special education per-pupil 
revenues. Possible causes of this inequity were examined and models offered to 
enhance the equity of Louisiana’s special education financing system. Alternative 
models were presented in which equity among the sixty-six school districts was 
enhanced. Models should continuously be developed and refined in order that new 
data may be generated to enhance equity and to monitor costs of Louisiana’s special 
education financing program.
This study established a framework in which the equity of Louisiana’s special 
education finance program may be monitored. The state presently is making 
adjustments to its special education financing program. It will be important to
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monitor special education per-pupil revenues among the sixty-six districts to 
determine the success of the new special education finance program. The process of 
monitoring the equity of special education per-pupil revenues needs to be ongoing so 
that the LDE will have the information necessary to make adjustments to the new 
special education finance formula in order to assure all special education students 
equal dollars regardless of the district in which they live.
The issue of whether or not wealthier districts attract and maintain more 
special education resources than poorer districts was examined. Bivariate 
correlations between district fiscal capacity and per-pupil revenues and district fiscal 
capacity and special education enrollments were used to assess these relationships. 
Further examination of these relationships is needed in order to assess the overall 
equity of Louisiana’s special education finance system. Another question which is 
raised and deserves further study is the definition of district fiscal capacity. Two 
alternative definitions were offered in this study; per-capita income or the RTS index. 
The importance of the definition is evident because the issue o f the relationship 
between district fiscal capacity and student special education enrollment is either 
resolved or not resolved. If district fiscal capacity is defined using per-capita income, 
the issue of equity is raised. If district fiscal capacity is defined using the RTS index, 
the issue is resolved.
Since districts are taking on the added burden of financing their special 
education programs, it is recommended that research be undertaken in the form of 
case studies. Actual data reveal which districts are doing a better job of absorbing the
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extra burden of financing special education as well as districts who have been unable 
to increase funding for their special education programs. Case studies in these 
districts may reveal information which will enable not only districts to improve their 
allocation of revenues, but also the state to improve the equity of the new special 
education finance program.
Finally, another issue which surfaced during the course of this study is that of 
the additional cost of educating students enrolled under Section 504. This area has 
the potential to present an added financial burden on local districts in the future. 
These costs need to be monitored and addressed both in the state special education 
finance program and in the special education curriculum program.
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•Appendix A . Special Education Finance Reform in the States
s ta te C urren t Formula Basis of AUocatkm Implemented Reform 
Last 5 years
ConsWertng
Reform
Alabama Pupil Weights Placement & Condition X X
Alaska Pupil Weights Type o f Placement X
.Arizona Pupil Weights Disabling Condition
.Arkansas Pupil Weights Type of Placement X .X
California Resource-based Classroom Unit
Colorado % Reimbursement Allowable Costs .X
Connecticut % Reimbursement Actual Expenditures X X
Delaware Flat Grant Classroom Unit X
Florida Pupil Weights Disabling Condition X
Georgia Pupil Weights Disabling Condition
Hawaii Pupil Weights Placement & Condition X
Idaho % Reimbursement Actual Expenditures
Illinois Resourced-Based No. o f  Sp. Ed. Staff X
Indiana Pupil Weights Disabling Condition
Iowa Pupil Weights Type of Placement X
Kansas Resource-Based No. o f Sp. Ed. Staff X
Kentucky Pupil Weights Disabling Condition X X
Louisiana % Reimbursement Actual Expenditures X
Maine % Reimbursement Allowable Costs
Maryland Flat Grant Special Ed. Enrollment
Massachusetts Pupil Weights Special Ed. Enrollment X
Michigan % Reimbursement Allowable Costs X
Minnesota % Reimbursement Acttual Expenditures X
Mississippi Resource-Based No. o f Sp. Ed. Staff X
Missouri Resource-Based No. o f Sp. Ed. Staff X
Montana* % Reimbuisemen Allowable Costs X
Nebraska % Reimbursement Allowable Costs X
Nevada Flat Grant Classroom Un
New Hampshire Pupil Weights Type o f Placement X
New Jersey Pupil Weights Placement & Condition X
New Mexico Pupil Weights Type of Placement X
New York Pupil Weights Type of Placement X
North Carolina Flat Grant Sp. Ed. EnroUmeiU. X
North Dakota % Reimbursemen Actual Expenditures X X
Ohio Resource-Based Classroom Unit X
Oklahoma Pupil Weights Disabling Condition X
O r^o n Flat Grant Sp. Ed. Enrollment X
Pennsylvania Fist Grant Total District Enrollment x
Rhode Island % Reimbursement Actual Expenditures
South Carolina Pupü Weights Disabling Condition X
South Dakota % Reimbursement Allowable Costs X
Tennessee Resourced-Based Classroom Unit X X
Texas Pupil Weights Type of Placement X X
Utah Pupil Weights Type of Placement X
(appen. con'd.)
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Vermont**
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wvoming
Flat Grant 
Resource-Based 
Resource-Based 
Flat Grant 
% Reimbursement 
% Reimbursement
Total Dist. Enrollment 
Classroom Unit 
Classroom Unit 
Sp. Ed. Enrollment 
Allowable Costs 
Actual Expenditures
*Montana has passed reforms that are scheduled for implementation in the 1994/1995 School Year 
** Vermont's special education fundmg formula contains a substantial percent reimbursement component 
Appendix A adapted from Parrish. Nov. 1993, p. 2
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Appendix B. Federal, State, and Local Funding Court Decisions
Federal Funding
Freeman V Cavœos J 5 6  F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1990), 923 F.2d 1434 (11th Cir. 
1991), affd, 939 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1991). The Department of Education 
terminated school district funds under section 504 after the district failed to cooperate 
with an investigation based on parental complaints regarding residential placements. 
The district did not provide residential placements to handicapped students, viewing 
this as affirmative action not required under Section 504.
Behavior Research Inst. Inc. v. Secretary o f  Admin., 577 N.E. 2d 297 (Mass. 
1991). The BRI was a specialized care facility that provided services to children with 
severe behavioral disorders and handicapping conditions. The BRI reported that it 
must receive reimbursement under the EHA fi-om the Department of Education of 
$153,351 to provide services for each of two named students. While Massachusetts 
law provided that education would ensure "maximum possible development," nothing 
in that law provided that a particular student was entitled to receive services from a 
specified provider at a given rate.
Washington V. United States Dep'tqfEduc., 905 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1990). 
The DOE claimed that the State of Washington violated the EHA Wien it supplanted, 
rather titan supplemented, state and local funds for the education of resident 
handicapped children. A reduction of expenditures had resulted when the state began 
educating all but the most severely handicapped children in regular classrooms in local 
schools, rather than in specialized segregated facilities. Because total and average 
expenditures dropped during the one-year period, due to greater mainstreaming and a 
reduction in transportation costs, the DOE concluded that federal funds had been used
(appen. con’d.)
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to supplant. On appeal, the circuit court held that die Act required the maintenance of 
local funding efforts; that in determining the number of handicapped children, the 
district must use head count rather than FTE, and that the present case should be 
remanded to determine whether an exception to the maintenance of effort requirement 
was available because of the unusually laige expenditure in one year.
Louisiana State Bd. o f Elementary and Secondary Educ. v. United States. 
Dept, o f Educ., 881 F. 2d 204 (5th Cir. 1989). The United States Department of 
Education (DOE) required the State of Louisiana to refund $700,000 in grant money 
received under the EHA due to improper spending. The circuit court upheld the DOE 
action.
Commonwealth o f Mass., Dept, o f Educ. v. United States Dept, o f  Educ., 837 
F.2d 536 (1st. Cir. 1988). The court foimd that imder the Tydings Amendment to the 
EHA, enacted in 1970 as P.L. 91-230, the federal Secretary o f Education had the 
power to reallocate funds that were originally allocated to local education agencies if 
these funds were not obligated by the local agencies by the end of a specified 
canyover period.
Edward B. v. Brunelle, 662 F. Supp. 1025 (D.N.H. 1986). The court ruled 
that section three of the EAHCA, which discusses the relationship of the EHA to other 
applicable statutes, was not retroactive.
Wordsworth Academy v. Gaugler, 453 A.2d 1064 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982). 
Where the hearing officer ordered the Department to reimbursement expenses for a 
child's education, but the Secretary of Education later overturned the award, 
reimbursement was denied by the courts. The court based its decision on a section of 
the code that specified diat expenses were to be paid by the Department only where 
placements were made widi die approval of the Department
(appen. con'd.)
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State Fundmg
Durant V. State, 313 N.W.2d 571 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), and remanded, 317 
N.W.2d 854 (îvlich. 1982), dismissed Dwranr v. Department o f Educ., 342 N.W. 2d 
591 (Mich. CL App. 1983), affd in pait, rev’d in part, 381 N.W. 2d 662 (Mich.
1985), remanded, 463 N.W.2d 461 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). Parents, taxpayers, and 
the local school district brought this action to compel the maintenance of the present 
funding level for handicapped students by the State Department of Education. Based 
on its interpretation of the state Headlee Amendment (which prevents die state from 
reducing its portion of necessary costs in given circumstances), the case was remanded 
for additional facts concerning necessary costs of programs, funding as categorical aid, 
and as applicable, the amount of underfunding.
Lincoln Intermediate Unit No. 12 v. Commonwealth, Dept, o f  Educ., 553 
A. 2d 1020 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989). Pennsylvania's special education funding laws 
provided that die state would pay the difference between the cost to educate a regular 
student and a special education studenL Schools were to provide the state with a 
funding plan which was then reviewed by the state. Funding from the state was based 
both on state special education allocations and unit needs. In this case, the LEU 
provided a funding plan and an amended plan following state guidelines, but the state 
disapproved both. The court found that fact issues precluded judgment of whether die 
state was within its authority to deny the funding plans, and whether ^ipropriate 
procedures for the denial were followed.
State V. Cochran, 764 P.2d 1037 (Wyo. 1988). The case was remanded for a 
determination o f whether the State Board of Education had partial financial 
responsibility for services which had been provided to a handicapped student beyond 
his twenty-first birthday.
(appen. con’d.)
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Failis V. Ambach, 710 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1983). The court found that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing to question state action in reducing the required amount of 
reimbursement by local public school districts to private schools.
Alban v. County o f Nassau, 455 N.Y.S.2d 379 (App. Div. 1982). The New 
York Commissioner of Education could require counties to pay additional residential 
tuition by promulgating a new rate structure even after tiie culmination of die school 
year, provided reimbursement claims were made within a reasonable period of time.
Board o f Educ. o f Greeburgh Cent. School. Dist. No. ", Westchester County 
V. Ambach, 453 N.Y.S. 2d 895 (App. Div. 1982). The court found that before 
ordering a school district to contract services for handicapped students with another 
district, the commissioner must decide whether the services are appropriate and 
reasonable, and must balance the increased cost to the district with die "added 
educational opportunity to the student"
Organization to Assure Servs. fo r  Exceptional Students, Inc. v. Ambach, 432 
N.Y.S. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1980), reVd and remanded, 440 N.Y.S. 390 (App. Div. 1981), 
449 N.Y.S. 2d 952 (N.Y. 1982). The Commissioner of Education had the power to 
set tuition rates and teacher salary increases for schools that had contracted with the 
state to provide special education services.
Foundation fo r the Handicapped v. Department o f Social and Health Servs. 
o f Wash., 648 P.2d 884 (Wash. 1982). The court rejected the claim for the return of 
$83,000,000 that was collected by the state ftom institutionalized clients and their 
guardians for their care since 1967. However, the court found that some of the 
notices used to make the coUectiotis needed to be modified.
(appen. con'd.)
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Pilato V. New York State Dept, o f  Educ., 406 N.Y.S.2d 562 (App. Div. 1978). 
The Commissioner of Education had the authority to refuse to approve a Family Court 
order to pay the cost of a private school that was not approved by the State Board of 
Education.
In re Suzanne E.,3Zl N.Y.S.2d 628 (Fam. C t 1976). The court ordered the 
state to pay one half the cost of educating a multi-handicapped child in an out of state, 
residential placement.
County and Local Funding
Lake Erie Inst, o f Rehabilitation v. Manon County. W. Va. Bd. o f Educ., 798
F. Supp. 262 (W.D. Pa. 1992). Summary judgment was given to the defendant as the 
court held that the alleged promise of the superintendent to pay for rehabilitative 
services was ultra vires and did not bind the county board.
In re Todd P., 509 A.2d 140 (N.H. 1986). The court found that where the 
school district had not been provided the opportunity to review die IE? of a child who 
was placed in a home for delinquents, the school district could not be held financially 
responsible for the educational expenses of that placement.
School Comm, o f Brookline v. Bureau o f Special Educ. Appeals, 452 N.E.2d 
476 (Mass. 1983). The court found that under Massachusetts law, the district could 
not claim a lack of funds to pay the private day school costs for a handicapped student 
based on statewide budgetary limits.
(appen. con’d.)
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D.S. V. Board o f Educ. o f  East Brunswick, 458 A. 2d 129 (N.J. Super. C. App. 
Div. 1983). Where state statute required payment of the tuition and related costs 
where residential placement was appropriate to meet a child's educational needs, the 
district could not claim insufiScient federal funding to assist in the payment.
Linder v. Wake County B d o f Educ., 273 S.E.2d 735 (N .O  App. Ct. 1981). 
The court found that the parents had no standing to file a claim where a dispute 
existed between two districts over a tuition chaige.
Hines v. Pitt County Bd. o f Educ., 497 F.. Supp. 403 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). The 
school district could not claim that it had insufficient funds to pay the tuition costs 
involved in educating an emotionally handicapped child.
MJi. V. Mihvaukee Pub. Sck, 495 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Wis. 1980). Parents 
attained a preliminary injunction preventing the termination of treatment services for 
iiandicapped children where the district claimed that program funding had been 
exhausted.
Quogue Union Free Sch. D isl No. 3 v. County o f Suffolk, 424 N.Y.S.2d 261 
(App. Div. 1980). New York Education Law required that the county Human 
Services Department would have to continue supporting the educational costs of four 
children it had placed in foster homes, despite changes in the law. The issue was not 
addressed under the EHCA.
Smith V. Cumberland Sch. Comm., 415 A.2d 168 (R.I. 1980). After 
examining legislative intent, the court concluded that school committees had to 
reimburse the state department for the educational services it provided at its institutions 
and that the department had no choice but to provide the educational services if they 
were not locally available for children with emotional disturbances.
(appen. con’d.)
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North V. District c f  Columbia Bd. o f Educ., 471 F. Stq>p. 135 (DC. 1979). 
Despite district claims that the Department of Human Resources should pay for tuition 
to a residential facility, the court provided a preliminary injunction forcing the board of 
education to cover the costs, basing its decision on EHCA and RA requirements. The 
school board claimed that the child's problems were emotional rather than educational.
Elliot V. Board o f Educ. o f Chicago, 380 N.E. 2d 1137 (111. App. C t 1978). 
The S2,500 statutory maximum on the annual amount school districts were required to 
pay for the education of individual handicapped children who were excluded from 
public schools and who attended specialized facilities, was struck dowtt
State V. Stecher. 390 A.2d 408 (Conn. Super. C t 1978). The town of 
residence was not held liable for partial payment for the residential placement of a 
handicapped child.
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Appendix C. State Models For Financing Special Education
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Appendix D. Interstate Financing .Arrangement for -Special Education
State
Alabama
.Alaska
Arizona 
.Arkansas 
C alilbmia
Special Education
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Geoigia
Hawaii
Idaho
Not available.
The costs of services for exceptional pupils are included in basic 
state support.
Nine weighted categories.
Seven weighted categories.
The .Master Plan for Special Education provides funding for 
instructional personnel service units, support services, and where 
applicable) nonpublic, nonsectarian schooling sufficient to rovide 
special education services for approximately 10% of the total 
student population.
The state reimburses for excess costs of special education 
programs. Maximum reimbursement is 80%. The prorated 
payment is about 44% of excess costs.
State support is based on district wealth as defined in the GTB 
formula. Aid ranges from 30% of reimbursable costs forealthiest 
district to 70% of reimbursable costs for poorest districts.
Units for 12 categories are provided, ranging in size from 4 
pupils per unit to 15 pupils per unit.
Of the 53 weighted categories in the foundation program, 15 are 
for exceptional pupils.
Four weighted categories for special education.
Full state funding.
A total of 80% of ancillaiy salaries (special education teachers, 
psychologists, psychological examiners, therapists) is provided. 
Additional support units are provided in foundation program.
(appen. con'd.)
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Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
K a n sa s
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Flat grant of 58.000 per certified special education employee and 
S2.800 per approved nonceitified employee is provided. Excess 
costs for pupils with severe disabilities in district-operated 
programs are added up to a maximum of S2.000 greater than a 
district’s regular pupil per capita cost.
Thirteen wc%hted categories in foundation program.
Three weighted categories are provided for special education 
pupils.
total of 80% of special education transportation and costs is 
provided; SI4.069 in categorical aid per instructional umt is also 
provided.
Extra classroom units are allotted per approved teacher, not to 
exceed the total provided in the biennial budget. For each unit 
allocated, 7.2 ADA deducted from basic allocation.
Additional instructional units are provided for 18 program 
categories. This includes funding for assessment teachers, school 
psychologists, school social workers, and other certified 
personnel.
In FT 1987-1988, 106% of base year costs were allocated.
Excess cost reimbursement for special education pupils.
Three pupil weighted categories are included in the foundation 
program.
Districts may be reimbursed for up to 75% of added costs for 
most programs, subject to a capped appropriation, and 100% for 
certain programs.
State categorical aid is provided for 66% of the salary of essential 
personnel, not to exceed SI 8,400 per FTE staff person, and for 
47% of expenditures for special supplies and equipment, not to 
exceed S47 per disabled child.
Instructional unit add-on for approved class.
Reimbursement of SI3,989 per approved instructional unit of 
special education.
(appen. con'd.)
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lo3
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire 
New Jersey
New Mexico 
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
■AJlowable costs associated with special education programs are 
fuUy reimbursed.
Gifted pupils receive an additional weighting of 25% of basic 
needs by grade level (districts qualifying for equalization aid.
For 1987-1988. districts receive one unit of special education 
support (S24.000) for every 150 pupils enrolled in the district.
Five weighted categories for special education.
Weighted pupils (13 categories) times the state average net 
current expense per pupil.
Four weighted categories included in the foundation program.
Aid for special education pupils equals weighted resident pupils 
multiplied by district-approved operating expense per pupil, but 
not less than S2,000 or more than S4,200. multiplied by district 
excess cost aid ratio. Aid is in addition to aid for operating 
expense.
State allocated aid for students with disabilities on the lesser of 
June 1 head count or 12.5% of total prior year ADM.
Districts are reimbursed: the excess over 2.5 times the state 
average cost per ptqiil for students placed out-of-district for 
services; 60% of the excess student transportation costs; 80% of 
boarding care costs; and varying rates for staff and contracted 
services per fee schedule.
A flat grant of S7,400 per instructional unit plus salary (115°b of 
state minimum salary schedule) is awarded for special education 
and $8,650 salary for vocational education units; $1,525 per unit 
plus 115% salary allowance awarded for special education 
support personnel and programs for gifted pupils. Districts 
receive mileage or per pupil transportation grants. Partial cost 
reimbursement for home instruction, teacher training, or special 
instructional services for students with physical or emotional 
disabilities.
Twelve weighted categories included in foundation program.
Reimbursement up to 30% of excess cost or pro rata share
(currentN about 11 •’b).
(a p p e n . con  d . i
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Pennsylvania Reimbursement of 100% of approved excess cost of pupils in
district or intermediate unit-operated special classes; 80% of 
tuition and maintenance cost for pupils assigned to approved 
private schools for students with physical emotional or cognitive 
disabilities.
Rhode Island Formula for special education provides excess cost aid.
South Carolina Disabled children are weighted according to nine specific
classifications.
South Dakota Reimbursement of lOO^o for students with severe and profound
disabilities; 50% on other allowable costs.
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virgjnia
Washington
Identified and served disabled students receive additional 
weighting in determining pupil counts.
For the portion of the day students are served in approved 
programs, the adjusted allotment is multiplied by a weight 
varying fi'om 2.0 to 10.0 depending on the instructional 
arrangement used. Twelve weighted categories included in the 
foundation program.
Foundation program provides weighted categories for disabled 
students according to five levels.
The state funds 75% of actual salaries of an approved number of 
mainstream special education positions. .Also, 100% forward 
funding is provided for designated special education programs 
and residential placements, with the district of legal residence 
reimbursing the state for actual costs or district’s average per 
pupil costs, whichever is lower.
Additional state funds are provided for special, vocational, and 
adult education programs.
A  program for highly capable students is funded in an amount 
equal to I"ô of the school district enrollment multiplied by 
S344.23.
West Virginia General aid formula weights special education pupils 3.0.
■Additional funds are provided for teaching personnel, facilities, 
and transportation.
(appen. con'd.)
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in:)
Wisconsin State reimburses 63% of approved costs for education and 100% 
of room and board for intradistrict transfer pupils and 51% for 
school psychologists and social workers.
Wvomino \o t  available.
(V e rs te g e n  a n d  C o x  p p . 148 - 151)
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Appendix E. To From Index
The conversion to 1994 dollars is commonly called a To From Index.
It is calculated by dividing the year to which one wants to convert into thej^eor from  
where the data came. That statistic is then multiplied by the actual amount 
of money of the year from  which was converted. The resulting amount is now in 1994 
dollars.
For example, if converting 1991 dollars to 1993 dollars, one would refer to The 
Economic Report of the President (19941. In this publication, one would find the table 
entitled Implicit price deflectors fo r  gross national product. The column entitled State 
and Local would be located under the heading Government Goods and Services. The 
years 1991 and 1993 would be located. The 1991 index was 117.5. The 1993 index 
was 122.9. Apply the formula:
Year to = 1993 122.9
= 1.046
Year from = 1991 117.5
Take that statistic (1.046) and multiply it by the 1991 dollar amount firom the data.
1.046 X $2,567,879 = $2,685,839 
1991 dollars = $2,567,829 comes to $2,685,839 in 1994 dollars
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Appendix F. The Calculation of the Coefficient of Variation, Federal Range Ratio,
and McLoone Index
The CV is expressed algebraically as: 
\ N 2 N
CV =  \ Z  ADM (Rp-Ri) /  Z  ADMi
i=2_
Rp
where ADMi is average daily membership for the ith district, Ri is revenue per-pupil, 
and Rp is the mean per-pupil revenue (Berne & StiefeL 1984, p. 56).
The FRR is calculated as follows:
FRR= ( R s 5 - R i ) /  Ri
where Rss and Ri are the 95th and 5th percentiles of the distribution (Berne & StiefeL, 
1984, p. 66).
The MI is calculated in the following manner:
j j
MI = ( lA D M iR i)  /  ( Mdiip Z  ADMi)
i-i '  i= l
where ADMi is the average daily membership for the ith district, Ri is per-pupil 
revenue, Mdnp is the per-pupil revenue for the median student, and J is the dstrict at 
the median level (Berne & Stiefel, 1984, p. 20).
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Appendix G. Special Education Finance Model I
District W FSpEdAI T o tS pE dE n P e rP u p R e v PCI
Fiscal C apacity 
C apichy  Index Rank
A cad ia $ 5 2 8 2 .6 7 2 1379 $3.831 $ 1 2 6 0 2 0.59464356 48
Allen $1 .9 0 3 2 0 8 520 $3.660 $10.236 0.517305 55
A scen sio n $7.622.996 2043 $3.731 $16.664 1.33586805 n
A ssum ption $ 2 .1 3 2 4 9 6 566 $3.768 $12.708 0.53485043 51
A voyelles $25 5 7 .1 8 8 683 $3.744 $11.311 0.47643276 61
B e au reg a rd $ 2 9 1 5 .2 4 0 797 $3.658 $14.146 0 80191222 28
Bienville $1.448.019 374 $3.872 $13.294 1.17831703 12
B o ssie r 56.610.964 1771 $3.733 $15.644 0.67153481 42
C a d d o $22.577.576 6133 $3.648 $17.996 0,96500978 21
C a lc as ieu $18.535.095 5040 $3.678 $16.137 1.23033827 10
C aldw ell $805.334 221 $3,644 $12.697 0.5689125 49
C a m e ro n $1.381.379 386 $3.579 312.922 1 50550741 7
C a tah o u la $1.415.264 401 $3.529 $12.727 0.49080235 62
Q a i  b o rn e $1.365.566 368 $3.711 $12.291 0.82508247 25
C o n co rd ia $ ;  .200.659 331 $3.627 $12.478 0.58776628 46
D eso to $2 2 2 9 .6 3 3 633 $3.522 $13.528 0.80892368 41
E a st B aton R ouge $36.350.699 9886 $3.677 SI 8.798 1.4853229 8
E a s t Carroll $592.988 145 $4.090 $11.432 0.48011183 57
E a s t F elic iana $1.170.162 322 $3.634 $12.864 0 49091417 59
E vangeline $3.585.033 968 $3.704 $11.939 0.5691026 50
Franklin $1.591.466 443 $3.592 $12.125 0 4761532 60
G rant $1.134.018 313 $3.623 $11.690 0.33324015 66
Iberia $11 .6 0 2 2 2 4 3089 $3.756 $14.574 0.75184792 35
Iberville $2211 ,561 606 $3.649 $14.435 1.94541795 2
(appen. con’d)
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District W FSpEdAI T o tS pE dE n P e rP u p R e v p a
Fiscal C apacity  
C ap id ty  Index Rank
Ja ck so n SI .236.803 335 S3.692 513.606 0.77546547 32
Jefferson S33.186.969 8759 $3.789 518.340 1 68209114 5
Je fferson  Davis S3.604.235 977 S3.689 512.035 06218619 34
Lafayette SI 6.856.658 4223 S3.992 517.489 1 16632933 14
1-afourctie 59.785.988 2578 S3.796 513.447 0 75248532 29
LaSalle 51.032.363 283 S3,648 513.309 0 77042214 31
fjncoln 52.257.871 613 S3.683 514.710 092029075 24
Livingston S5.848.551 1586 S3.688 514.094 0 36613922 65
M adison 5979.277 279 S3.510 512.427 0.46383003 58
M orehouse S2.918.628 798 S3.657 513.929 0 82675985 27
N atchitoches S3.986.006 1078 53 .698 512.513 0.68174448 33
O rleans S36.868.010 9762 53.777 518 962 1 02876153 16
O uachita S8.398.962 2237 53.755 515.181 0 9096785 17
P laquem ines S I.984.532 499 S3.977 515.251 2.5303215 1
Pointe C o u p ee SI .802.682 487 S3.702 514.036 1.39020408 23
Fiapides S11.603.354 3076 53,772 515.186 0 85734414 26
R ed  Rn/er S562.491 161 53.494 513.200 0.67533687 39
Richland S2.516.526 691 53.642 513.472 0 58433324 53
S ab in e S2.007.122 544 S3.690 512.756 067430808 37
St. Bernard S5.964.890 1602 53.723 514.833 1.03748393 19
St. C harles S5.279.283 1463 53.609 517.509 202939894 3
St. H elena 3344.262 262 53.604 510.718 054056472 56
St. J a m e s 51.351.048 355 53.834 514.153 1.60471904 4
St. John S3.449.493 923 53.737 $14.541 1.16824154 15
(appen. con’d.)
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Fiscal Capacity
District W FSpEdAI T otS pE dE n P erP u p R ev P O C a p ic ty Rank
Index
St. Landry S7.66T730 2007 53.827 513.346 0.6085882 45
St. Martin S4.830.872 1264 53.822 511.111 0.54602181 54
S t  Maty S5.550.363 1478 53.755 512.161 0.94136986 20
St. T am m any SI 8.768.902 5114 33.670 518.089 0 82549623 30
T an g ip ah o a 57.329.326 1923 53.811 513.186 0 62457926 47
T e n sa s 51.043.658 298 53.502 512.511 0.64512161 40
T erreb o n n e 510.925.654 2921 53.740 513.339 0  93980431 18
Union 51.008.644 286 53.527 514.064 0.6301258 4 4
Vermillion 55.621.522 1484 53.788 512.570 0 86336036 22
V ernon 54.140.747 1117 53.707 512.213 0.37759015 64
W ashington 52.745.815 762 53,603 512.773 0.37449259 63
W eb ste r 53.102.737 829 53.743 514.459 072 9 7 0 6 4 6 43
W est Baton R ouge 51.940.481 541 53.587 516.267 1 66166061 6
W est Carroll 31.075.284 284 33.785 511.228 0 56442829 52
W est F e lia a n a 51.132.889 306 53.702 59.863 1.10901873 9
Winn 51.680.696 456 53,686 512.734 C.583S69S1
City of M onroe 55.933.264 1586 53.741 315.181 1 11009226 13
City of B oga lusa 51.950.647 509 53.832 512.773 0 70103439 36
(appen. con'd.)
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Disability Categories, Definitions o f Costs, and Weights For Model I
Disability Category Definition o f  Cost W eight
Mild/Mental Retarded (MMR) Supplemental 1.5
Speech Impaired (SI) Supplemental 1.5
Emotional/Behavior Disorder (ED) Supplemental 1.5
Learning Disabled (LD) Supplemental 1.5
N oncal^o rical Preschool (NC) Siqrplemental 1.5
D eaf(D ) Replacement 4.0
\% ually  Impaired (VI) Replacement 4.0
Orthopedic Impaired (01) Replacement 4.0
Other Health Impaired (OHI) Replacement 4.0
D eaf® lind(D-B) Replacement 4.0
Multiple Handicapped (MH) Replacement 4.0
Autism (A) Replacement 4.0
Traumatic Brain Injury (FBI) Replacement 4.0
Educationally Handicapped (EH) Replacement 4.0
Gified and Talented (G  & I ) Supplemental 1.5
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Appendix H - Special Education Finance Model II
District W FSpEdAI T o tS pE dE n W F S p E d P erP u p R ev p a
F iscal 
C a p id ty  Index
A cadia S5.449.183 1379 S3.952 512.602 0.59464356
Allen SI .979.404 520 53.807 510.236 0.517305
A scension S7.863.137 2043 S3.849 S16.664 1.33586805
Assum ption S2.201.S10 566 53.890 SI 2.708 0.53485043
A voyelles $2.606.440 683 S3.816 511.311 0.47643276
B eauregard S3.044.574 797 53.820 514.146 0.80191222
Bienville SI .465.787 374 S3.919 SI 3.294 1.17831703
B ossier S6.826.888 1771 53.855 SI 5.644 0.67153481
C a d d o S23.568.918 6193 53.806 517.996 0.96500978
C a lcasieu 51921 0 .3 8 0 5040 S3.812 516.137 1.23033827
C aldw ell 5834.018 221 53.774 512.697 0.5689125
C am eron SI .451.342 386 S3.760 5 1 2 9 2 2 1.50550741
C atahoula SI .476.883 401 S3.683 512.727 0.49080235
O a ib o m e SI .381.069 388 53.753 512.291 0.82508247
C oncord ia 51.256.787 331 53.797 512.478 0.58776628
D eso to $2.352.930 633 53.717 513.523 0.80892368
E ast Baton R ouge 537.253.115 9886 53.768 SI 8.798 1.4853229
E ast Carroll S577.771 145 53.985 511.432 0.48011183
E ast F e lia a n a 51.184.716 322 53.679 512.864 0 49091417
Evar\getine $3.684.042 96 8 53 .806 511.939 Q.S691Q26
(appen. con’d.)
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D istria W FSpEdAI T o tS p E d E n  W F S p E d P erP u p R ev p a
Fiscal 
Capicrty Index
Franklin SI .670.296 443 S3.770 512.125 0 4761532
G rant S l.187,418 313 S3.794 S11.690 033324015
Iberia S n  .904.179 3089 S3.S54 SI 4.574 0.75184792
Iberville S2.239.953 606 S3.S96 514.435 1.94541795
Ja d ts o n $1.288.417 335 S3.846 SI 3.606 0 77546547
Jefferson S34.150.833 8759 S3.899 518.340 1 68209114
Jeffe rso n  Davis S3.723.809 977 S3.311 512.035 0.6218619
Lafayene SI 6.871.498 4223 S3.995 517.489 1 16632933
Lafourcfie SI 0.039.767 2578 S3.894 513.447 075248532
L aSalle SI .078.956 283 53.813 513.309 0 77042214
Lincoln S2.321.961 613 S3.788 514.710 0.92029075
Livingston S6.062.935 1586 $3.823 SI 4.094 0 36613922
M adison SI .034.449 279 S3.708 512.427 046383003
M orehouse S3.008.657 798 53.770 513.929 0.82675985
N atchitocfies S4.150.635 1078 S3.850 512.513 0 68174448
O rlean s S37.873.087 9762 S3.880 518.962 1 02876153
O uachita 58.662.565 2237 53.872 515.131 09 0 9 6 7 8 5
P laqu em in es S2.027.274 499 54.063 515.251 2.5303215
Poin te  C o u p e e $1.860.774 487 $3.821 $14.038 1 39020408
R a p id e s S11.788.731 3076 53.832 515.186 085734414
R ed  River S594.956 161 S3.695 $13.200 0.67533687
R ichland SZ631.297 631 S3.808 $13.472 0.58433324
S ab in e $2.075.436 544 $3.815 $1Z 756 0.67430808
S t  B ernard S6.104.742 1602 S3.811 $14.833 1.03748393
(ap p en . c o n ’d .)
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OistricJ W FSpEdAI T otSpE dEn V i/FSpEdPerPupR ev p a
F iscal 
C apkaty  Index
St. C h a rle s S5.486541 1463 $3.750 $17.509 2.02939894
S t  H e le n a $990.156 2 62 $3.779 $10.718 0.54056472
S t  J a m e s SI .379.926 3 55 S3.887 $14.153 1.60471904
S t  Jo h n S3.557.944 923 S3.855 $14.541 1.16824154
S t  Landry S7.886.143 2007 S3.929 513.346 0.6085882
S t  Martin S4.875.508 1264 S3.857 $11.111 0.54602181
S t  Mary S5.700.257 1478 S3.857 $12.161 0.94136986
S t  T am m any 519.449.231 5114 S3.803 $18.089 0.82549623
T an g ip ah o a S7.491.412 1923 S3.896 $13.188 0.62457926
T e n s a s S1.103.142 298 S3.702 SI 2.511 0.64512161
T e rre b o n n e S11.325.933 2921 S3.877 $13.339 0.93980431
Union SI .064.049 286 S3.720 $14.064 0.6301258
Vermillion S5.728.953 1484 S3.860 $12.570 0.86336036
V ernon S4.300.898 1117 S3.850 SI 2.213 0.37753016
W ashington S2.855.686 762 S3.748 $12.773 0.37449259
W eo ste r S3.188.730 829 $3.846 $14.459 0.72970646
W est Baton R ouge S2.029.575 541 $3.752 SI 6 2 6 7 1.66166061
W est Carroll SI .112.616 284 S3.918 $ 1 1 2 2 8 0.56442829
W est F elic iana $1.163.465 306 S3.802 $9.863 1,10301873
Winn SI .735.820 456 S3.807 $12.734 0.68396981
City of M onroe S6.079.877 1586 S3.833 $15.181 1.11009226
City of B o g a lu sa S2.004.016 509 $3.937 $12.773 0.70103439
(appen. con’d.)
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Disability Category Definition o f  Cost Weight
Mild/Mental Retarded (MMR) Supplemental 1.6
Speech Impaired (SI) Supplemental 1.6
Emotional/Behavior Disorder (ED) Supplemental 1.6
Learning Disabled (LD) Supplemental 1.6
Noncategorical Preschool (NC) Supplemental 1.6
D eaf (D) Replacement 3.5
Visually Impaired (VI) Replacement 3.5
Orthopedic Impaired (01) Replacement 3.5
Other Health Impaired (OHI) Replacement 3.5
Deaf/Blind (D-B) Replacement 3.5
Multiple Handicapped (MH) Replacement 3.5
Autism (A) Replacement 3.5
Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) Replacement 3.5
Educationally Handicapped (EH) Replacement 3.5
Gifted and Talented (G & D Supplemental 1.6
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Appendix I - Special Education Finance Model HI
D isn ia W FSpEdAI T o tS pE dE n W F S p E d P erP u p R ev p a
r is c a l  
Capicity Index
C apacity
Rank
A cadia $7,010,491 1379 55.084 $12,602 0.59464356 48
Allen S2.638.467 520 55.074 510.236 0.517305 55
A scension SI 0.350.522 2043 55.066 316.664 1 33586805 11
A ssum ption 52.872.320 566 55.075 312.708 0  53485043 51
A voyelles 53.441.705 683 55.039 311.311 0 4 7 6 4 3 2 7 6 61
B e au reg a rd 54.051.749 797 55.084 314.146 0.80191222 28
Bienville SI .886,074 374 55.043 313.294 1 17831703 12
B ossier S8.977.908 1771 S5.069 315.644 0 67153481 42
C addo 531.463.333 6193 S5.080 317.996 0 965 0 0 9 7 8 21
C alcasieu 525.545.859 5040 55.069 316.137 1.23033827 10
Caldw ell SI ,118.426 221 $5,061 $12,697 0  5669125 49
C am eron 31,962.328 386 55.084 312.922 1 50550741 7
C atahoula 52.028.418 401 55.058 312.727 0 4 9 0 8 0 2 3 5 62
O a ib o m e SI .845.406 368 $5,015 $12,291 0 8 2 5 0 8 2 4 7 25
C oncord ia $1.682.721 331 S5.084 312.478 0 5 8 7 7 6 6 2 8 46
D esoto S3.218.014 633 35.084 313.528 08 0 8 9 2 3 6 8 41
E ast Baton R ouge S49.836.084 9886 35.04 1 318.798 14853229 8
E ast Carroll 5721.896 145 54.979 311.432 04 8 0 1 1 1 8 3 57
E ast Felic iana 51.611.554 322 S5.005 312.864 0.49091417 59
E vangeline 54.890.574 968 SS.052 $11,939 0  5691026 50
Franklin S2.252.101 443 35.084 312.125 0 4761532 60
G rant 51.591.214 313 35.084 $11,690 0  33324015 66
Iberia $15,622,380 3069 $5,057 $14,574 0  75164792 35
(appen. con’d.)
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OistricS W FSpEdAI T o tS pE dE n  W F S p E d P erP u p R ev p a
Fiscal 
C ap id ty  Index
C apacity
R ank
Iberville S3.035.008 606 $5.008 $14.435 1.94541795 2
Ja c k so n SI .703.056 335 $5.084 $13.606 0.77546547 32
Je ffe rso n S44.411.663 8759 $5.070 $18.340 168209114 5
Je ffe rso n  Davis S4.946.493 977 S5.063 SI 2.035 0.6218619 34
Lafayene S21.255.201 4223 S5.033 $17.439 1.16632933 14
Lafourcfie SI 3.055.080 2578 $5.064 SI 3.447 0.75248532 29
L aSalle SI .438.701 283 S5.084 $13.309 077042214 31
Lincoln S3.096.008 613 $5.051 $14.710 0.92029075 24
Livingston S8.042.497 1586 S5.071 SI 4.094 0.36613922 65
M adison SI .418.366 279 S5.084 $12.427 0.46383003 58
M orehouse $4.031.419 798 S5.052 $13.929 0.82675985 27
N atchitoches S5.480.283 1078 S5.084 $12.513 0.68174448 33
O rlean s S49.434.423 9762 $5.064 SI 8.962 1.02876153 16
O uachrta s n  .341.352 2237 $5.070 S15.181 0 9036735 17
P laq u em in es S2.536.791 499 $5.084 $15.251 2.5303215 1
P o in te  C o u p e e S2.465.621 437 S5.063 $14.036 1 39020408 23
R a p id e s SI 5.490.215 3076 S5.036 SI 5.186 0.85734414 26
R e d  River S818.484 161 55.084 513.200 0.67533687 39
R ichland S3.512,871 691 $5.084 SI 3.472 05 8433324 53
S a b in e S2.755.395 544 $5.065 SI 2.756 0.67430808 37
SL B ernard S8.083.175 1602 S5.046 SI 4.833 1.03748393 19
S l C h a rles S7.407.030 1463 S5.Q63 $17.509 2.02939894 3
St. H elena SI .331.943 262 $5.084 $10.713 0  54056472 56
S l J a m e s SI .789.483 355 S5.041 $14.153 1.60471904 4
(appen. con’d.)
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District W FSpEdAI T o tS pE dE n  W F S p E d P erP u p R ev P G
Fiscal 
C ap id ty  Index
Capacity
Rank
S t  Joh n S4.677.053 923 S5.067 SI 4.541 1.16824154 15
S t  Landry SI 0.177.673 2007 S5.071 SI 3.346 0.6085882 45
S t  Martin S6.354.702 1264 S5.027 S11.111 0.54602181 54
St. Mary S7.478.203 1478 SS.060 312.161 0 94136986 20
St. Tam m any S25.911.891 5114 S5.067 SI 8.089 0.82549623 30
T an g ip ah o a S9.725.224 1923 S5.057 313.188 062457926 47
T e n sa s SI .514.958 298 S5.084 SI 2.511 0  64512161 40
T erreb o n n e 314.839.468 2921 35.080 313.339 0 93980431 18
Union 31.453.953 286 35.084 314.064 0.6301258 44
Vermillion 37.488.375 1484 S5.046 SI 2.570 0.86336036 22
Vernon S5.673.466 1117 S5.079 SI 2.213 0.37759016 64
W ashington S3.858.569 762 35.064 SI 2.773 037449259 63
W eb ste r 34.194.098 829 35.059 314.459 0 72970646 43
W est Baton R ouge S2.745.226 541 S5.074 SI 6.267 1.66166061 6
W est Carroll SI .443.785 284 55.084 S11.228 056442829 52
W est F e lia a n a S I.545.462 306 S5.051 S9.863 1.10901873 9
Winn S2.308.025 456 35.061 512.734 068396981 38
City of M onroe 38.012.000 1586 35.052 S15.181 1.11009225 13
City of B oga lusa S2.582.546 509 S5.074 $12,773 0 70103439 36
(appen. con’d.)
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Disability C a t^ o ry Definition o f  Cost W e i^ t
Mild/Mental Retarded (MMR) Supplemental 2.25
Speech Impaired (SI) Supplemental 2.25
Emotional/Behavior Disorder (ED) Supple:, .ntal 2.25
Learning Disabled (LD) Supplemental 2.25
Noncategorical Preschool (NC) Supplemental 2.25
D eaf(D ) Supplemental 2.25
Visually Impaired (VI) Supplemental 2.25
Orthopedic Impaired (01) Supplemental 2.25
O ther Health Impaired (OHI) Supplemental 2.25
DeafTBlind (D-B) Supplemental 2.25
Multiple Handicapped (MH) Supplemental 2.25
Autism (A) Supplemental 2.25
Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) Supplenental 2.25
Educationally Handicapped (EH) Supplemental 2.25
Gifted and Talented (G & T) Supplemental 2.25
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Appendix J - Special Education Finance Model IV
F is c a l
C apacity
Effort
District T o tS p E d E n PPR E V W eform SpEdA I p a index Rank
A cad ia 1379 $4,470 36.164.130 $12,602 0 5 9 4 6 4 3 5 6 42
Allen 520 SS.062 32.632.240 310.236 0.517305 9
A scen sio n 2043 34.470 3 9 .1 3 2 2 1 0 316.664 1.33586805 23
A ssum ption 566 35.062 3 2 8 6 5 .0 9 2 312.708 0.53485043 6
A voyelles 683 34.470 33.053.010 311.311 0.47643276 41
B e au reg a rd 797 35.062 34.034.414 314.146 0.80191222 4
Bienville 374 S4.470 31.671.780 313.294 1.17831703 25
B o ssie r 1771 34.470 37.916.370 315.644 0.67153481 24
C a d d o 6193 35.062 331.348.966 317.996 0.96500978 5
C a lc as ieu 5040 34.470 3 2 2 5 2 8 .8 0 0 316.137 1230 3 3 8 2 7 26
C aldw ell 221 $4,470 3987.870 3 1 2 6 9 7 0.5689125 30
C am ero n 386 35.062 31.953.932 312.922 1.50550741 12
C atah o u la 401 35.062 32.029.862 3 1 2 7 2 7 0.49080235 15
Ctai b o rn e 368 33.877 31.426.736 312291 0.82508247 45
C o n c o rd ia 331 34.470 31.479.570 312.478 0 .58776628 34
D eso to 633 35.062 33.204.246 313.528 0.80892368 3
E a s t B aton R o u g e 9886 34.470 344.190.420 318.798 1.4853229 27
E a s t Carroll 145 33.877 5562.165 311.432 0.48011183 65
E a s t F e lic iana 322 33.877 31.248.394 312.864 0.49091417 48
E vangeline 968 34.470 $4,326,960 311.939 0.5691026 37
Franklin 443 34.470 31.980.210 312.125 0.4761532 33
G rant 313 34.470 31.399.110 311.690 0.33324015 36
Iberia 3089 34.470 313.807.830 314.574 0.75184792 22
(appen. con’d.)
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District T o tS p E d E n PPREV W efonnSpEdA l P O
FiscaJ 
C ap id ty  Index
Efidft
Rank
Iberville 606 $4.470 52.708.820 514.435 1.94541795 28
Ja c k so n 335 55.062 $1.695.770 513.606 0.77546547 8
Je fferson 8759 53.877 $33.958.643 518.340 1.68209114 52
Je ffe rso n  Davis 977 $5.062 $4.945.574 512.035 0.6218619 14
Lafayette 4223 54.470 518.876.810 517.489 1.16632933 31
Lafourche 2578 54.470 511.523.660 513.447 0.75248532 39
L aSalle 283 54.470 51.265.010 513.309 0.77042214 35
Lincoln 613 53.877 52.376.601 514.710 0.92029075 54
Livingston 1586 $5.062 $8.028.332 514.094 0.36613922 2
M adison 279 33.877 51.081.683 512.427 0.46383003 47
M orehouse 798 53.877 53.093.846 513.929 0.82675985 55
N atchitoches 1078 53.877 54.179.406 512.513 0.68174448 57
O rlean s 9752 55.062 549.415.244 518.962 1.02876153 13
O uachita 2237 53.877 $8.672.849 515.181 0.9096785 62
P laq u em in es 499 53.877 51.934.623 515.251 2.5303215 58
Poin te  C o u p e e 487 53.877 51.888.099 514,036 1.39020408 59
R a p id e s 3076 55.062 515.570.712 515.186 0.85734414 18
R ed  River 161 $4.470 $719.670 513.200 0.67533887 43
Richland 691 $4.470 53.088.770 513.472 0.58433324 38
S ab in e 544 53.877 52.109.088 512.756 0.67430808 50
S l  B ernard 1602 55.062 58.109.324 514.833 1.03748393 17
S t  C h arles 1463 55.062 $7.405.706 517.509 2.02939894 10
S t  H elena 262 53.877 $1.015.774 $10.718 0S4OS6472 63
S t  J a m e s 355 54.470 $1.586.850 514.153 1.60471904 40
(qjpen. con’d )
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D istria T otS pE dE n PPREV W eform SpEdA I p a
Fiscal 
C a p id ty  Index
Effort
R ank
S t  Jo h n 323 $5,062 $4,672,226 $14,541 1.16824154 21
S t  Landry 2007 $3,877 $7,781,139 $13,346 0.6085882 46
S t  Martin 12S4 $5,062 $6,398,368 $11,111 0.54602181 20
S t  Mary 1478 55.062 57.481.536 512.151 0.94136986 16
S t  T am m any 5114 $5,062 $25,887,068 $18,089 0.82549623 1
T a n g ip a h o a 1323 $3,877 $7,455,471 $13,188 0.62457926 53
T e n s a s 298 53.877 51.155.346 512.511 0.64512161 49
T e rre b o n n e 2921 53.877 $11,324,717 $13,339 0.93980431 61
Union 286 $3,877 $1,108,822 $14,064 0.6301258 64
Vermillion 1484 53.877 55.753.468 $ 1 2 5 7 0 0.86336036 66
V ernon 1117 $5,062 $5,654,254 $12,213 0.37759016 7
W ashington 762 $5,062 $3,857,244 $12,773 0.37449259 11
W eb ste r 829 $3,877 $3,214,033 $14,459 0.72970646 56
W e s t B aton R o u g e 541 S4.470 $ 2 .4 1 8 2 7 0 $16,267 1.66166061 32
W e s t Carroll 284 53.877 51.101.068 $11,226 0.56442829 44
W e s t F e lic iana 306 $4,470 $1,367,820 $9,863 1.10901873 29
Winn 456 $3,877 $1,767,912 $12,734 0.68396981 51
City o1 M onroe 1586 $3,877 $6,148,922 $15,181 1.11009226 60
City of B o g a lu sa 509 $5,062 52.576.558 $12,773 0.70103439 19
(appen. con’d.)
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Disability Categories, Defimtions of Costs, and Weights For Model IV
Disability Category Definition o f  Cost Weight
Mild/Mental Retardec MMR) Supplemental 2.25
Speech Impaired (SI) Supplemental 2.25
Emotional/Behavior Disorder (ED) Supplemental 2.25
Learning Disabled (LD) Supplemental 2.25
Noncategorical Preschool (NC) Supplemental 2.25
D eaf(D ) Supplemental 2.25
Visuafly Impaired (VT) Supplemental 2.25
Orthopedic Impaired (01) Supplemental 2.25
Other Health Impaired (OHD Supplemental 2.25
Deaf/Blind (D-B) Supplemental 2.25
Multiple Handicapped (MH) Supplemental 2.25
Autism (A) Supplemental 2.25
Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) Supplenental 2.25
Educationally Handicapped (EH) Supplemental 2.25
Gifted and Talented (G  & T ) Supplemental 2.25
Levels o f  Per-Pupil Revenue
Funding Level Effort Rank Per-Pupil Revenue
Level 3 1-21 $5062
Level 2 22-43 $4470
Level I 44-66 $3877
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